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Abstract
Wildfire suppression remains an inherently dangerous yet increasingly
frequent task for fire services throughout Australia and the world. Each year
firefighters from career and volunteer agencies respond to wildfires that
impact the urban interface. When such an event occurs during a period of
intense fire behaviour the conditions are often incompatible with life for
persons either caught in the open or those seeking refuge in a vehicle. In
order to improve firefighter safety and operational effectiveness at the rural
urban interface (RUI) during landscape scale wildfires, this dissertation serves
to examine critical components of wildfire response, most notably wildfire
suppression strategies and tactics applied during a landscape scale wildfire
event and the procedures and protective systems utilised in the event of
firefighter entrapment and burnover.
The theme of the research is firefighter safety and suppression
effectiveness during mega-wildfire response at the rural urban interface (RUI),
also known as the wildland urban interface (WUI). Mega-wildfires are those
landscape wildfires that overwhelm firefighting resources, typically generate
their own localized weather systems, and require campaign style efforts
lasting extended durations. Wildfire events including Margaret River (2011),
and Yarloop (2016) in Western Australia, the devastating Californian and
Greece wildfires (2018) and the unprecedented wildfires throughout eastern
Australia in late 2019 / early 2020 meet this category. The RUI is the land where
towns and cities exist alongside forest and other vegetation that supports the
development of an established headfire with a quasi-steady rate of spread
(RoS) across the landscape. In such instances, firefighters are called on to
protect vulnerable communities and critical infrastructure from the ember
storms, radiant heat and flames that accompany the head fire. In doing so,
firefighters face great personal peril. If the incorrect suppression tactics or
strategies are applied, or if wildfire behaviour suddenly changes, firefighter
entrapment and burnover resulting in significant injury or fatality remains an
all too common consequence.
iv
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The studies not only quantify the severity of the conditions firefighters
encounter when attempting to protect life, property and the environment at
the RUI, but also find traditional wildfire suppression strategies and tactics at
the RUI need to be reexamined. Whilst the field of wildfire engineering is in
its infancy, the studies suggest its development and adoption into wildfire
suppression operations has the potential to improve both operational
effectiveness and firefighter safety.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1. Background to research
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies across Australia
respond to wildfires that impact the rural urban interface (RUI). When such
an event occurs during a period of intense fire behaviour the conditions are
often incompatible with life for persons either caught in the open or those
seeking refuge in a vehicle.

In order to improve firefighter safety and

operational effectiveness during wildfires, these studies serve to examine
critical components of wildfire response, identified through 14 years of the
lead researcher’s front line operational fire services and fire engineering
experience supported by over a decade of research in the field.
These components are the:
1. Wildfire fighting strategies and tactics applied during a landscape
scale wildfire event in the defense of the ; and
2. Procedures and protective systems utilised in the event of
entrapment and burnover.
Critically, the studies are designed to have practical benefits to fire services
and firefighters internationally, for wildfires are not suppressed by theory and
journal articles.

1.2. Thesis objectives
The research objectives of the thesis are as follows:
1. To explore the critical linkage between wildfire suppression,
firefighter safety and urban design;
2. To develop a fire engineering approach to the analysis of forest
and woodland wildfire suppression strategies that not only
compares international suppression thresholds, but considers
firefighter tenability as a key factor for determining the suitability of
suppression strategies;
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3. To provide guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to
firefighting strategies required to extinguish large wildfire across a
wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front
depths; and
4. To investigate the potential effectiveness of vehicle protection
systems (VPS) in reducing firefighter fatalities during wildfire
suppression:
a. When applied to historical firefighter entrapments and
burnovers resulting in firefighter fatality/ies from international
case studies; and
b. When applied to simulated wildfires designed to encompass
the 99th percentile of weather conditions and potential
wildfire behaviours.

1.3. Thesis structure
The thesis is presented in six chapters.
Chapter 1 is an introduction.
Chapter 2, The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering (the Handbook) has
been accepted for publication by the Bushfire & Natural Hazards CRC.
Each section of the Handbook is designed to build upon the previous,
providing a holistic approach to understanding vegetation and wildfire
basics before exploring evidence based wildfire suppression.

The critical

linkage between wildfire suppression, firefighter safety and urban design is
also explored.

Whilst the primary focus of the Handbook is wildfire

suppression, there are many aspects applicable to urban designers and
policy makers. These are summarized at the conclusion of each section. As
an engineering handbook, it is designed to be a standalone text, written in
an appropriate manner.

The Handbook comprises of a review of

international literature relating to wildfire suppression at the RUI; details each
of the studies completed as part of the dissertation; and provides firefighters,
engineers and town planners detailed technical approaches and analysis to
enhance the resilience of communities in areas prone to wildfire impacts,
2

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

and enhance the safety and effectiveness of wildfire suppression at the
urban interface during catastrophic wildfire conditions. In one sense, the
Handbook is in its own right, the publication of this doctoral thesis, with limited
aspects of the literature review pertaining to consideration of vegetation
structure in wildfire models, and risk management (sections 1 and 8 of the
Handbook) originating from studies as part of a MEng (Building Fire Safety &
Risk) through Victoria University in 2017 and MParamedScRes through Edith
Cowan University in 2016, and subsequent publications (Penney 2019; Penney
& Stevenson, 2019).

The significant majority of the Handbook (the

introduction; sections 1.7 and 1.8; full sections 2 to 7; section 8.6 and 8.7; and
all of section 9) are completely new works for this dissertation. None of the
studies presented in Chapters 3 to 7 of this dissertation have been previously
submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education.
Chapter 2 includes the full literature review, conclusions and directions for
future work in the field. Chapter 2 is presented as it has been submitted for
publication by the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research
Center, however it has been reformatted in the style of this thesis. Reference
formatting has been retained in the publication style for which the work has
been submitted. Chapters 3 to 6 have been written as manuscripts for
publication in their own right and so some repetition will be evident.
Chapter 3 examines firefighter tenability and its influence on siege wildfire
suppression through two separate studies. International literature and fire
service doctrine was reviewed to establish wildfire suppression thresholds.
The first study involved analysis of headfire RoS, fire line intensity (I) and flame
length (LF) using McArthur and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model (DEFFM)
empirical

models

was

deterministically

compared

to

documented

thresholds. The second study involved empirical wildfire behaviour and
radiant heat modelling completed in accordance with the methodology
detailed in AS3959 Annexure B. Radiant heat flux as a function of separation
distance at 5 m increments from 0-100 m from the head fire front was
calculated for each scenario with the results deterministically assessed
3
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against the defined tenability criteria.

Reference formatting has been

retained in the publication style for which the work has been submitted.
Chapter 4 investigates the prediction of water suppression requirements
and its impacts on firefighting strategies and logistics in the realm of wildfire
suppression. It provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to critical
water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of
forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. This is achieved
through mathematical empirical analysis of water flow rates required for
head fire suppression during simulated wildfires in forest vegetation.
Reference formatting has been retained in the publication style for which the
work has been submitted.
Chapter 5 investigates the effectiveness of wildfire vehicle suppression
systems on firefighter tenability during entrapment and burnover. Accident
investigation reports of firefighter fatalities from wildfire entrapment and
burnovers in the USA, Australia and New Zealand between 1979 to 2020 were
studied. Additionally, wildfire simulation using two separate empirical models
was completed across a broad spectrum of forest fuel loads and up to the
99th percentile of fire weather conditions in Australia. The results were
deterministically compared to defined firefighting vehicle protection system
(VPS) fire line intensity and radiant heat flux thresholds.

Reference

formatting has been retained in the publication style for which the work has
been submitted.
Chapter 6 proposes the Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) to assist
Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) analyse critical information and
calculate required versus available safe RUI firefighter preparation time. Case
studies representative of historical wildfire events are presented to
demonstrate how the RUIM can be utilised by IMT to reduce the potential risk
of firefighter injuries and fatalities. Reference formatting has been retained
in the publication style for which the work has been submitted.
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Chapter 2 – The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M., Richardson, R. (in
press). The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering. Bushfire and Natural Hazards
Cooperative Research Centre, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia.

Foreward
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies across Australia
respond to wildfires that impact the urban interface. When such an event
occurs during a period of intense fire behaviour the conditions are often
incompatible with life for persons either caught in the open or those seeking
refuge in a vehicle. In order to improve firefighter safety and operational
effectiveness during landscape scale wildfires, as well as providing sound
engineering guidance to improve community resilience to wildfire impacts,
this text book serves to examine critical components of wildfire response,
identified through 14 years of the lead researcher’s front line operational fire
services and fire engineering experience supported by over a decade of
research in the field. These components are the wildfire fighting strategies
and tactics applied during a landscape scale wildfire event; the procedures
and protective systems utilised in the event of burnover; operational risk
management; and wildfire resilient urban design. The Handbook of Wildfire
Engineering (the Handbook) provides firefighters, engineers and town
planners detailed technical approaches and analysis to enhance the
resilience of communities in areas prone to wildfire impacts, and enhance
the safety and effectiveness of wildfire suppression at the urban interface
during catastrophic wildfire conditions.
Each chapter of the Handbook is designed to build upon the previous,
providing a holistic approach to understanding vegetation and wildfire
basics before exploring evidence based wildfire suppression.

The critical

linkage between wildfire suppression, firefighter safety and urban design is
also explored.

Whilst the primary focus of the Handbook is wildfire
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suppression, there are many aspects applicable to urban designers and
policy makers. These are summarized at the conclusion of each section.
During the preparation of this book, Australia was suffering from
catastrophic wildfires on both the west and east coasts and tragically civilians
and firefighters alike were injured or killed. The lead author was deployed as
a Strike Team Leader from Western Australia and was tasked with wildfire
suppression and property defense near Walcha, NSW. In addition to his own
local experiences in Margaret River in 2011 and Yarloop 2016, during the 2019
NSW deployment he witnessed first-hand the devastating effects of wildfire
on firefighters and the communities, survived near miss entrapments and
nights spent on the fireground cut off by fire behaviour and falling trees. This
book is dedicated to all those affected by wildfires, particularly for the
firefighters of all backgrounds and jurisdictions who put themselves in harm’s
way to protect life, property and the environment.

May the guidance

provided in this book help firefighters return safely to their loved ones and
provide enhanced protection of communities in wildfire prone areas.

About the Authors
Greg Penney is the primary author. With 14 years’ experience as a career
urban and wildland firefighter / officer in Western Australia (in both
metropolitan and country commands), amongst other qualifications he holds
a MEng (Building Fire Safety & Risk), MParamedScRes (Risk), GDip Bushfire
Protection

and

Bachelor

of

Science.

During

the

devastating

Waroona/Yarloop wildfires of 2016, Greg received a commendation for
distinguished service and outstanding actions in leading the defense of
Preston Beach facing catastrophic wildfire conditions. The Handbook builds
upon his two existing dissertations and serves as part of his current PhD by
publication “Wildfire suppression in Australian forest fuel structures at the
urban interface – a quantitative analysis.” As a subject matter expert, Greg
authored the Fire Protection Association of Australia (FPAA’s) Bushfire
Protection and Design Accreditation (BPAD) Level 1 course and has
7

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

previously consulted in the field to the Western Australian branches of Master
Builders Australia (MBA), Australian Institute of Building Surveyors (AIBS),
Australian Institute of Architects (AIA) and Department of Planning (DoP). In
his current fire service role Greg leads the development and delivery of
Incident Management training, including strategic and tactical fire and
rescue response across a large range of hazards including wildfire, urban fire,
rescue and Hazardous Materials.

Greg is not only a highly qualified

researcher in the field of wildfire engineering and suppression, he is also a
decorated firefighter with extensive experience in both planning and
engineering in areas prone to wildfire impacts.
Professor Daryoush Habibi is the Executive Dean of Engineering at Edith
Cowan University. Professor Habibi is a professional engineer with 27 years of
experience in industry and academia. Prior to his appointment as the Dean
of Engineering, he was the Head of School of Engineering from 2006 to 2015,
during which time he initiated and led a program of rapid growth in ECU’s
engineering

portfolio, making his School the fastest growing engineering

school in the nation. His other professional experience includes Telstra
Research Laboratories, Flinders University, and Intelligent Pixels Inc., where he
served as Vice-President Engineering. Professor Habibi holds the degrees of
Bachelor of Engineering (Hons) and Doctor of Philosophy, both from the
University of Tasmania. He is a Fellow of Engineers Australia, and a Fellow of
the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology.

Professor

Habibi is one of Greg’s PhD supervisors and is credited for his review and
contribution to the Handbook.
Dr Marcus Cattani is a Senior Lecturer in Occupational Health and Safety
at Edith Cowan University. Dr. Marcus Cattani has worked as an academic,
occupational hygienist, HSE Manager and consultant in the chemical,
manufacturing, engineering and resources industries since 1988. Marcus is
passionate about improving the management of injury risk to an acceptable
level, and assisting organisations develop the risk management partnerships
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required to achieve this.

Dr. Cattani’s research focusses on the

development of educational materials to assist organisations understand
and manage risk, and, the development of processes to measure risk. Marcus
is the Chair of the WA Branch of the Safety Institute of Australia, a member of
the ECU Sustainability in Education Committee, attends the Chamber of
Minerals and Energy OSH Committee, sits on the ECU Vice Chancellors HSE
Awards Committee, and the School OHS Committee. Dr Cattani is one of
Greg’s PhD supervisors and is credited for his review and contribution to the
Handbook.
Dr Steven Richardson contributed to Section 3 – Modelling wildfire radiant
heat flux, and is credited with the alternate view factor equations to AS3959.
Steven Richardson is a Senior Lecturer at Edith Cowan University. He
completed a PhD in Applied Mathematics in 2007 at The University of Western
Australia. His research interests are broadly in mathematical modelling,
having been involved in projects related to optimal control, asset
management, bush fires, traffic, aviation and optics.

Section 1 – Wildfire fuels
Candidature note: Section 1 – Wildfire fuels, subsections 1.1 to 1.6 are
declared as originally being submitted as part of the lead author’s MEng
dissertation, subsequently published in Penney and Stevenson (2019).

1.1. Introduction
For

frontline

firefighters,

fire

behaviour

specialists

and

Incident

Management Teams alike, understanding how vegetation type and
structure affects wildfire behaviour is critical to the planning and execution
of safe and successful suppression strategies.

Just as important is the

understanding of how vegetation is represented in the empirical and physics
based models used to predict wildfire spread. During mega-wildfires that
occur in catastrophic fire weather conditions, wildfire behaviour through
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vegetation of even moderate density may be near impossible to suppress.
Conversely, over or under representing fuel structure and density when
completing wildfire behaviour predictions may result in fire behaviour being
incorrectly quantified and inappropriate suppression strategies being
recommended.
For urban planners and decision makers reviewing planning applications
at the Rural Urban Interface, including those using AS3959 Construction of
buildings in bushfire prone areas (SAI Global, 2018) and the relevant bushfire
planning guidelines in each jurisdiction, it is equally as important to
understand how vegetation contributes to wildfire behaviour.

When

considering the benefits and costs of development in Bushfire Prone Areas,
misunderstanding

the

vegetation

related

limitations

and

inherent

assumptions of Deemed To Satisfy (DTS) or simplified planning / construction
standards and guidelines can have significant and costly impacts. Whilst
under calculating wildfire behaviour and impacts may result in avoidable loss
of life (of both the public and the firefighters who defend them) and property,
inappropriate identification of fuel structures and resultant calculation of
potential wildfire behaviour can stifle safe and appropriate development
and lead to unnecessary expenditure of potentially hundreds of thousands
of dollars in over engineering and redundant infrastructure.
This section explores how vegetation structure not only contributes to
wildfire behaviour, but also how it is represented in the models used to predict
it on both the fireground and in the urban planning context. It should be
considered the introductory preparation for firefighters as it represents the first
step in “knowing the enemy”.

1.2. Vegetation structure
Wildfire fuel is the vegetation consumed by a fire burning in vegetation
regardless of the size of the fire itself. The term wildfire fuel applies to
vegetation involved in a 10m2 fire in the same manner as the vegetation
involved in a 100,000m2 wildfire.

Often referred to as fuel load, wildfire fuel
10
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is defined by its physical structure and density. The extent to which fuel load
needs to be defined is dependent on the model used to predict wildfire
behaviour. In order to demystify the concept of wildfire fuels this section first
discusses the concept of fuel load and subsequently discusses how this is
considered within common empirical and physics based wildfire models.
Understanding the classification of wildfire fuels and how they are
represented in wildfire modelling is the first stage of interpreting modelling
outputs and their application in assessing the suitability of wildfire suppression
strategies, construction requirements and land use planning decisions.

1Figure 1.1: Fuel load by strata

As detailed in Figure 1.1, four main fuel strata layers and the bark layer are
considered (Hines et al., 2010; Gould et al., 2007) when describing wildfire
fuels. These are canopy; elevated; near-surface; and surface fuels as well
as the bark.

The height of each layer is not considered in the forest,

woodland or grass fuel empirical models of Australian Standard 3959 –
11
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Construction of buildings in bushfire-prone areas (subsequently referred to as
AS3959) 1 but is relevant for heath or scrub fuels and the empirical model of
(Gould et al., 2007).

Each layer and description are provided in the list

below:
1. Canopy fuel is contained in the forest crown. The crown
encompasses the leaves and fine twigs of the tallest layer of trees
in a forest or woodland. Crown involvement may lead to erratic
and extreme fire behaviour and contributes to spotting distances.
2. Elevated fuel includes shrubs, scrub, and juvenile understory plants
up to 2–3m in height, however, canopy of heights less than 4m can
be included when there is no identifiable separation between the
canopy and lower shrubs. The individual fuel components
generally have an upright orientation and may be highly variable
in ground coverage. Elevated fuels influence the flame height and
rate of spread of a fire whilst also contributing to crown
involvement by providing vertical fuel structure.
3. Near-surface fuels include grasses, low shrubs, and heath,
sometimes containing suspended components of leaves, bark,
and twigs. This layer can vary from a few centimeters to up to 0.6m
in height. Near-surface fuel components include a mixture of
orientations from horizontal to vertical. This layer may be continuous
or have large gaps in ground coverage and influences both the
rate of spread of a fire and flame height.
4. Surface fuel includes leaves, twigs, and bark on the forest floor.
Surface fuel (or litter) components are generally horizontally
1

Introduced after the devastating 2009 Victorian Bushfires, AS3959 not only

details the construction enhancements to the Buliding Code of Australia in
order to enhance a dwelling’s resilience to wildfire impacts, it also details the
methodology and equations for calculating wildfire radiant heat flux across
all Australian vegetation structures.

Bushfire is the Australian colloquial

equivalent of the term ‘wildfire’.
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layered. Surface fuel usually contributes the greatest to fuel
quantity and includes the partly decomposed fuel (duff) on the soil
surface. This fuel layer influences the rate of spread of a fire and
flame depth as well as contributing to the establishment of a fire
post initial ignition.
5. Bark fuel is the flammable bark on tree trunks and upper branches
that contributes to transference of surface fires into the canopy,
embers and firebrands, and subsequent spot fires.
The consideration of Vegetation Height is only considered in the empirical
models of shrubland, scrub and heath fuel structures and the dry eucalypt
forest fire model (DEFFM) of Gould et al. (2007). The effects of vegetation
height on fire line intensity and flame length are discussed in the following
section of this report. For treed structures, whilst vegetation height has some
bearing on the deemed fuel loads assigned within AS3959, it is not considered
in the empirical model itself.

For grasslands structure, the effect of

vegetation height is not considered in any form in AS3959.
The “Framework for an Australian fuel classification to support wildfire
management” (Hollis et al., 2015) provides enhanced taxonomy for fuel
classification with greater emphasis on fuel attributes (composition,
geometry,

density

and

physical

aspects)

within

each

stratum.

Unfortunately the corresponding fuel load data sets and attributes for each
stratum remain the subject of potential future research. The full potential of
the framework may also be limited by empirical wildfire models which
consider binominal fuel structure (understory and total) as opposed to
incorporating the detailed fuel load data presented by (Hollis et al., 2015).
Appropriate definition and consideration of wildfire fuel is essential as it
directly affects calculated wildfire outputs including head fire rate of spread,
fire line intensity, flame height and radiant heat outputs. The manner and
detail with which wildfire fuel is considered is largely dependent on the model
applied. The forward Rate of Spread (RoS) and intensity of an active front
of a fire, known as the head fire, is dependent on the fuel available for
13
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consumption in the active flaming front (Alexander, 1982; Alexander & Cruz,
2016). This is incorporated into existing empirical wildfire models of AS3959
through the consideration of available fuels within a 1ha assessment area,
representative of the active fire area directly behind the head fire. Typically
driven by wind direction, the head fire is the main component of a wildfire
contributing to the RoS and fire behaviour intensity. Subsequently, it is the
focus when calculating radiant heat flux for the purposes of determining the
appropriate standard of bushfire resilient residential construction in AS3959.
In landscape scale wildfire scenarios, being those greater than 1ha, the 1ha
area of assessment falls within the greater active fire area, whilst in sublandscape scale wildfire scenarios the active fire area instead falls within the
1ha assessment area. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.

(a)

(b)

2Figure 1.2. (a) Landscape scale wildfire scenario; and (b) sub-landscape scale wildfire
scenario.

1.3. Consideration of wildfire fuel in empirical models
Wildfire fuels are represented in empirical models through numerical inputs
in wildfire behaviour equations including Rate of Spread (RoS), fire line
intensity (I) and flame length (Lf). AS3959 (cB3) states the appropriate surface
14

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

(understory) fuel load (w) and overall fuel load (W) must be determined and
that “both the understory and the canopy should be considered in the
assessment. The rate of spread for forest fires should be determined using the
understory fuel loads. Flame heights should be determined on the basis of
both the combined understory and canopy fuels (overall fuel loads) for forest
fires.” Further, AS3959 (c1.5.27) defines the understory as “the vegetation
beneath the overstory” whilst AS3959 (c1.5.20) defines the overstory as “the
canopy, being the tallest stratum of the vegetation profile.” This two layered
classification of fuel load requires the surface fuel load to also incorporate all
fuel layers below the canopy as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Mathematically this broadly assumes that despite the complex structure
and geometry of fuel below the canopy, all fuel below the canopy will
contribute to fire behaviour as a single fuel unit, resulting in the assumption of
cell dimensions for treed fuel structures illustrated in Figure 1.33.

Cell

dimensions for all other fuel structures are identified in Figure 1.4 and consider
understory and total fuel load as the same value.

3Figure 1.3: Cell dimensions treed fuel structures

15
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4Figure 1.4: Cell dimensions non-treed fuel structures – scrub, shrub and grassland

This two layered mathematical simplification does not necessarily provide
true consideration of the influence of the fuel layers and their contribution to
wildfire behaviour, especially where fires occur in small pockets of vegetation
that do not support the development of a 100m head fire (detailed in section
2.2.3 of this report). Greater consideration of the impact of wildfire fuels by
strata on wildfire behaviour is considered in Hines et al. (2010) and Gould et
al. (2007), however when applied to the models identified in AS3959, the two
layered fuel load classification requires fuel loads to be simplified back to
understory and total fuel density only. The alternative lies in developing new
empirical models that have greater consideration of fuel strata or using
physics based models discussed later in this report.

Despite significant variance in fuel structure between vegetation species
throughout Australia, only four empirical models are suggested in AS3959 to
quantify wildfire behaviour. These empirical approaches consist of a wildfire
behaviour model enabling calculation of the physical parameters of wildfire
behaviour (each model unique to the classification of vegetation structure);
and separate view factor model, otherwise known as configuration factor,
which details the calculation of the receiving body’s resultant radiant heat
flux (the same view factor model is used regardless of vegetation structure
and resultant fire behaviour). Each of these models assume that all wildfire
16
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has attained a quasi-steady rate of spread (RoS) and are of landscape
proportions.
The six wildfire behaviour models detailed in AS3959 are:
1. Noble et al (1980) used for all treed fuel structures subsequently
classified as Group A Forest, Group B Woodland and Group F
Rainforest;
2. Cruz et al (2013)

shrub, scrub and heath vegetation structures

subsequently classified as Group C Shrub, D Scrub and E
Mallee/Mulga;
3. Purton, (1982) for grassland fuel structures subsequently classified as
Group G Grassland;
4. Marsden-Smedley et al (1995) for Tussock Moorland subsequently
classified as Group H Grassland specific to Tasmania.
Alternate models that may be also be suitable are:
1. Forest & Woodlands - Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model or DEFFM
(Gould et al, 2007);
2. Anderson et al (2015) for scrub and heath vegetation structures;
and
3. Cheney et al (1998) for various vegetation within the identified
Rangelands geographical areas
The empirical models are reliant on prescribed fuel load densities measured
in tonnes per hectare which equates to large cell sizes of a minimum 1ha land
area (fuel height may vary).

Further, AS3959 prescribes set fuel load

densities for each vegetation structure regardless of the actual geometry of
the vegetation involved in the wildfire or the amount of vegetation
consumed during the fire scenario. This results in fires burning through small
areas of vegetation being modelled as landscape scale fires as opposed to
scenario specific heat release rates that consider the geometry and volume
of the fuel consumed.

Subsequently the use of landscape scale models

detailed in AS3959 for predicting sub-landscape scale fires (road reserves,
17
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verges, landscaped gardens, vegetation adjacent to rivers etc.) or where
there is restricted fire run potential, limited fuel loads are consumed or
substantial boundary walls are present, may not be appropriate as currently
applied and may significantly over estimate radiant heat flux.
Defining fuel load and structure is perhaps the most critical input of existing
empirical models.

It not only determines which mathematical model is

applied, each model being specific to a broad vegetation type (AS3959;
Noble, Bary & Gill, 1980; Catchpole et al, 1998; Marsden-Smedley &
Catchpole, 1995), but when used for determining construction standards for
buildings in wildfire prone areas, it also determines which prescribed fuel load
is assigned.

The vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour

model are detailed in Table 1.1.
1Table 1.1. Vegetation descriptors with fuel load and fire behaviour model (adapted from
AS3959, Table 2.3).
Fire Behaviour
Model

Vegetation

Vegetation Type

Description

Assigned

Classification

fuel load
(t/ha)

• Trees over 30m high;
• 30-70% foliage cover (may
include

understory

ranging

Tall open forest

from rainforest and tree ferns to

Tall woodland

low trees and tall shrubs);
• Found in areas of high reliable
rainfall. Typically dominated by
eucalypts.
• Trees 10-30m high;

Noble et al/
Note: DEFFM is also

A

suitable as an

Forest

alternative

• 30-70% foliage cover (may
Open forest
Low open forest

include

understory

of

sclerophyllous low trees and
tall scrubs or grass).
• Typically

dominated

by

eucalypts.
• Trees

10-30m

in

height

at

maturity;
Pine plantation

• Generally
species

comprising
or

other

Pinus

softwood

species, planted as a single
18
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species for the production of
timber.
• Trees 10-30m high;
• 30-70% foliage cover (may
Woodland
Open woodland

include

understory

of

sclerophyllous low trees and
tall scrubs or grass).
• Typically

dominated

by

eucalypts.
• Low trees and shrubs 2-10m
high;
B
Noble et al /

Woodland

• Foliage cover less than 10%.

w = 15

• Dominated by eucalypts and

W = 25

Acacia.

Note: DEFFM is also
suitable as an

Low woodland

alternative

Low open woodland
Open shrubland

Often have a grassy

understory
Acacias

or

low

and

shrubs.

Casuarina

woodlands grade to Atriplex
shrublands in the arid and
semi-arid zones;
• Low

open

woodland

is

classified on the basis of the
understory present.
• Found in wet areas and/or
areas affected by poor soil
fertility or shallow soils.
• Shrubs
Closed heath
Open heath

1-2m

high

often

comprising Banksia, Acacia,
Hakea and Grevilea.
• Wet heaths occur in sands
adjoining dunes of the littoral

Catchpole et al

C

(shore) zone. Montane heaths

w = 15

Shrubland

occur on shallow or water

W = 25

logged soils.
• Shrubs <2m high;
• greater

than

30%

foliage

cover.
Low shrubland

• Understory

may

grasses.

Acacia

contain
and

Casuarina often dominant in
the arid and semi-arid zones.
Catchpole et al

D
Scrub

• Found in wet areas and/or
Closed scrub

areas affected by poor soil
fertility or shallow soils;
19
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• >30% foliage cover.
• Dry heaths occur in rocky
areas.
• Shrubs >2m high.
• Typical of coastal wetlands
and tall heaths
• Shrubs greater than 2m high;
Open scrub

• 10-30% foliage cover with a
mixed species combination
• Vegetation

dominated

by

shrubs (especially eucalypts
and acacias) with a multistemmed habit;

E
Catchpole et al

Mallee /

Tall shrubland

Malga

•

usually greater than 2m in
height;

w=8
W=8

• <30% foliage cover.
• Understory of widespread to
dense low shrubs (acacias) or
sparse grasses.

Noble et al

F
Rainforest

>90% foliage cover;

Tall closed forest

•

Closed forest

• understory

Low closed forest

may

contain

a

large number of species with a
variety of heights;

w = 10
W = 12

• Not dominated by eucalypts
Purton

G
Grassland

All forms, including situations with shrubs and trees, if the

w = 4.5

overstory foliage cover is less than 10%

W = 4.5

Tussock Moorland
Marsden-Smedley

H

et al

Grassland

• All forms of vegetation where
the overstory is dominated by
the

species

Buttongrass.

Only occurs as a significant
vegetation type in Tasmania.

Some of the confusion regarding wildfire fuel can be attributed to the
multiple inconsistencies between the qualitative and pictorial descriptions of
the classifications of vegetation in AS3959 and the quantified inputs such as
vegetation height and foliage cover used in the calculations (AS3959; DOP,
2016; FPA, 2016). Several of the more significant inconsistencies that cause
confusion regarding wildfire fuels are summarised in Table 1.2.
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2Table 1.2: Discrepancies of fuel classification in AS3959
Discrepancy in Fuel Classification in AS3959

Effect on Empirical Modelling

requires

This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface

classification of treed vegetation structures on

fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A

the basis of foliage cover (defined as the

(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha)

proportion of the ground that would be shaded

vegetation structures.

Table

2.3,

Figures

2.3

and

2.4

by foliage when the sun is shining directly
overhead, expressed as a percentage for each

In the case of confusion between Group B

stratum or identifiable layer of vegetation

Woodlands and Group B Open Woodlands, the

[AS3959, c1.5.17]):

incorrect empirical model being applied for

•

30-70% for Group A Forest

Group C Shrubland, Group D Scrub or Group G

•

10-30% for Group B Woodland

Grassland understories.

•

10-30% for Group B Open Woodland
(subsequently classified on the basis

These discrepancies can ultimately result in

of the understory vegetation)

significantly different fire engineering outputs
including flame angle, view factor and radiant

Table B2 identifies the same amount of wildfire

heat flux as shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6.

fuel above the surface strata (being 10t/ha) for
both Forest and Woodland vegetation structures
regardless of foliage cover.
Figure 2.4(B) illustrates Open Woodland as being
a single tree in a field, however the suggested
foliage cover may be interpreted as 30%, the
same as that required for Group A Forest.
Figures 2.4(A) and 2.4(B) illustrate significant
overlap between understory fuel structures as
densities with an almost total absence of
understory

fuel

for

the

Low

Open

Forest

classification.
Table 2.3 Note 2 states “Overstorys of open
woodland, low open woodland, tall open
shrubland and low open shrubland should be
classified to the vegetation type on the basis of
their understorys; others to be classified on the
basis of their overstorys.”
Table

2.3 “Tall woodland” has the

same

This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface

qualitative description and classification as

fuel load for Group B Woodland (15t/ha) as

Group A Forest resulting in wildfire modelling
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reflective of Group A Forest fire behaviour as

opposed to the greater Group A Forest (25t/ha)

opposed to reflecting the reduced understory

being applied.

fuel structure that defines ‘woodland’ wildfire
fuels.

These discrepancies can ultimately result in
significantly different fire engineering outputs as
shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6.
requires

This discrepancy can result in incorrect surface

classification of all treed vegetation greater than

fuel load inputs being utilised between Group A

10m in height and a foliage cover in excess of

(25t/ha), Group B (15t/ha) and Group F (10t/ha)

90% to be classified as Group F Rainforest

vegetation structures.

Table

2.3,

Figures

2.3

and

2.4

regardless of climate or species.
Wildfire behaviour through dense Eucalypt forest
matching the descriptions in AS3959 Table 2.3
and AS3959 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 will consume
significant fuels and result in the highest
magnitude of wildfire intensity.
Empirical modelling using the Group F Rainforest
fuel loads will significantly underestimate radiant
heat flux where treed fuel structures are dense
and significant.
For modelling the effect is variable fuel load
inputs which result in significantly different
engineering outputs as shown in figures 1.4 to 1.6.
Table 2.3 describes Group C Shrubland as shrub

The variance in qualitative descriptions of

vegetation less than 2m in height potentially with

vegetation height from that of the empirical

foliage cover greater than 30% whilst Group D

inputs result in potential discrepancy between

Scrub is identified as shrub vegetation greater

vegetation classification and calculated wildfire

than 2m in height, potentially with foliage cover

behaviour.

greater than 30%

description between “shrub and “heath” may

The discrepancy in fuel type

introduce further confusion.
Table B2 defines the vegetation height for Group

This inconsistancy can result in incorrect surface

C Shrubland as 1.5m and the vegetation height

fuel load inputs being utilised between Group C

for Group D Scrub and Group E Mallee Mulga as

(15t/ha), Group D (25t/ha) vegetation structures.

3m.

It can also result in the incorrect vegetation

B2 identifies the ‘fuel type’ for all three

classifications as “Shrub and Heath.”

height input being used.
These inconsistencies can ultimately result in
significantly different fire engineering outputs as
shown in figures 1.7 to 1.10.
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Using Figures 1.5a-1.5b as a case scenario, the ambiguity surrounding fuel
classification using the qualitative descriptions in AS3959 become apparent.
The vegetation structure in the case scenario could arguably be considered
Group A - Low Open Forest or Group B – Open Woodland as the foliage
cover, defined as the “proportion of the ground that would be shaded by
foliage when the sun is directly overhead, expressed as a percentage of
each stratum or identifiable layer of vegetation” (AS3959, c1.5.17), exceeds
30%. Further, the surface and near surface fuel layer do not clearly fit the
description for either category and arguably does not satisfy the definition of
minimal fuel condition, defined as “insufficient fuel to significantly increase
the severity of wildfire attack (recognizable as short-cropped grass for
example, to a nominal height of 100mm)” (AS3959, c2.2.3.2(f)) required to be
considered low threat vegetation and excluded from consideration for
calculation of wildfire impacts in accordance with AS3959.
The effect of these variable fuel load inputs for the scenario examined
results in significantly different wildfire outputs as shown in Figures 4 to 10. The
outputs detailed were calculated using the detailed methodology detailed
in AS3959; assuming flat site and effective slopes; and standard inputs of
AS3959 appropriate to each fuel classification.

5Figure 1.5. (a) Case study; and (b) Case study surface fuel.
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In accordance with the vegetation descriptions provided in AS3959 the
vegetative fuel in the case study could be qualitatively classified as being
Group A Forest, Group B Woodland or Group F Rainforest (being low closed
forest) depending on the individual assessor.

Whilst the same empirical

model (McArthur) is applied to each of these vegetation structures, the
associated assigned fuel loads vary significantly. A result is the fire behaviour
outputs and subsequent radiation modelling outputs are vastly different as
illustrated in Figures 6-12.

Subsequently, the associated construction

responses required under the Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 2015) for a
typical residence could vary by over a hundred thousand dollars (FPA, 2016)
and result in significant over engineering in situations where landscape scale
fire behaviour is not possible.

These inconsistencies also facilitate the

opportunity for consultants and home owners alike to underestimate
potential wildfire impact in order to reduce construction costs, leaving houses
potentially vulnerable where landscape scale wildfire impacts occur. This
subsequently highlights the need for comprehensive understanding of
wildfire engineering with greater analysis of fuel loads where landscape scale
fire behaviour is not possible, typically within the urban and peri-urban area,
as opposed to blind reliance on the broad qualitative descriptions and
simplified radiant heat flux tables detailed in AS3959.
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6Figure 1.6.

Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel

structures
Class A Forest

Class B Woodland

Class F Rainforest

1.20

View factor

1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0

4

8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 100

Separation from head fire (m)
7Figure 1.7.

View factor as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed fuel

structures
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Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison – treed

fuel structures
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9Figure 1.9.

Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison –

Woodland and open woodland structures (open woodland modelling based on the
understory structure)
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Flame angle as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub,

scrub and grassland structures
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View factor as a function of separation from head fire comparison – shrub,

scrub and grassland
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Radiant heat flux as a function of separation from head fire comparison –

shrub, scrub and grassland

Two of the aims of Project Vesta, perhaps the most significant research
project into fire behaviour through dry eucalypt forest of recent times, were
to (Gould et al., 2007, piii):
i.

develop new algorithms describing the relationship between
fire spread and wind speed, and fire spread and fuel
characteristics including load, structure and height; and
ii.
develop a fuel hazard assessment guide that provides
quantitative description of fuel hazard and its effects on fire
behaviour.
The published results have subsequently been adapted to other jurisdictions
including Victoria (Hines et al., 2007) and South Australia (DENR, 2011).
Unlike the two layered

fuel structure incorporated by the models

suggested in AS3959, the dry eucalypt model of Gould et al. (2007) considers
three fuel layers contributing to head fire rate of spread being surface, nearsurface and elevated fuels (illustrated in Figure 1, with bark fuels being used
to estimate potential spotting distances. Using the approach of Gould et al.
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(2007) fuels in each strata are assigned hazard scores based on qualitative
descriptions and the assessor’s inspection. If the approach of Gould et al.
(2007) is used, fuel loads are first assigned hazard ratings which are then
converted to the required hazard scores shown in Table 1.3.
3Table 1.3. Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al., 2007, Table 9.3, reproduced with
permission from L.McCaw on behalf of CSIRO and the Department Environment and
Conservation)
Vesta Fuel Hazard Score
Fuel Hazard Rating

Surface

Near-surface

Elevated

Bark

Low

1

1

1

0

Moderate

2

2

2

1

High

3

3

3

2

Very High

3.5

3.5

3.5

3

Extreme

4

4

4

4

The assigned scores are subsequently 29tilized in the head fire rate of
spread equation (see Section 2). The approach of Gould et al. (2007) not
only provides greater consideration of wildfire fuel structure than the
empirical methods detailed in AS3959, but also provides a guide to potential
spotting behaviour resulting from fire brands. Specific to dry eucalypt forest
with litter and shrub understory, Gould et al., (2007) does not allow assessment
of fuel loads or fire modelling in woodland, shrub, or grassland fuel structures.
Perhaps the main benefit of Gould et al. (2007) is the ability to vary fuel loads
on the basis of ground truthing and field interrogation, even if this is somewhat
subjective and constrained by the assumptions of 100m head fire width and
sufficient vegetation geometry to sustain landscape scale wildfire behaviour.
The calculated rates of spread and flame heights from the model can
theoretically be combined with the view factor model of AS3959 to calculate
radiant heat flux, however there is no evidence within the literature to support
one approach over the other.
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1.4. Consideration of sub-landscape scale vegetation
geometry
Within the urban environment, wildfire growth in road reserves, urban
parklands, and similar scenarios can be restricted by the geometry of the
available fuel beds. Current approaches of AS3959 suggest modification of
the head fire width may be appropriate in these instances. However, whilst
the width of the head fire is a vital component in determining radiant heat
flux, head fire widths greater than 40m resulted in negligible differences
between the view factor and radiant heat flux within 30m of the flame front
(Penney, 2017). Through analysis of heat release rates, the same study
identified that reduction of head fire width alone without further
consideration of fuel bed geometry was not suitable in scenarios where the
fuel bed geometry restricted fire growth. It was subsequently identified that:
1. Regardless of the actual geometry and coverage of fuel within the
assessment area, AS3959 assumes landscape scale wildfire
behaviour with a 100% homogenous fuel loading within the
assessment area and a head fire width of 100m;
2. When fuel bed geometry prevents a 100m head fire or quasisteady RoS being obtained, failure to adjust wildfire fuel inputs
may result in significant overestimation of wildfire impact,
particularly radiant heat flux; and
3. In order to more accurately model wildfires in fuel beds that restrict
fire growth, it is necessary to calculate available fuel loads that will
contribute to fire behaviour over the area being assessed using the
vegetation availability factor equation as described below.
As previously published (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), whilst the head fire
flame width should be considered as the width of the continuous fuel
contributing to the active fire front, the area covered by potential fuel load
available for contribution to the RoS and intensity of the active fire as a
fraction of the total assessment area is defined as the vegetation availability
factor (VF), given by
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𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 =

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚2 )
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚2 )

(1.1)

where the fuel cell area is the coverage of vegetation present within a 100
m by 100 m assessment area directly in front of the receiving body. The
available surface fuel load wA (t/ha), and the available total fuel load WA
(t/ha), are then defined as
and

𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 = 𝑤𝑤 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 𝑊𝑊 × 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹

(1.2)

(1.3)

where 𝑤𝑤 and 𝑊𝑊 are respectively the surface fuel load and total fuel load
sourced from relevant jurisdictional data sets.

The calculated fuel loads can then be applied to the relevant fire
behaviour equations of RoS , fire line intensity, and flame length for the
purposes of determining the suitability of wildfire fighting strategies and
tactics or for calculating the radiant heat flux on receiving bodies in the path
of the head fire. Where models do not consider the fuel load when
calculating RoS , the vegetation availability factor can still be applied for the
purposes of calculating radiant heat flux, fire line, and intensity.

Where individual vegetation or small vegetation beds are present that
would result in an isolated fire but would not facilitate the type of fire
propagation present during wildfire events, it is appropriate to model those
instances accordingly. This is discussed in further in Section 2.

1.5. Consideration of wildfire fuel in physics based modelling
As opposed to empirical models derived from statistical data, physics
based wildfire modelling involve computational models that considers
interaction of atmosphere, fire and vegetative fuel using partial differential
equations to solve for filtered fire spread. Physics based models predict the
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wind flow through and above the fuel strata, incorporates ‘chemical kinetics’
to describe the drying and pyrolysis and simplified combustion equation to
predict combustion of the vegetation in defined time steps.
Significantly more complex than empirical approaches, physics based
models such as Firestar require both atmospheric quantities and vegetation
inputs (Finney & McAllister, 2011; Pimont et al., 2006) to be defined on a two
or three-dimensional spatial grid. Some models including the Wildland Fire
Dynamic Simulator (WFDS) allows the resolution of the grid to be altered to
suit the specific scenario with fine grid sizes as small as 1.6m x 1.6m x 1.4m
(Pimont et al., 2006), allowing vegetation structures and fires of almost all
scales to be modelled. This enables enhanced analysis of potential wildfire
behaviour compared to traditional empirical models by accounting for each
mechanism of heat transfer (conduction, convection and radiation) (Porterie
et al., 2005; Finney & McAllister, 2011; Finney et al., 2015) but subsequently
requires powerful computers and extended analysis durations (Cruz et al.,
2014).

Whilst the use of physics based models is widely accepted in

traditional fire engineering analysis (ABCB, 2005; SFPE, 2008) its use in the
prediction of wildfire behaviour in Australia remains in its relative infancy in
part due to the complex computational analysis required (Cruz et al., 2014).
One of the main characteristics of physics based wildfire modelling is the
requirement to input spatial and physical characteristics for each fuel type
and structure within the cell to be analysed. This permits the modelling and
evaluation of heterogeneous fuels in a single simulation (Cruz et al., 2014;
Parsons, Sauer & Linn, 2010). The result of the analysis is a fire ‘map’ with
outputs including fire line intensity, temperature and radiant heat flux
captured at set timed intervals in a separate spreadsheet.
Physics based models categorise wildfire fuel into two separate layers
being surface and raised fuels. Unlike empirical approaches however, the
two categories of fuel are not simply modelled as two distinct fuel layers.
Fuel structures within each layer are represented as individual fuel units within
the confines of the grid resolution (Cruz et al., 2014; Parsons, Sauer & Linn,
2010). A comparison between the two approaches is illustrated in Figure
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1.13 and enables individual trees to be considered separately as opposed to
the empirical approach of an entire forest being modelled as a single fuel
unit.

13Figure 1.13.

Empirical (left) compared to WFDS (right) wildfire fuel cells

Input parameters for surface fuels including grasses and litter are the
descriptors of the fine fuels, which are vegetation with a diameter or thickness
of approximately 6 mm or less. If the surface vegetation is not uniform in size
then the loading in each representative size class (i.e., surface-to-volume
ratio) can be inputted. Grasses, for example, are more likely to be sufficiently
represented by one value of the surface-to-volume ratio and the fuel loading
would be for that size class. However, litter may be better represented using
more than one surface-to-volume ratio. Input parameters for raised fuels
include trees and shrubs that are large enough to be resolved on the
computational grid. For example, if the grid cells are 1 m cubes and the
shrubs are 0.5 m tall, then they are not resolved. Where raised fuels are not
considered due to grid resolution they are modelled as surface vegetation.
Similar to WFDS, FIRETEC is a three dimensional physics based model for fires
through vegetation. It relies on the formulations of physics and chemistry to
model the fire behaviour through vegetation in cells of horizontal grid
resolution as small as 2m and fine fuel grid resolution as small as 0.05m (Pimont
et al., 2006).
WFDS has two distinct ways of modelling vegetative fuels, being the Fuel
Element (FE) model for vegetation that occupies a specified volume such as
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trees (for example, Douglas fir trees are modelled as cones), and the
Boundary Fuel (BF) model for surface fuels such as grasslands.
In the FE model thermally thin vegetation is represented on a threedimensional grid. Porterie et al. (2005, p573) describes the gas phase grid as
the pyrolized fuel vapour leaving the fuel material, diffusing with the available
oxidizer and forming a combustible mixture ahead of the flaming edge that
is subsequently ignited by the flame itself.

The gas phase grid requires

sufficient resolution so that temperature gradients and conjugate heat
transfer between the gas and solid phases in the fuel bed can be calculated
to an acceptable level.

As a result, it is regarded as providing better

predictions than the BF model if adequately resolved, however it is also both
computationally intensive and time consuming.
The BF model utilises a vertical grid with sufficiently high spatial resolution
to capture vertical radiant heat transfer.

A horizontal grid is also utilised

similar to the FE model, typically however with larger resolution.

The

underlying assumptions of the BF model are most consistent with landscape
scale fires in which the majority of heat release and radiant emission occurs
vertically above the thermally degrading surface fuel bed.
Two models may be utilised for thermal degradation of wildfire fuel, ‘Linear’
or ‘Arrhenius’, both derived from empirical studies.
assumes

a

two-stage

endothermic

thermal

The Linear model

decomposition

(water

evaporation and then solid fuel pyrolysis). In contrast, the Arrhenius model
considers a three-stage endothermic thermal decomposition being water
evaporation, solid fuel pyrolysis and subsequent char oxidisation (Morvan &
Dupuy, 2014).

Solid fuels are represented as a series of layers that are

consumed from the top down until the solid mass reaches a predetermined
char fraction at which point the fuel is considered consumed (Cruz et al.,
2014). The model then continues the process throughout the fuel structures
in predetermined time intervals providing illustrative and tabularised outputs.

1.6. Use of existing data to advance physics based models
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The structural framework provided by Hollis et al. (2015) includes several of
the fuel characteristic inputs required for physics based modelling.

By

combining datasets when information becomes available, improvements to
both empirical and physics based models may be achieved.

Table 1.4

summarises the status of fuel attributes within existing data sets and how they
correspond to physics based inputs.
4Table 1.4. Fuel attributes
Fuel Attribute from Hollis

Equivalent

Attribute

et al.

physics based models

Mass

Mass

for

Notes
Mass is not currently considered in empirical
models which rely on density in (t/ha).

Compactness

Density

Compactness is not currently considered in
empirical models.

Mineral content
Heat content

Specific heat

Not considered in either form of model.
Considered in empirical models through
Heat of combustion, being 18600kJ/kg.
This would be altered in physics based
models to suit the individual fuel.

Data sets

from physics based models could be
applied to empirical scenarios.
Density

Density

Empirical models utilise t/ha, however
physics based models would rely on density
in 3 dimensions.

Horizontal continuity

Fuel geometry

Existing empirical models do not consider
horizontal continuity due to the 1ha grid
size.

For physics based models the fuel

geometry can be manually inputted to suit
the specific scenario.
Particle shape and size

Fuel geometry

Empirical models do not consider particle
size due to the 1ha grid size.

Particle size is

captured in physics based models through
enhanced definition of fuel geometry.
The shape of the fuel (cylindrical, conical or
cubic for instance) can also be considered.
Surface area

Fuel geometry

Empirical models do not consider surface
area.
based

Surface area is captured in physics
models

through

enhanced

definition of fuel geometry.
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Height

to

base

of

Fuel geometry

canopy

Whilst empirical models use canopy height
as a guide to selecting vegetation fuel load
inputs, they do not consider height to base
of canopy in the calculation of fire
behaviour itself.

Physics based models

can capture this through detailed fuel
geometry inputs.

-

Drag coefficient

A

coefficient

derived

from

empirical

correlation for laminar or turbulent flow
around a simplified shape.

Individually

imputed for each specific scenario and
affects physics based modelling of fire
behaviour.

Not considered in empirical

approaches.

-

Char component

Determines the point at which the fuel is
considered

completely

consumed

in

physics based models and value depends
on individual scenario. Not considered in
empirical models.

-

Pyrolysis range

When the pyrolysis starts and finishes,
assessed in set time steps in physics based
modelling.

Not considered in empirical

models.

Existing data sets are limited, however combining the accepted empirical
two layered fuel loads detailed in AS3959 with analysis of fuel strata detailed
in (Hines et al., 2010; Gould et al., 2007; Hollis et al., 2015) may provide a
suitable starting point for vegetation fuel inputs required for physics based
modelling. Tables 1.5 to 1.8 detail suggested bulk densities for initial analysis
and comparison against existing empirical models (Penney, 2017).
The suggested fuel loads in Tables 1.5 to 1.8 have been determined by
adapting the existing data sets identified for the associated empirical models
to the three-dimensional t/m3 from the existing two-dimensional t/ha that
may be suitable in the absence of other data.
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5Table 1.5. Suggested bulk density Forest
Fuel Strata

Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare
AS3959

(Hines et al., 2010)

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3
(Overlap will occur between strata if
height is less than 1m)

Surface

2-20

Near Surface

1-8

25A

Elevated

0-8

4

Bark

25

0-7

1

Canopy

10

n/a

1B

A

Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell

B

Assuming 100% foliage cover

6Table 1.6. Suggested bulk density Woodland
Fuel Strata

Bulk Density in tonnes per hectare
AS3959

(Hines et al., 2010)

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3
(Overlap will occur between strata if
height is less than 1m)

Surface

2-20

Near Surface

1-8

10A

Elevated

0-8

2

Bark

15

0-7

1

Canopy

10

n/a

0.3B

A

Surface and near surface strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell

B

Assuming 30% foliage cover

7Table 1.7. Suggested bulk density Scrub
Fuel Strata

Bulk Density in tonnes per

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3

hectare (AS3959)

Surface
Near Surface
Elevated

15A

Bark

25

0

Canopy

0

10B

A

Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell

B

Assuming 100% foliage cover

8Table 1.8. Suggested bulk density Shrub
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Fuel Strata

Bulk Density in tonnes per

Suggested Bulk Density in kg/m3

hectare (AS3959)

Surface
Near Surface
10A

Elevated
Bark

15

0

Canopy

0

5B

A

Surface, near surface and elevated strata are assumed to be in the same fuel cell

B

Assuming 100% foliage cover

1.7. Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s
Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and severity
of wildfires.

During periods of elevated fire weather conditions, mega-

wildfires in through continuous vegetation structures (particularly in forest and
woodlands), no amount of resources or water (see Sections 4-6) will be able
to suppress the head fire.

Firefighting strategies in these situations should

therefore focus on areas of opportunity where vegetation structure,
particularly surface, near surface and elevated fuels are limited and the
vegetation geometry does not support a continuous wildfire front.

The

removal of fuel immediately adjacent to assets and communities through
‘dry’ firefighting strategies such as backburning (see Section 4) may need to
be considered early in firefighting campaigns.

1.8. Implications for frontline fire behaviour specialists and
urban planners
To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the
accuracy of modelled wildfire outputs the following is recommended:
1. Classification of vegetation based solely on qualitative descriptors
should not over-ride the wildfire behaviour model applied to the
scenario without due consideration of the wildfire behaviour expected
to occur through the vegetation.

Using the case study previously

provided as an example, whilst the vegetation could reasonably be
classified as Class A Forest or Class B Woodlands, applying the Noble
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et al wildfire behaviour model to either of these options without
modifying the deemed fuel loads would significantly result in overestimation of wildfire outputs.

In urban areas where vegetation

geometry restricts wildfire growth, a more appropriate and accurate
approach is to assess the fuel load utilizing Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores
and apply the correct vegetation availability factor.

Further

guidance on this can be found in Sections 2 and 3; and
2. Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning
perspectives) involved in modelling wildfire and calculating potential
impacts require a sound understanding of the respective models and
their limitations.

Caution should be applied when attempting to

‘simplify’ complex equations, models or engineering concepts in
standards, guidance material or documents for use by lay persons or
in land use planning decisions. The profession of wildfire engineering
is in its infancy and job titles do not necessarily equate to the
knowledge and skills required to complete the required technical
analysis or make informed and accurate decisions. This can be in part
be remedied by professionalization / accreditation of the sector and
greater recognition of the role of fire safety engineers with wildfire
backgrounds in it.

Section 2 – Wildfire behaviour and characteristics
2.1. Introduction
Understanding how wildfire behaves and how this behaviour is modelled is
the next step for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour specialists IMT’s and urban
planners. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between wildfire inputs and the
empirical wildfire behaviour models and the radiation view factor model
adopted throughout Australia. This section discusses each of the empirical
wildfire components, whilst the radiation model is explored in the next
section. Accurately modelling wildfire behaviour is important as it is used to
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assist determine the suitability of wildfire suppression strategies and tactics
(Section 4), as well as for determining the suitability of development in
bushfire prone areas.

Empirical Wildfire model

Atmospheric conditions selected (Fire Danger
Index or Wind Speed)

Inputs include:

Vegetation classification (fuel structure, fuel load, empirical
model)

Site parameters (slope under vegetation and
site slope)

•

Empirical model

•

Fuel load

•

Vegetation height

•

Wind speed

•

Slope

Outputs include:

WIldfire behaviour outputs empirically
calculated (Rate of Spread, Flame Length,
Intensity)

•

Rate of Spread

•

Intensity

Reciever inputs determined (Height of
receiver, distance to receiver)

Radiation model

Inputs include:

Geometry of the radiant heat panel determined from bushfire
behaviour outputs (Flame Angle, Flame Height, Flame Width)

•

Head fire width

•

Separation between
receiver and head
fire

View factor calculated

Radiant heat flux calculated

Outputs include:
•

Flame angle

•

View factor

•

Radiant heat flux

14Figure 2.1. Relationship between bushfire and radiation models

2.2. Fire Weather
The influence of weather on wildfire behaviour and the potential difficulty
of wildfire suppression is considered through the use of fire danger indices
(Dowdy et al., 2009). In Australia, the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FDI)
is used to account for the effect of weather on forest wildfires. The FDI is
calculated by (Nobel et al, 1980):
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 2𝑒𝑒 (−0.45+0.987𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)−0.0345𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅+0.0338𝑇𝑇+0.0234𝑉𝑉)

(2.1)

Where DF is drought factor (given as a number between 0 and 10
representing the influence of recent temperatures and rainfall events on fuel
availability); RH is relative humidity (%); T is temperature (°C); V is wind speed
at 10m (kph)
For grassfires, the Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) is calculated by (Cruz
et al, 2015)
GFDI= 2exp (−23.6 + 5.01 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶) + 0.0281𝑇𝑇 − 0.266√𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.633�𝑈𝑈10

(2.2)

where:

C is degree of curing (%); T is air temperature (°C); RH is relative humidity (%);
U10 is average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1)
Whilst Dowdy et al. (2009, Figure 2, p10) report the 95th and 99th percentile
FDI’s throughout Australia from 2000 to 2007, future projected changes in FDI
forecast widespread increases in the severity of near-surface fire weather
throughout Australia (Dowdy, 2018; Dowdy et al., 2019) as illustrated in Figure
2.2.

Alternatively, AS3959 provides alternate FDI datasets, summarised in

Table 2.1.
9Table 2.1: FDI and GFDI (excluding alpine areas)
Jurisdiction

Forest Fire Danger Index

Grassland Fire Danger
Index

Australian Capital Territory

100

130

New South Wales

80-100

110-130

Northern Territory

40

50

Queensland

40

50

South Australia

80

110

Tasmania

50

70

Victoria

100

130

Western Australia

80

110
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15Figure 2.2. The 99th (upper panel) and 95th (lower panel) percentiles of the FDI. (image
from Dowdy et al. 2009, used with permission from the Bureau of Meteorology)

During extreme wildfire events strong and deep convection can occur
within the fire plume (Dowdy et al., 2019).
pyroconvection.

This phenomenon is termed

Condensation of moisture within the fire plume can

release latent heat, resulting in enhanced convection and the formation of
clouds known as pyrocumulus.

In severe cases thunderstorms, (known as

pyrocumulonimbus), and pyrogenic lightning may result in multiple additional
wildfire ignitions. The feedback processes involved in such extreme weather
events includes significant variations in surface wind speed and direction that
results in unpredictable and dangerous wildfire behaviour and directional
changes (Peace et al. 2017; Potter, 2012). The Continuous Haines index (CH)
is a numerical index between 0-13 which provides an indication of how dry
and unstable the atmosphere is above the surface and therefore the
potential for the formation of dangerous pyroconvective processes (Dowdy
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et al, 2019; Mills & McCaw, 2010; Potter, 2012; Potter, 2018). Values of 10 or
more are considered significant and require additional vigilance to be
exercised during wildfire suppression efforts.
The CH is calculated by (Dowdy et al, 2019; Mills and McCaw, 2010):
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0.5(𝑇𝑇850 − 𝑇𝑇750 − 4)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷850 − 3)
3

if 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 > 5, then 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 5 + 0.5(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 5)

(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
(2.6)

Where CA is the Stability Score based on the temperature difference T850
– T700, where T850 and T700 are the temperatures at 850 hPa and 700 hPa,
respectively; CB is the Humidity Score based on the 850hPa dew point
depression (DD850): equal to T850 – DP850, where DP850 is the dew point
temperature at 850 hPa.

2.3. Rate of Spread
During the initial stages of a wildfire only a few particles on the top of the
surface fuels will be involved, with flame spread influenced by the direct
contact of the flames with surrounding unburned fuel (Cheney & Gould,
1997).

As the fire size grows, convective preheating of surrounding fuels

occur and flame height increases resulting in more fuel becoming available.
McAlpine (1988) suggests that, influenced by both the wind and topography,
the fire continues to grow in size and accelerate until it achieves a quasisteady rate of spread (RoS).
In point source accelerating fire scenarios, whereby the developing fire
originating from a single ignition point is yet to grow sufficiently to reach the
quasi-steady 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 required to support the assumptions used in landscape
scale wildfire behaviour, the accelerating head fire rate of spread 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎

(km/h) in forest and woodland fuels is given by (McAlpine, 1998; Van Wagner,
1985):
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(1 − 𝑒𝑒 −𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 )

(2.7)

where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the equilibrium/potential head fire rate of spread (km/h), t

is the time since ignition (h), and β (h−1) is a constant related to how rapidly
the head fire accelerates. A reasonable first estimate for β can be
established using the assumption that the fire will accelerate to 90% of the
equilibrium rate of spread in 30 minutes (i.e., 0.5 h) for treed vegetation
structures, including forest and woodlands. The attainment of the 90%
equilibrium rate of spread 30 minutes post ignition within treed fuel structures
is supported by the findings of Gould et al (2007); Kucuk et al (2007); Van
Wagner (1985); and Cheney (1981).
Stevenson (Penney & Stevenson, 2019) identified that applying this to
Equation (1) gives

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

= 0.9 and t = 0.5, as illustrated below to solve the fire

acceleration parameter (𝛽𝛽):

−

β

0.9 = 1 − e 2
β
−
1
⇒ e 2 =
10
β = 2 ln(10)
⇒
≈ 4.605.

It is worth noting that the value of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.0768 stated in previous work by

McAlpine (1998) is in units of (min−1). This would only be appropriate in the
current setting if the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 were considered in km/min rather than km/h.

For modelling purposes, the time since ignition may not be known,

therefore the ability to determine the rate of spread of an accelerating fire
in terms of distance travelled since ignition is required. As 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 is the rate of

change of distance D (km) with respect to time, it follows that
dD
= RoS a .
dt

By integrating Equation (2.7) with respect to time, and setting D(0) = 0, the
distance travelled post ignition can be expressed as:

 e − βt 1 
− 
D = RoS  t +
β
β


(2.8)

From Equation (2.7) we know that
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t=−

1

RoS a 

ln1 −

β 
RoS  ,

which when inserted this into Equation (2.8), enables distance travelled post
ignition to be written as:
D=−

RoS  RoSa
 RoSa  

+ ln1 −

β  RoS
RoS  


(2.9)

or alternatively as:
 RoS a
βD
 RoS a  
= −
+ ln1 −

RoS
RoS
RoS  



(2.10)

Equation (2.10) can be used to determine the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 of an accelerating

head fire 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 at a specified distance D from the point source ignition with
the equilibrium rate of spread. The problem is that it is not possible to re-

arrange Equation (2.10) to express 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 as a function of D. To resolve this
issue a plot of

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

is numerically generated against
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎

to approximate the ratio
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

which can be used

(and hence 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 ) for a given value of the ratio

. Such a plot is given in Figure 2.3 below.

16Figure 2.3. Plot of the ratio

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

Figure 2.3. Plot of the ratio

against

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

against

.

𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

.

Head fire spread distance at a given time can be calculated using the
equation McAlpine (1988, Eqn 5):
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𝑒𝑒 −0.0768𝑡𝑡
1
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �𝑡𝑡 +
−
�
0.0768
0.0768

(2.11)

Where D is the head fire spread distance at time t; RoS is the potential head
fire rate of spread; t is the elapsed time since ignition.
The fire will continue to accelerate with an increasing forward RoS until it
attains a quasi-steady rate. Whilst Cheney and Gould (1997) report this may
not occur in forest fuels until a head fire width of approximately 150m is
reached, Penney (2017) identifies the more conservative figure of 100m,
which is subsequently consistent with the calculations of Van Wager, is
adopted for modelling purposes by both AS3959-2009 Construction of
buildings in bushfire prone areas (AS3959) and NSWFRS (2016).

During

catastrophic bushfires, the scale and intensity of the bushfire itself can result
in air-flow and wind conditions generated by the fire itself (Dold & Zinoviev,
2009) and subsequently ‘explosive’ bushfire behaviour similar to flashover
phenomena experienced in structural firefighting response (Chatelon,
Sauvagnargues, Dusserre, & Balbi, 2014).

RoS is calculated in treed fuel structures of forest, woodland and rainforest
using (Noble et al, 1980 cited in AS3959):
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0.0012 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 × 𝑤𝑤

(2.12)

Where RoS is the potential rate of spread (kph), also simply referred to as rate
of spread; FDI is Fire Danger Index (dimensionless); w is surface fuel load (t/ha)
Alternatively, for dry eucalypt forest, potential quasi-steady rate of spread
(RSS) can be calculated using the Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores (Gould et al, 2007)
discussed in Section 1:
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𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏0 (𝑉𝑉10 − 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 )𝑏𝑏1 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑏𝑏2 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑏4 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ ���∅𝑀𝑀̇ 𝑓𝑓 ��∅𝑆𝑆̇ 𝑓𝑓 �

(2.13)

Where Rss is the potential quasi-steady rate of spread (m/h); Rt is the threshold
rate of spread of 5kph at the threshold wind speed (Ut); V10 is mean wind
speed at 10m in the open (kph); Vt is threshold wind speed 5kph; Sfhs is surface
fuel hazard score; NSfhs is near surface fuel hazard score; NSh is near surface
fuel height; b0 – b4 are regression constants b0 = 1.132; b1 = 0.904; b2 = 0.279;
.
.
b3 = 0.611; b4 = 0.013; ØMf is fine fuel moisture function; ØSf is slope function
And (Gould et al., 2007, Eqn. 5)
∅𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 = �𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 −1.495 �⁄0.0545
Where Mf is fine fuel moisture content (%); ∅𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓

(2.14)

is calculated by (Gould et

al., 2007, Eqn. 6).

∅𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(0.069𝜃𝜃)

(2.15)

Where Ɵ is slope of the ground (degrees)

For shrubland and scrub, RoS is calculated by Anderson et al, (2015):
RoS = 5.67(0.67 U10)0.91 H0.22 e (-0.076MC)

(2.16)

Where H is height of the fuel bed (m); U10 is average wind speed at 10m out
in the open; MC is moisture content
Alternatively, it may be calculated using Cruz et al (2013):
RoS = 0.023𝑉𝑉 1.21 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 0.54

(2.17)

Where VH is the average height of the classified vegetation (m); V is average
wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1)
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For grassland, RoS is calculated by Putron (1982):
RoS = 0.13𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺

(2.18)

When using equations 2.12 and 2.16-2.18, RoS can be corrected for the
effects of slope by (AS3959):
𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 (0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 (−0.069 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2.19)
(2.20)

Where Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h); R is the
forward rate of spread determined; slope is the slope (degrees)
Cruz et al (2015) however suggest this approach will grossly over-estimate
the effect of slope and subsequently will result in an under-prediction of
downslope RoS. To address this downslope RoS should be corrected by:

𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅

exp (−0.069𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)
2 exp(−0.069𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) − 1

(2.21)

Where Rslope is the forward rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h); R is the
forward rate of spread determined; slope is the slope (degrees)

Residence time is defined as the time the flaming zone takes to pass over
a given point.

There is some variance in the literature regarding typical

residence time in forest fuels. Fire service literature (DFES, 2014) suggests in
forest fuels a figure of between 45 to 60 seconds can be expected. During
the development of firefighting vehicle crew protection systems, Nichols,
Canderle, Knight and Leonard (2003, p2) identified it was reasonable to
expect “residence times of several minutes,” however the peak of the
burover intensity will last between 15-30 seconds as the fine bushfire fuels are
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consumed. This is consistent with the findings of Linton (2016) in her report
into the burnovers experienced during the 2012 Black Cat Creek Fire. Wotton,
Gould, McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012, p270) reported longer periods as
the “average flame-front residence time for eucalypt forest fuels was 37
seconds and did not vary significantly with fine fuel moisture, fuel quantity or
bulk density.” Poon (2003) describes a significantly longer flame residence
time as lasting 1-2 minutes and mainly involving the fine fuels of twigs, ground
litter and foliage, yet in the same report he identifies a residence time of 60
seconds as being appropriate for modelling purposes.

Smith (2013)

identifies residence time may be calculated using:
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =

𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

(2.22)

Where TR is residence time (minutes); D is flame depth (m); RoS is rate of
spread (m/hr)

2.4. Flame length and height
Flame length (Lf) will increase as the fire develops from ignition to a bushfire
of landscape proportions.

It is also affected by numerous other factors

influencing the fire behaviour including fuel structure, wind speed and
topography.

Flame height is the vertical height of the flame above the

ground as illustrated in Figure 2.4 and will vary depending on the inclination
of the ground, the flame length and the flame angle. Whilst Linton (2016)
reports flame heights of between 8-10m during the fatal Black Cat Creek
bushfire, Cruz et al. (2012) reports flame heights 10-20m above the crowns of
trees were experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore East fire.

The

flame heights experienced by crews on Black Saturday are also consistent
with reports of flames encountered by crews during the 2016 Yarloop
Waroona fire in Western Australia.
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17Figure 2.4. Flame length and height

Flame length (LF) in treed fuel structures including those involved in Australian
bushfire events can be calculated using the equation (AS3959, Eqn B2):

𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 =

13𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 0.24𝑊𝑊
2

(2.23)

Where Lf is flame length (m); W is the total fuel load (t/ha); Rslope is the forward
rate of spread corrected for slope (km/h)
Flame height can also be calculated using the assigned hazard scores
(Gould, 2007, Eqn. 7):
𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 = 0.0193 × 𝑅𝑅 0.723 × 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�0.64𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓ℎ �

(2.24)

Where Hf is flame height (m); R is head fire rate of spread; Efh is elevated fuel
height (m)
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2.5. Fire line intensity
Current vehicle protection systems utilised in Western Australian fire service
vehicles have been tested against fire line intensities of between 2.510MW/m and designed to withstand 7.5MW/m (Nichols, Gould, Knight,
Leonard, & Brown, 2005). Comparatively, Cruz, et al. (2012) report average
fire line intensities experienced during the Black Saturday Kilmore East Fire in
2009 of 88MW/m.

Dold, Zinoviev and Leslie, (2011) describe bushfires as

eruptive and unstable combustion involving a process of dynamic
interaction between RoS and fire line intensity (I). A critical component of
the fireline intensity is the heat of combustion, defined as the amount of heat
released when a unit quantity of fuel is oxidized completely to yield stable
end products (SFPE, 1-93). Common values for H are identified in Table 2.2.
AS3959 details that I, in kW/m and corrected for slope, is calculated using
Byram’s fireline intensity equation.
𝐼𝐼 = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 /36

(2.25)

Where H is the heat of combustion (kJ/kg), shown in table 2.2; W is total fuel
load (t/ha)
10Table 2.2. Heat of Combustion
Fuel

Heat of Combustion (kJ/kg)

Source

Wood (European Beech)

19500

DiNenno Table 1-5.3

Wood (Ponderosa Pine)

19400

DiNenno Table 1-5.3

Australian vegetation

18600

AS3959

2.6. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists and IMT’s
This section covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and
behaviour.

As the suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged against

these inputs it is essential that all firefighters, fire behaviour specialists and
IMT’s alike not only understand the presented models, but are effective in
accurately applying them. Incorrect predictions may result in inappropriate
strategies

being

devised,

leaving

frontline

personnel

exposed

to
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overwhelming wildfire conditions with potentially fatal consequences (see
Sections 5 and 7). Whilst fire behaviour specialists are required to accurately
and competently predict wildfire behaviour, all personnel from firefighters to
the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby increasing the margin for
safety for both firefighters and the community.

2.7. Implications for urban planners
Perhaps the greatest implications for urban planners apply to assessments
of potential wildfire behaviour in urban areas where the landscape scale
wildfire behaviour assumed in AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines is
not possible. Where vegetation fuel bed geometry (refer back to Section 1)
prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to paragraph 2.3 of
this section), as reported in recent studies (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), failure
to adequately adjust inputs may result in the significant over-calculation of
potential wildfire behaviour. This can be in part be remedied by deference
in such instances to suitably qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire
backgrounds that can provide quantified analysis and an appropriate level
of fire safety engineering rigor to design solutions.

Section 3 – Wildfire radiant heat flux
3.1 Introduction
Thermal radiation is the energy emitted from a body due to the internal
temperature of the surface that is transported by photons capable of
traveling through a perfect vacuum (Massoud, 2005). The rate of transfer of
radiation across a given surface is known as radiant heat flux. Humans can
only be exposed to relatively small levels of radiation before feeling pain and
suffering other debilitating effects, hence it becomes a crucial factor in
determining tenability on the fireground (see Section 5). Even prior to the
attainment of a quasi-steady Rate of Spread ( 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ), radiation quickly
becomes the primary mechanism of heat transfer from a bushfire and
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impacts the receiving body well before direct flame impingement occurs
(Leonard, 2009; Sullivan, Ellis, & Knight, 2003; Wotton, Gould, McCaw,
Cheney, & Taylor, 2012). This section builds upon Section 2, discussing the
calculation of radiant heat flux from wildfires and other vegetation fires
occuring in small fuel beds. Understanding wildfire radiant heat flux is critical
as it has impacts on firefighter and civilian tenability, as well as signficant
implications for land use planning and construction in areas prone to wildfire
in Australia.

3.2 Radiant heat flux
In order to empirically calculate the radiant heat flux during a bushfire
event the chaotic flame front is geometrically represented by a uniform
parallelepiped black body radiant heat panel (Sullivan, Ellis & Knight, 2003;
Tan, Midgley & Douglas, 2005; Mendham, 2013) as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The horizontal position of the panel in relation to the flame is determined to
be directly below the middle of the extended flame panel (Sullivan, Ellis &
Knight, 2003) as shown in Figure 2.

Both the flame temperature and

emissivity are assumed to be consistent across the panel, whilst AS3959 also
assumes the receiving body is perpendicular to the approaching fire front.

18Figure 3.1: Geometrical representation of the flame front.
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19Figure 3.2: Geometrical representation of the flame front – side view.

Radiant heat flux is calculated using the equation:
𝑞𝑞 = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏

(3.1)

where 𝑞𝑞 is the radiant heat flux in kW/m2, 𝜏𝜏 is the atmospheric transmissivity,
𝐸𝐸 is the flame emissive power in kW/m2 and 𝜙𝜙 is the view factor.

3.3 Atmospheric transmissivity
With reference to Figure 3.3, atmospheric transmissivity (τ) is calculated
using the following steps:
Calculate path length (𝐿𝐿):

or

If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, then 𝐿𝐿 = 0
If 𝑑𝑑 > 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, then 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(3.2)

(3.3)

where 𝑑𝑑 is the distance between the fuel bed and the receiver (m), 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the
flame length (m) and 𝛼𝛼 is the flame angle (in degrees) that maximizes the
view factor, calculated in accordance with the algorithm shown in Figure 3.4
(AS3959).
The atmospheric transmissivity is then calculated as follows:
If 𝐿𝐿 = 0, then 𝜏𝜏 = 1
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or
If 𝐿𝐿 ≠ 0, then 𝜏𝜏 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝐿𝐿 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝐿𝐿2 + 𝑎𝑎3 𝐿𝐿3 + 𝑎𝑎4 𝐿𝐿4

(3.4)

where 𝐿𝐿 is the path length and 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 is the coefficient calculated by
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝐶1𝑛𝑛 + 𝐶𝐶2𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 + 𝐶𝐶3𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 + 𝐶𝐶4𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

(3.5)

where 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 is the ambient temperature, 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 is the flame temperature, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the
relative humidity; and 𝐶𝐶1𝑛𝑛 , 𝐶𝐶2𝑛𝑛 , 𝐶𝐶3𝑛𝑛 and 𝐶𝐶4𝑛𝑛 are constants defined in Table

3.1 (AS3959, Table B3, reproduced with the permission of SAI Global on behalf
of Standards Australia).
11Table 3.1: Constants used in Equation 3.5.
n

C1n

C2n

C3n
10-3

4.68 ×

C4n
10-5

0

1.486

-2.003 ×

-6.052 × 10-2

1

1.225 × 10-2

-5.900 × 10-5

1.66 × 10-6

-1.759 × 10-3

2

-1.489 × 10-4

6.893 × 10-7

-1.922 × 10-8

2.092 × 10-5

3

8.381 × 10-7

-3.823 × 10-9

1.0511 × 10-10

-1.166 × 10-7

4

-1.685 × 10-9

7.637 × 10-12

-2.085 × 10-13

2.350 × 10-10

20Figure 3.3: Typical building and fire front configuration.
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21Figure 3.4: Flame angle algorithm (Copied by Greg Penney with the permission of SAI
Global on behalf of Standards Australia).

3.4 Flame temperature
Drysdale (2011) identifies that flames emit radiation within the visible
spectrum with a dull red glow at approximately 823K.

As the flame

temperature (𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 ) increases, the flame colour changes as detailed in Table

3.2. Poon (2003) identifies that the predominantly ‘reddish-orange’ colour
of bushfire flames suggests a flame temperature of approximately 1273K,
which is supported by Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who
report a flame temperature of 1200K is appropriate for large wildland fires.
AS3959 (2009) adopts a flame temperature of 1080K and assumes a uniform
temperature across the flame surface.

Conversley, the approximate
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maximum flame temperature reported in the research by Wotton, Gould,
McCaw, Cheney and Taylor (2012) was 1373K.
12Table 3.2: Visual colour of flame.
Temperature (K)

Appearance

823

Red glow

973

Dull red

1173

Cherry red

1373

Orange

1673

White

3.5 Emissivity
Emissivity (𝜀𝜀) is the ratio of the energy of radiated from a material’s surface
to that radiated from a blackbody (perfect emitter) at the same temperature
and wavelength and under the same conditions (NPL, 2014).

It is a

dimensionless number between 0 (a perfect reflector) and 1 (a perfect
emitter). During small scale experiments representative of a bushfire in the
early stages of development, Boulet et. al. (2009) reported emissivity of up to
0.74 in flames lengths of 4m. AS3959 (2009, CB10.2) adopts a flame emissivity
of 0.95 across the flame surface using the justification that “bushfire flames
under design 2 fire weather scenarios are generally optically thick (𝜀𝜀~1). "

This value is consistent with the findings of Agueda, Pastor and Perez, cited in
Rossi, Simeoni, Moretti and Leroy-Cancellieri (2011) who report the emissivity
of large wildland fires as being able to be considered close to the emissivity
of a perfect emitter and assigned an emissivity of 0.90. Poon (2003, p26)
however, suggests the use of “an emissivity close to 1 may not be a
reasonable approximation of the emissive power from the flame front” and

2

A design fire scenario is a specific fire scenario on which the analysis will be

conducted, and a design fire is a quantitative description of assumed fire
characteristics within the design fire scenario.
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subsequently assumes a flame emissivity of 0.6 justifying this figure as
“equivalent to a flame depth of about 5m” (Poon, 2003, Table 12, p38).
The flame emissive power (𝐸𝐸) is calculated by:
𝐸𝐸 = 𝜎𝜎ɛ𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 4

(3.6)

where 𝜎𝜎 is the Stefan-Boltzman constant of 5.67x10-11 kWm-2K-4, 𝜀𝜀 is the

flame emissivity and 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 is the flame temperature.

3.6 View factor

The view factor (𝜙𝜙) is a geometrical factor ranging from 0 to 1 which is
related to the extent that the fire front fills the field of view looking from the
site toward the flame. A value of 𝜙𝜙 = 1 indicates that the entire field of view
consists of flame (i.e. not even sky), while a value of 𝜙𝜙 = 0 indicates that the

fire front is completely out of view. As such, it is the view factor that must
incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions on the radiant heat

flux. To address this issue, this section proposes an alternate view factor model
to that presented in AS3959.
In the absence of shielding bodies and referring to Figure 3.5, calculation
of the view factor in the wildfire context is expressed as:
If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼) then
otherwise, if 𝑑𝑑 > 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼) then
𝜙𝜙 =
where

⎧
1⎪

𝜋𝜋 ⎨
⎪
⎩

𝑋𝑋1

�1 +

𝑋𝑋1 =

(3.7)

𝜙𝜙 = 1

𝑌𝑌1

𝑌𝑌1

𝑋𝑋1

⎫
�+
⎪
�1 +
�1 + 𝑌𝑌12
𝑋𝑋2
𝑌𝑌2
𝑌𝑌2
𝑋𝑋2
⎬
tan−1 �
�+
tan−1 �
�⎪
2
2
2
2
�1 + 𝑋𝑋2
�1 + 𝑋𝑋2
�1 + 𝑌𝑌2
�1 + 𝑌𝑌2 ⎭

𝑋𝑋12

tan−1 �

�1 +

𝑋𝑋12

�+

𝑌𝑌12

tan−1 �

𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 sin(𝛼𝛼) − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos(𝛼𝛼) tan(𝜃𝜃) − 𝑑𝑑 tan(𝜃𝜃) − ℎ
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)

(3.8)

(3.9)
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𝑋𝑋2 =

ℎ + �𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)�tan (𝜃𝜃)
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)

𝑌𝑌1 = 𝑌𝑌2 =

0.5𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓
𝑑𝑑 − 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼)

(3.10)

(3.11)

𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame length (m), 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 is the flame width/head fire width (m), 𝛼𝛼 is

the flame angle (degrees), 𝜃𝜃 is the slope of the land between the site and

vegetation fuel bed (degrees), 𝑑𝑑 is the horizontal distance between the site

and the base of the vegetation fuel bed (m), and ℎ is the elevation of the
receiver (m). Figure 3.5 provides an illustration of these variable in relation to

a typical site and fire front. In order to consider the worst case scenario, the
view factor is maximized with respect to the flame angle 𝛼𝛼. To do this, the
optimization algorithm in Figure 4 (AS3959) is used.

22Figure 3.5: Typical building and fire front configuration.

Within the urban environment, substantial non-combustible structures may
stand between the receiving body and the fire front. For modelling purposes,
these structures include significant walls or buildings, but not tin fencing or the
like. Ignoring the impact of these structures on view factor may result in
significant over estimation of wildfire impacts (Penney & Richardson, 2019). In
order to incorporate the impact of non-combustible obstructions, the total
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combined view factor of the obstructions must be calculated and then
subtracted from the unobstructed view factor given by Equations (3.7–3.11).
This approach may be suitable for empirical calculation of radiant heat flux
when firefighters are seeking shelter behind a substantial structure, however
it is not suitable for use where firefighters are sheltering behind a fire
appliance as the fire front will be significantly wider than the shielding body.
Flames may also travel underneath and over the top of an appliance, drawn
down the far side by an eddy caused by flame and air movements (Mangan,
1997).
In describing the details of this approach, Penney and Richardson (2019)
generalise Equations (3.7–3.11) and re-write them as follows:
1. Equations (3.8) and (3.11) impose the assumption that the site is
horizontally central with respect to the fire front. This assumption will
be relaxed to allow the calculation of view factors for obstructions
and fire fronts which are not centrally aligned to the site.
2. Equations (3.7–3.11) are formulated in terms of parameters
specifically referencing the fire front (not an obstruction).
Furthermore,

although

convenient

from

a

computational

perspective, they are not presented in a means that offers
significant geometrical insight. The equations will be reformulated
in terms of view angles from the site to the fire front or obstruction(s).
The first step is to generalise and amend the existing view factor model. The
second step is to consider the effect of shielding obstructions.

Figure 3.6 displays a generalised geometrical representation of the side
view of a fire front and site. Consistent with the view factor calculation
assumptions of AS3959, an inclined flame is approximated by a vertical flame
with the same height as the inclined flame (height measured vertically from
the highest point of the flame to the ground directly below) and located in
the middle of the inclined flame.
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1
L f cos(α ) tan (ψ 1 ) − d tan (ψ 1 ) − h
2
1
H 2 = d tan (ψ 1 ) − L f cos(α ) tan (ψ 1 ) + h
2
1
L = d − L f cos(α )
2
H 1 = L f sin (α ) −

23Figure 3.6: Geometrical representation of the side view of the site and vertical
approximation of a fire front.

With reference to Figure 3.6, and Equations (3.9) and (3.10), it becomes
evident that:
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )

�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 = sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )

for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2.
Figure 3.7 displays a generalised geometrical bird’s-eye view of the fire front
and site. Equation (3.7) enforces the assumption that the site is horizontally
central with respect to the fire front by setting 𝑊𝑊1 = 𝑊𝑊2 =

𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓
2

, however wildfires

may not be centered with respect to the receiving structure. To reflect this,
Figure 3.7 represents a generalised asymmetrical case.
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W1 = W2 =
L=d−

Wf
2

(in the case of horizontal symmetry)

1
L f cos(α )
2

24Figure 3.7: Geometrical representation of the birds-eye view of the site and vertical
approximation of a fire front.

With reference to Figure 3.7, and Equation (3.11), it becomes evident that:
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )

�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2 = sec(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )

for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2.

Figure 3.8 displays a three dimensional representation of the upper-left
quadrant of the fire-front relative to the site, and the four angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2. The indexing of quadrants is summarised in Table 3.3.

25Figure 3.8: Geometrical representation of the upper-left quadrant of the fire front relative
to the site.
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13Table 3.3: Indexing of quadrants.
Quadrant

𝒊𝒊

1

𝒋𝒋

1

Upper-left

1

2

Upper-right

2

2

Lower-right

2

1

Lower-left

With reference to Figure 3.8, it becomes evident that:
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗

�1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖

�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗2

=
=

tan�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �
= tan�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )

tan(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
sec�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �

= tan�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �

for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2.

Accordingly, the generalised view factor for a rectangular approximation to
a fire front or obstruction that does not pass through the site can be
expressed as:
2

2

2

2

𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
1
⎞⎞
𝜙𝜙 =
��⎛
tan−1 �
�+
tan−1 ⎛
2
2
2𝜋𝜋
�1
+
𝑋𝑋
�1
+
𝑋𝑋
2
2
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑗𝑗=1
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
�1 + 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗
⎝
⎠⎠
⎝
=

tan�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �
tan(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
1
���
tan−1 �tan�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �� +
tan−1 �tan�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ���
sec(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
2𝜋𝜋
sec�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑗𝑗=1
2

(3.12)

2

1
� ��sin(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + sin�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 �𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
=
2𝜋𝜋
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑗𝑗=1

where the angles 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2 are as defined in Figures

3.8–3.10. Consistent with Equation (3.7), if the vertical approximation to the
flame front lies on or behind the site (relative to the direction of travel of the
fire front) the view factor is assigned the value 𝜙𝜙 = 1.
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The method for calculating the view factor of a flame front that is at least
partially obstructed by non-combustible structures incorporates greater
complexity than the existing model of AS3959 which does not consider the
impact of obstructions on radiant heat flux. To assist with the discussion we
describe the method with reference to the (𝑟𝑟, 𝛽𝛽, 𝜈𝜈) coordinate system
illustrated in Figure 3.9.

26Figure 3.9: The (r,β,ν) coordinate system.

The 𝑟𝑟 component is the distance from the site measured in the 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 plane,

𝛽𝛽 is the angle in the 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 plane measured anticlockwise from the positive
𝑥𝑥 -axis when viewed from above (i.e. 𝑧𝑧 > 0 ), and 𝜈𝜈 is the vertical angle
measured from the 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 plane with positive values for 𝑧𝑧 > 0, and negative
values for 𝑧𝑧 < 0.

The view factor calculation method is based on a discretisation of the fire
front with respect to 𝛽𝛽 as illustrated in Figure 3.10.
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27Figure 3.10: The discretisation of the fire front with respect to β using 6 uniformly distributed
values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 }6𝑖𝑖=1 looking from above. Note that 𝛽𝛽1 , 𝛽𝛽2 , 𝛽𝛽3 > 0 while 𝛽𝛽4 , 𝛽𝛽5 , 𝛽𝛽6 < 0.

The discretisation consists of a total of 𝑛𝑛 uniformly distributed values {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 }𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1,
with minimum value 𝛽𝛽1 corresponding to the leftmost edge of the flame

front (looking from above), and maximum value 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 corresponding to the

rightmost edge.

Consider the vertical rectangle illustrated in Figure 3.11.

28Figure 3.11: Any rectangle specified by a set of angles 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , 𝜈𝜈 𝑈𝑈 , and 𝜈𝜈 𝐿𝐿 will have the
same view factor relative to the site. Note that 𝜈𝜈 𝑈𝑈 > 0 and 𝜈𝜈 𝐿𝐿 < 0, while 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 > 0 and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 > 0.

In order to calculate the view factor of the Figure 3.11 rectangle using
Equation (3.12), the angles are set as follows:
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( )

 tan ν iU 
,
ψ 1 = tan 
(
)
β
cos
i 

β1 = β i ,
−1

γ 11 = tan −1 (tan (β i )cos(ψ 1 )),
γ 12 = − tan −1 (tan (β j )cos(ψ 1 )),
ν 11 = ν iU ,
 tan (ν iU )cos(β j ) 
−1 
,
ν 12 = tan


(
)
β
cos
i



( )

 tan ν iL 

ψ 2 = − tan 
(
)
β
cos
i 

β2 = β j
γ 21 = tan −1 (tan (β i )cos(ψ 2 ))
−1

γ 22 = − tan −1 (tan (β j )cos(ψ 2 ))
ν 21 = −ν iL
 tan (ν iL )cos(β j ) 
−1 

ν 22 = − tan


(
)
β
cos
i



(3.13)

𝑛𝑛

A single flame front with top edge coordinates denoted ��𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ��𝑖𝑖=1 and
bottom edge coordinates denoted {(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 )}𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 is illustrated in Figure 3.12.

29Figure 3.12: A flame front with top and bottom edge coordinates {(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 )}4𝑖𝑖=1 and

{(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 )}4𝑖𝑖=1 respectively.

We now consider a collection of 𝑀𝑀 obstructions with top edge coordinates
denoted
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑛𝑛2

��𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 ��𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗

𝑛𝑛2

1

and

bottom

edge

𝑗𝑗

coordinates

denoted

𝑗𝑗

��𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 ��𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀 . Note that 1 ≤ 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 ≤ 𝑛𝑛 for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀
1
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since the obstruction(s) may not span the full horizontal angular extent of the
fire front when viewed from the site, and any part of an obstruction lying
beyond the angular extent of the fire front does not impact the view factor
calculation. This is illustrated in Figure 3.13.

30Figure 3.13: An obstruction may only partially obstruct the fire front and will only obstruct
the fire front if it lies within the angular region.

The calculation of the view factor 𝜙𝜙 subject to shielding obstructions

proceeds as follows: If 𝑑𝑑 ≤ 0.5𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 cos (𝛼𝛼) (i.e. the center of the inclined flame is
directly above or behind the site, so the vertical approximation to the fire
front is on top of the site) then
otherwise

𝜙𝜙 = 1,

1. Calculate the view factor 𝜙𝜙𝐹𝐹 of the unobstructed vertical
approximation to the fire front by setting 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 and

𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = 𝜈𝜈1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 in Equation (3.13), and then substituting the resulting
angles into Equation (3.12).

2. In order to accommodate non-rectangular obstructions, the
obstructed view factor 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂 is calculated by approximating the
obstructions using thin rectangles defined within the angular

increments from 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 to 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+1 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛 − 1. For each angular
increment, the obstructed view factor 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 is calculated by
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

determining the maximum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖

𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

and minimum value of 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖

for the obstructions that lie between the flame front and the site. If
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𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖

> 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is used to denote the top of the obstructing

rectangle, as any part of the obstruction extending above the

flame front does not actually block the view of the flame front. This
is illustrated in Figure 3.14.

31Figure 3.14. (Left) Obstruction 2 completely blocks the fire front from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 as

the part of Obstruction 2 that extends above the view line of the top of the fire front does
not contribute to blocking the fire front. (Right) Obstruction 1 partially blocks the fire front
from the site, so 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1𝑈𝑈 .
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

Similarly, if 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 < 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , then 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is used to denote the bottom of the obstructing

rectangle. Denoting the angle to the top and bottom of the obstructing
rectangle on increment 𝑖𝑖 as 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 respectively, it follows that
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 }
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 , 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 }

where
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = max�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 �: 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 �
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = max�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 �: 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 �

0, 𝑥𝑥 < 0
𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) = �
1, 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = �𝑗𝑗: 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 �

The obstructing view factor 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 for each angular increment 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑛 − 1
is calculated by setting 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖𝑖 + 1 in Equation (3.13), and then substituting the
resulting angles into Equation (3.12).

68

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

3. Calculate the total obstructed view factor
𝑛𝑛−1

𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂 = � 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

4. Calculate the view factor of the partially obstructed flame front
𝜙𝜙 = 𝜙𝜙𝐹𝐹 − 𝜙𝜙𝑂𝑂 .

In order to consider the worst case view factor with respect to the flame
angle in this approach, four modifications need to be made to the
optimisation algorithm illustrated in Figure 3.4:
1. In the original algorithm the initial value (lowest value) of the flame
angle considered in is the site slope 𝜃𝜃. This is not a valid angle in the

case that an obstruction exists between the flame front and the
site, as it effectively allows the fire front to penetrate the
obstruction. To avoid this situation it is necessary to set the initial
flame angle such that the fire front would clear the obstruction. This
amounts to setting

𝛼𝛼0 = tan

−1

𝑗𝑗

�tan(𝜃𝜃) + max �
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

ℎ𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )

𝑥𝑥 −

𝑗𝑗
𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 )

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

� : 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀�

when 𝑥𝑥 > min�𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ): 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀�. Note that 𝜃𝜃 denotes the site
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

slope, and ℎ𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ) denote the maximum height and 𝑥𝑥
component of obstruction 𝑗𝑗 at angle 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 relative to the site.

A further complication could arise if the center of the fire front lies in front

of the obstruction when the base of the fire front lies behind the obstruction.
The issue in this instance is that the obstruction would not have an impact on
the view factor. To avoid this situation the minimum flame angle is required
to satisfy
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𝛼𝛼0 ≥ max �cos
𝑗𝑗

−1
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

2�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝜀𝜀�
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
�
� : 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀�
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓
𝑗𝑗

when 𝑥𝑥 > min�𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ): 𝑛𝑛1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛2 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑀𝑀� . Note that 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the flame

length, and 𝜀𝜀 is a small positive number (e.g. 10-6).

1. If the fire front is positioned on top of an obstruction, the flame
angle 𝛼𝛼0 is set to 90 degrees to effectively consider the fire front as

being behind the obstruction. In this case, the algorithm is not
required to proceed further to determine an optimal value of 𝛼𝛼0.

2. Since the algorithm does not start with the flame angle 𝛼𝛼0 equal
to the site slope 𝜃𝜃, it is possible that the initial value of 𝛼𝛼0 could turn

out to be the flame angle that optimises the view factor. The
standard optimisation algorithm of AS3959 terminates or refines its
search increment when the view factors 𝜙𝜙0 , 𝜙𝜙1 , and 𝜙𝜙2 , which

correspond to the flame angles 𝛼𝛼0 < 𝛼𝛼1 < 𝛼𝛼2 satisfy 𝜙𝜙1 ≥ 𝜙𝜙0 and

𝜙𝜙1 > 𝜙𝜙2 , however, if 𝜙𝜙0 > 𝜙𝜙1 at the first step the algorithm will not
terminate. Hence the additional termination or refinement criteria,

𝜙𝜙0 > 𝜙𝜙1 must be added to the algorithm in addition to the existing

criteria (i.e., (𝜙𝜙1 ≥ 𝜙𝜙0 and 𝜙𝜙1 > 𝜙𝜙2 ) or 𝜙𝜙0 > 𝜙𝜙1 ).

3. In the case that the obstruction completely obscures the line of
sight from the building site to the top of the flame front, the
optimisation algorithm will never terminate as it will not be able to
identify a non-zero view factor no matter how much the flame
angle (𝛼𝛼) is increased. In order to avoid this situation, an additional
condition is added to both loops of the algorithm. Specifically, if
𝛼𝛼1 > 90𝑜𝑜 during the iteration then the algorithm will terminate

immediately, and the flame angle will be set to 𝛼𝛼1 = 90𝑜𝑜 . This

measure is only required to avoid an infinite loop, and will not affect
the outcome of the calculation.
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3.7 Fire in isolated vegetation and fuel beds that restrict
wildfire growth
In urban environments the failure to consider the effect of vegetation
geometry on restricting wildfire growth can lead to significant overestimation
of potential radiant heat impacts (Penney & Richardson, 2019). In turn, this
may result in:
1. Firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend
homes as a result of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that
indicates suppression efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable
house loss and impacts on communities. This may occur as
firefighting suppression thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour
parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally (Penney et. al.,
2019). Where inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation
geometry that does not support the assumptions of landscape
wildfire modelling, otherwise defendable areas may be left
unguarded due to inappropriate evaluation of suppression
strategies;
2. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens,
public open space, road reserves, and residential areas within
urban areas. In turn, land that is actually suitable for development
may be identified as being subject to overestimated wildfire
impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether.
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small
unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a
landscape

scale

wildfire,

in

turn

restricting

or

prohibiting

development on adjacent and near-by lots; and
3. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire
resistant construction standards of affected dwellings and
structures

that

hinders

development

through

either

misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels
of wildfire impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive
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as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering and
construction required.

As detailed by Penney and Richardson (2019), within the urban
environment in road reserves, urban parklands and similar scenarios,
correction of the wildfire models can be achieved through the application
of:
1. The Vegetation Availability Factor (refer to Section 2);
2. Calculation of accelerating 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 from a point source (refer to Section
2);

3. Consideration of shielding structures when calculating view factor; and
4. Calculating the final radiant heat flux.

Methods of calculating radiant heat flux that rely of a defined 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

cannot be applied to fires occurring in isolated vegetation structures,
including individual trees, bushes or small garden beds (Figure 3.14) or other
situations where there is an absence of a sustained forward 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. AS3959

provides some provisions for the exclusion of defined ‘low threat vegetation’,
where these exclusions do not apply or modelling is required for other
purposes. In such instances the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 will be zero, a vertical flame (flame

angle of 90°) should be modelled (i.e. 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 = 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 ) and a reduction in emissivity is

appropriate compared to landscape scale wildfire environments.
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32Figure 3.14: Modelling of isolated trees (left) and shrub/scrub (right).

To calculate radiant heat flux in this situation, flame height (𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 ) is calculated
by (Dupuy, Marechal & Morvan, 2003)
2

𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 = 0.2𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 5

(3.14)

where 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 is the flame height (m) and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 is the maximum heat release rate
(kW). The maximum heat release rate is given by
𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 = 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

(3.15)

where 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 is the heat of combustion and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is the Mass Loss Rate. Finally,
the Mass Loss Rate is given by

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =

𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡

(3.16)

where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is the total fuel load consumed in the isolated vegetation structure
(kg), calculated using the Vegetation Availability Factor in the absence of

other available datasets, and 𝑡𝑡 is time (s), assumed to be 37 seconds as
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reported by Wotton et. al. (2012) reflective of flaming residence times and
greater than the duration of tall flames, being a maximum 22 seconds.
Once 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 is known, the view factor, flame emissive power and final radiant
heat flux can be calculated as previously described.

3.8 Case Studies
A number of case studies are presented to illustrate the application and
implications of the approaches described previously to consider radiant heat
flux from a fire front while accounting for fuel loading, non-combustible
obstruction(s), or accelerating fire fronts. These case studies, as well as the
alternative view factor calculations were originally published in Penney and
Stevenson (2019).

The first case study considers a semi-rural environment in which a row of
single and two story brick houses backs onto forest type bush land with a fuel
bed of unrestricted geometry and Vf=1. Suppose that the radiant heat flux of
a fire in the bush land behind the houses is to be estimated at a site or house
on the opposite side of the street. The geometry of the specific case
considered here is provided in Figure 3.15.
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33Figure 3.15. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 1 scenario. The measurements within the
house boxes denote the height of each house.

The parameter values used in the calculation as described in AS3959 are
summarised in Table 3.4.
14Table 3.4. Parameter values used in the Case Studies.
Parameter

Value

Parameter

Value

Effective slope

0o

Flame temperature (Tf)

1090 K

Site slope (θ)

0o

Ambient temperature (Ta)

308 K

Vegetation class

Forest

Relative humidity (RH)

25%

Fire Danger Index (FDI)

80

Flame width (Wf)

100 m

Surface fuel load (w)

25 t/ha

Flame emissivity (ε)

0.95

Overall fuel load (W)

35 t/ha

Stefan Boltzman constant (σ)

5.67 × 10−11 kW/m2/K4

Heat of Combustion (H)

18600 kJ/kg

The radiant heat flux was calculated for a range of distances from the site
to the vegetation fuel bed ranging from 10 m to 100m. For the sake of
comparison, the radiant heat flux at the site was estimated using four
calculation methods:
1. The method outlined in AS3959, ignoring the obstructions presented
by the houses located between the site and vegetation fuel bed.
2. The method outlined in AS3959 with the receiver height h set to 3
m (instead of the mid-level of the flame front).
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3. The method outlined in this paper, where each of the four houses
is considered to reduce the view factor of the flame front.
4. A simplified method in which the four obstructions are considered
as a single rectangular obstruction with height 5 m (i.e., the height
of the tallest house), and width equal to the combined width of the
four houses. The combined width is the distance from the
westernmost edge of the westernmost structure to the easternmost
edge of the easternmost structure.
Figure 3.16 provides a plot of the radiant heat flux at the site as a function of
the distance to the vegetation fuel bed using each of the methods 1–4
outlined above.

34Figure 3.16. The radiant heat flux at the site as a function of the distance to the vegetation
fuel bed.

As expected, the methods that did not consider the shielding effect of the
houses (magenta and red lines) provided higher estimates for the radiant
heat flux compared to the methods that did consider the shielding effect
(blue and green). For small distances to the vegetation fuel bed, the
approaches that did not consider shielding significantly over-estimated the
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radiant heat flux compared to the method presented in this paper (blue line).
As the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increases, the difference between
the AS3959 approach and shielding approach presented here becomes
small. This is most likely because the 10m gap between house 2 and 3
becomes the most significant zone for heat flux for a more distant fire front,
so the impact of the obstructions becomes less significant.
Method 4 (green line) provided the lowest estimates of radiant heat flux as
expected. As the distance to the vegetation fuel bed increased, the radiant
heat flux estimated using this approach tended to zero far more rapidly than
the other methods. This was most likely due to the significant gap between
house 2 and house 3, which was not blocked in methods 1–3, but was
blocked when the four houses were approximated as a single rectangular
obstruction.

This

highlights

the

importance

of

considering

multiple

obstructions individually to ensure that the impact of radiation through
significant gaps is not diminished.

The second case study considers an accelerating fire front burning within
a 20m wide treed forest style bushland zone within the road reserve between
the edge of a freeway or highway and a 3m brick wall separating the
freeway from housing. The geometry of the vegetation fuel bed prevents the
fire attaining its maximum potential rate of spread. There is a row of houses
located 10m on the other side of the brick wall, one of which will be
considered the site at which the radiant heat flux from the fire will be
considered. The geometry of the specific case considered here is provided
in Figure 3.17.
The parameters used in the calculation are summarised in Table 3.3. In
addition, the vegetation factor Vf = 0.2 scales back the surface and overall
fuel loads as defined in Section 2. The fire is assumed to ignite from a point
source at the edge of the Freeway, 30 m from the site/receiver. The fire is
assumed to spread perpendicular to the Freeway at an accelerating rate
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RoS a , which is related to the distance from the ignition point D. The rate
parameter β = 2 ln(10) h-1, as suggested by McAlpine (1988), is utilised. Figure
3.18 provides a plot of the accelerating rate of spread RoS a and the
equilibrium rate of spread RoS against the distance from the ignition point D.

35Figure 3.17. A bird’s-eye view of the case study 2 scenario.

36Figure 3.18. The accelerating rate of spread RoSa and the equilibrium rate of spread RoS
against the distance from the ignition point D.

From Figure 3.18 it is apparent that over 20 m (i.e., the distance from the
ignition point to the obstructing wall) the rate of spread reaches
approximately half of its equilibrium value. The rate of spread perpendicular
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to the forward direction is assumed to be half the forward rate of spread, so
𝐷𝐷

the flame width is given by 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 = 2 .

The impact of incorporating the acceleration of a fire front and an

obstruction into the heat flux model has been highlighted by comparing the
above scenario with an additional seven modelling variants. The eight
scenarios are summarised as follows:
1. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor
of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored (the model of
AS3959).
2. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100m, a vegetation factor
of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is ignored.
3. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction
(wall) is ignored.
4. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the
obstruction (wall) is ignored.
5. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation
factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction (wall) is included.
6. The fire front is modelled with a constant (equilibrium) rate of
spread from the ignition point, a width of 100 m, a vegetation
factor of Vf = 0.2, and the obstruction (wall) is included.
7. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 1, and the obstruction
(wall) is included.
8. The fire front is modelled with an accelerating rate of spread from
the ignition point, a vegetation factor of Vf = 0.2, and the
obstruction (wall) is included (i.e., the Case Study 2 scenario).
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The radiant heat flux for the above scenarios are plotted against the distance
from the site in Figures 3.19 and 3.20.

37Figure 3.19. The radiant heat flux for models ignoring the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow
line represents the Case Study 2 scenario.

38Figure 3.20. The radiant heat flux for models including the 3m obstructing wall. The yellow
line represents the Case Study 2 scenario.
80

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

As expected, the heat fluxes when the wall is ignored are all greater than
the corresponding fluxes when the wall is incorporated into the model to
provide shielding. Furthermore, the fluxes with Vf = 1 exceeded those with Vf
= 0.2. All of the models that include the modelling of acceleration start from
a flux of zero, which increases as the rate of spread, length, and width
increase (in addition to the increase from the larger view factor as the front
closes on the site). Significantly, in Figure 3.20 the yellow line corresponding
to the Case Study 2 scenario is not visible as the heat flux at the site remains
zero. This is because the fuel load and rate of spread are not sufficient to
create a front with sufficient height to be visible above the 3m obstruction
after 20m of spreading, with the flame height reaching only 2.4 m.
The progression of the flame front over the bush region between the
freeway and obstructing wall is illustrated in Figure 3.21 for scenarios 5 to 8.

39Figure 3.21. The progression of the fire front for modelling scenarios 5 through to 8. The
yellow line represents the Case Study 2 scenario.

The model of AS3959, which assumes the wildfire is established and has
attained a quasi-steady rate of spread, estimates the time taken for the
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ignited fire to travel from the freeway to the wall (20 m) is 30 seconds, while
the model incorporating the acceleration of the spreading front and the
reduced vegetation density estimates the time at 9 minutes, consistent with
the findings of McAlpine (1988) and Kucuk, Bilgili and Baysal (2007).

3.9 Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists and IMT’s
The case studies presented indicate potential significant over-estimation
of radiant heat flux using the approach outlined in AS3959 in cases involving
non-combustible obstructions and point-source ignition fires for a minimum of
20m separation from the fire front. This is significant as it is in this distance that
wildfire flame radiation is considered to have its greatest impact (Cohen &
Butler, 1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such situations are common in urban
environments. The results demonstrate the importance of appropriately
considering fuel geometry, wildfire behaviour, and the effect of shielding
structures when calculating radiant heat impacts on buildings and
emergency responders within urban environments where vegetation fuel
bed geometry prevents wildfires reaching landscape proportions.
Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could, in turn, result
in firefighters not being deployed to suppress wildfires and defend homes as
a result of over-estimation of wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression
efforts are not suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and impacts on
communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression thresholds are related
to wildfire behaviour parameters throughout jurisdictions internationally.
Where inappropriate predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that
does not support the assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling, otherwise
defendable areas may be left unguarded due inappropriate evaluation of
suppression strategies.
When considering the suitability of fire suppression strategies, there are
factors other than radiant heat flux that also require consideration. These are
addressed in Sections 4-7.
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3.10

Implications for urban planners

Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens, public
open space, road reserves, and residential areas within urban areas. In turn,
land that is actually suitable for development may be identified as being
subject to overestimated wildfire impact which restricts or prohibits
development altogether. Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a
small unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a
landscape scale wildfire, in turn restricting or prohibiting development on
adjacent and near-by lots.
Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire resistant
construction standards of affected dwellings and structures that hinders
development through either misidentification of land as being subject to
unacceptable levels of wildfire impact, or through making development
cost-prohibitive as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering and
construction required.
In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the vegetation
availability factor previously discussed, the methodologies proposed also
retain the assumption of a flame emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a
landscape scale wildfire with an active uniform flame front depth greater
than 2 m, and even potentially greater than 10 m (Poon, 2003; Sullivan, 2009).
In cases where the active flame front will not reach this depth, it may also be
suitable to reduce the emissivity. It is important to note that whilst the
vegetation factor and modified view factor model are applicable to all fuel
types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub, grassland, etc.), the point source
acceleration model presented in this Section is suitable for treed forest and
woodland structures only, as fire growth in other fuel structures may be
significantly faster.
The models presented in this Section are not intended to address the
potential radiant heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being involved
in fire. In part, this is inherently considered within AS3959 through the
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requirement that associated structures on the same parcel of land and within
6m of the dwelling subject to enhanced construction standards, must also be
constructed to that same standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the
land development should be constructed to the required standard of wildfire
resistance,

in

theory

significantly

reducing

the

potential

for

mass

conflagration spreading between multiple houses. Due to the differences in
wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation models as well as the
difference in building and structure performance once impacted by wildfire,
it is suggested that a high level of technical expertise is required to complete
this process.

Section 4 – Wildfire suppression
4.1. Introduction
Where wildfires occur yet pose no threat to life, critical infrastructure,
private assets or cultural and environmental areas of significance it is possible
to simply allow the fire to self-extinguish once it runs out of available fuel or
rainfall occurs.

Unfortunately this is rarely possible in populated areas

common throughout developed nations and significant intervention is
required by fire and emergency services to suppress wildfires and minimise
their impacts.

This section discusses wildfire suppression strategies and

presents evidence and analysis of available options to assist Incident
Controllers to make critical incident decisions during chaotic and large
wildfire incidents.

4.2. Strategies
Whilst offensive strategies involve actively combatting the fire, defensive
strategies are employed when the fire behaviour is too intense to be safely
attacked. Defensive strategies utilise tactics that do not involve active fire
suppression including building containment lines and focusing on evacuation
of people or livestock (DFES, 2012).

When attempting to suppress severe

wildfire, a combination of strategies may be necessary depending on the fire
behaviour, availability of resources, accessibility and fuel structure. When
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incorrect strategies are applied firefighting crews may find themselves
overrun by wildfire, known as a burnover.

In such instances, unless the

wildfire behaviour is particularly mild, the results can be fatal.

4.3. Offensive tactics

Direct firefighting attack involves firefighters (including personnel,
firefighting appliances, machines and aircraft) directly attacking the wildfire
using the tactics of either head attack or flank attack. A direct head attack
(see figures 4.1-4.3) involves firefighting efforts directly against the head fire
before moving down either flank once the head fire is suppressed; a direct
tail attack involves attacking the bushfire from the rear and working along
the flanks towards the head fire; and a direct flank attack involves attacking
the side of the fire and working around the head and tail. The direct tail
attack is the “preferred method of suppression” (DFES, 2012, p11) as it
reduces the potential for crews to be caught in a burnover due to a wind
change that turns the flank into the greater head fire. Direct head attacks
expose firefighters to the most severe wildfire behaviour, which reduces
towards the tail. All tactics require firefighters to be able to access the fire
edge in order to extinguish the fire. In dense forest fuels or in difficult terrain,
this may be problematic and result in firefighters attempting to extinguish
bushfire wherever they can in a patchwork manner.

Where this occurs

suppression efforts are likely to be less than optimal and result in unrestrained
wildfire propagation as well as placing firefighters in unnecessary danger.
Advantages and disadvantages of a direct attack reported in DFES (2012)
are summarised in Table 4.1.
15Table 4.1: Advantages and disadvantages of a direct attack

Advantages
Minimises the area burnt.

Disadvantages
Only possible on low intensity fires
with flame heights <1.5m to 2m.
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Reduces the likelihood of fire gaining
momentum with changes in weather,
fuel or topography factors.
Uses any dead edge of the fire to get
the fire contained quickly.
May allow safe night work.
Usually allows retreat onto burnt
ground.

Crews are more exposed to heatrelated illnesses such as heat stroke,
heat exhaustion, heat cramps and
smoke inhalation.
If fire behaviour changes or there is a
weakness in the control line, the fire
can quickly escape.
It may produce an irregular, winding
control line.

(a)

(b)
(c)
40Figure 4.1: Direct head attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c)
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(a)

(b)

(c)
41Figure 4.2: Direct tail attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c)
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(a)

(b)

(c)
42Figure 4.3: Direct flank attack - commencement (a), ongoing (b), near completion (c)

Parallel attacks involve construction of control lines by personnel using
hand tools or machines as close as possible to the flanks of the bushfire (Figure
4.4). The intent of the parallel attack is to establish fuel-free containment
boundaries that the fire cannot cross.

Retardant drops by firefighting

aircraft may be used to reduce wildfire behaviour approaching containment
line to increase the potential for containment lines to hold.

When

considering the establishment of parallel control lines or breaks, both the
production rates of firefighters with hand tools and machinery, as well as the
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required break width need to be considered as the production of control
lines must exceed the bushfire’s rate of spread in order for the fire to be
contained. Whilst supporting literature regarding these factors is limited, fire
line potential rates of construction are detailed in Tables 4.3-4.5, (McCarthy,
Tolhurst and Wouters ,2003 cited in FESA, 2011). Required fire break widths in
low intensity grassfire events where spotting is a possibility are detailed in
Table 4.6 (Cheney and Sullivan, 1997 cited in FESA, 2011). In more extreme
forest wildfires where flame lengths may reach 40-50m and spotting of several
hundred meters is possible (Gould et al, 2007) control lines will likely be
inneffective

against

an

established

headfire.

Advantages

and

disadvantages of a parallel attack reported in DFES (2012) are summarised in
Table 4.2.
16Table 4.2: Advantages and disadvantages of a parallel attack

Advantages
Control line may be shorter and
straighter than in a direct attack.
Crews may be less exposed to heat and
smoke.

Disadvantages
There is an increased chance of fire
escaping.
Total fire area will be greater.

17Table 17.3: Rates of fireline construction using handtools (adapted from FESA, 2011)

Elevated Fuel

Construction rate (meters
per person per hour)

Construction rate when
0.5m flames within 5m of
crew

Low
High
Very high / extreme

24
19
14

16
13
10
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18Table 4.4: Rates of fireline construction by machines (adapted from FESA, 2011)
Machine

Flat production
rate (m/hr)

15° slope production
rate (m/hr)

Comments

D4 &
Wheeled
Loader

700
630
470

420
380
200

300

60
10° slope production
rate (m/hr)

No debris
Some debris – can handle
Some debris – can
manage
Substantial – D6 required

900
700

730
550

450

375

350

270

D6-D9

Little debris
Some debris – D4 can
manage
Significant debris – D6+
required
Very significant debris –
D6+ has difficulty

19Table 4.5: Fireline construction rates (adapted from McCarthy, Tolhurst & Wouters, 2003)
Method / Appliance

Mean production
rate (meters per
hour)

Note

Firefighters using
hand tools

13.7 per person

D4

505

D6

640

D7

570

D9

560

A total of 34 incidents were reviewed and
average firefighter experience was high
(reported as a mean of 0.8 out of 1).
Minimum crew of 5, maximum of 60
firefighters.
A total of 34 D4 performances were
reviewed.
A total of 16 D6 performances were
reviewed.
A total of 9 D7 performances were
reviewed.
A total of 7 D9 performances were
reviewed.

Notes regarding the study:
1. Maximum flame height for the 103 incidents reviewed for the study was 5m;
and
2. The study does not specify the width of the fire line created.
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20Table 4.6: Required firebreak width for spotting vegetation (adapted from FESA, 2011)

Fire line intensity
(kW/m)
1000

Firebreak width

Anticipated success

10
7.5

High
Moderate

43Figure 4.4: Parallel attack

Identified as one of the most difficult strategies to implement properly in
the face of wildfire impact at the urban interface, backburning is the only
potentially successful tactic available for combatting large, fast moving or
intense and inaccessible fires (DFES, 2012).

As illustrated in Figure 4.5, it

involves the deliberate burning out of vegetation fuel between established
control lines and the approaching fire front and must be undertaken with
extreme care to avoid the creation of additional uncontrollable fire fronts.
Advantages and disadvantages of backburning reported in DFES (2012) are
shown in Table 4.7, however it is again noted no supporting research or
justification was provided to substantiate the statements. Due to the nature
of backburning, DFES (2014) identifies several conditions that prohibit
backburns being utilised, listed as:
1. The fire is running under extreme conditions;
2. Long distance spotting is occurring;
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3. The location of the fire edge is not known;
4. There are no adequate or existing control lines;
5. There are insufficient resources to construct and hold the backburn;
6. There is not enough time to allow penetration of the backburn to a
safe depth; and
7. The forecast weather conditions will lead to extreme fire behaviour
before the backburn can be secured.
21Table 4.7: Advantages and disadvantages of backburning

Advantages
May stop the progress of a rapidly
moving bushfire.
May be the most practicable method
of bushfire suppression for difficult
terrain.

(a)

Disadvantages
Increased total fire area.
If the backburn escapes control, the
progress of the main fire is
accelerated.
It can endanger the lives of firefighters
It may produce intense fire behaviour
at the junction between the backburn
and the main fire front.
It requires considerable time to
effectively establish.
It requires substantial resources to light
and patrol.

(b)

44Figure 4.5: Backburning – point source ignition (a) and line ignition (b)
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Although the use of fire through hazard reduction burns (HRB’s) and
backburning are utilised internationally for conservation, to reduce
uncontrolled wildfire behaviour and to enhance the potential for successful
suppression (Boer et al., 2009; Grant & Wouters, 1993; Marsden-Smedley, 2011;
Stratton, 2004; VBRC, 2010; Wimberly et al., 2009; Ingalsbee, 2015), the
effectiveness of these strategies in specifically reducing wildfire impact on
communities remains uncertain (Fernandes & Herminio, 2003; Florec, 2016;
McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001; Oliveras & Bell, 2008; Penman et al., 2011). Even
studies which report potential economic benefits of prescribed burn
programs from a suppression perspective (Kuzenko, 2000; Florec, 2016; Silva
& Gozalez-Caban, 2010), do not provide comparison of the total economic
or life loss from wildfires where HRB’s were, or were not present. Whilst HRB’s
remain an essential part of Australian wildfire related risk mitigation (AFAC,
2016; McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001), and backburning remains an important
aspect of wildfire suppression (DFES, 2014; Ingalsbee, 2015; Penney et al.,
2019a) the effectiveness of these programs in relation to the specific
objective of protecting people and buildings from the effects of wildfire is
unknown.
Illustrated in equation 4.1, the concept of effectiveness is described as a
product of efficacy and reliability (Thomas, 2002) and facilitates a numerical
measure of effectiveness allowing firefighting measures to be quantitatively
compared. Efficiency of HRB’s (EffHRB) can then be calculated to provide a
numerical measure against which to evaluate HRB’s against the set
objectives.
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

(4.1)

As Thomas (2002) explains efficacy is the degree to which a
system/process achieves an objective given it operates / is executed. The
efficacy the process will be different depending on the objective.

For

example, if HRB’s are intended to eliminate house damage at the rural urban
interface (RUI) from wildfire impacts its efficacy is:
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•

One (1) if there were no houses damaged whenever prescribed
burns were present and a wildfire occurred that would have
otherwise impacted the houses;

•

Between zero (0) and one (1) if the rate of houses damaged
whenever prescribed burns were present and a wildfire occurred
that would have otherwise impacted the houses was reduced
compared to otherwise identical situations where prescribed burns
were not present;

•

Zero (0) if the rate of damaged houses remained the same whether
prescribed burns were present or not; and

•

Negative if the rate of damaged houses increased when
prescribed burns were present and a wildfire occurred that would
have otherwise impacted the houses.

HRB’s work to reduce the severity of wildfire behaviour by reducing the
understory (and potentially bark) fuels available for consumption during a
subsequent wildfire event. Depending on the rate of vegetation regrowth,
HRB’s may reduce subsequent wildfire behaviour in the same area for up to
ten years post burn completion (McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001; Penman et al.,
2011; VBRC, 2010). However, a HRB may potentially stop a wildfire head fire
for only the first two years (VBRC, 2010) and even then only under certain
conditions.

Firstly, the HRB must be suitably placed in order for the

uncontrolled wildfire to impact it (in other words they are reliable).
Secondly, as reported by McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001), as fire weather
conditions worsen the probability of a HRB having any impact on an
established wildfire significantly decreases.

As illustrated in Figure 4.6

(McCarthy & Tolhurst, 2001, Figure 6), even with a moderate overall fuel
hazard score, once the Fire Danger Index reaches 50 the efficacy of the HRB
slowing the wildfire head fire drops to below 0.6. At increased overall hazard
scores and higher Fire Danger Indices, the efficacy of a previous HRB slowing
the wildfire head fire rapidly drops below 0.2. During a study of a different
area by the same authors involving 2425 wildfires on public land, the overall
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efficacy of HRB’s assisting suppression efforts was reported to be even lower
at 0.11. In some instances HRB’s have even been reported to have negative
efficacy (McCormick, 2002) where 30% of forest HRB’s studied in the Blue
Mountains in NSW had a negative effect. This negative effect was reported
to occur due to the curing of scrub fuels greater than 0.5m above the
ground, even if understorey fuels below that height were consumed.
The efficacy of a HRB in reducing spotting and new fire behaviour is
dependent on its ability to remove bark, particularly of stringy bark fuels
which contribute significantly to spotting behaviour and the ignition of new
fires (Grant & Wouters, 1993). Where spotting occurs there is the potential for
those spot fires to grow into uncontrolled wildfires having attaining a quasisteady rate of spread in their own right. Depending largely on vertical fuel
understory fuel structure and wind penetration (McRae, 1999), in forest fuels
this may take in excess of 30 minutes (Finney & McAllister, 2011; Kucuk, Bilgili
& Baysal, 2007; McAlpine, 1988; Penney & Stevenson, 2019) and may not
occur until a head fire width of approximately 150m is reached (Cheney &
Gould, 1997). The potential result of this may be that whilst the size of the final
wildfire that impacts urban areas may be less than that of the original wildfire,
this does not necessarily mean the wildfire impacts on life or property may
actually be reduced. Recent work into the effect of fuel bed geometry on
wildfire growth (Penney & Stevenson, 2019), firefighter tenability during
wildfire suppression (Penney at al, 2019a) and critical flow rates for wildfire
extinguishment (Penney et al., 2019b) suggests that there will be little if any
difference in the ability for firefighters to suppress the ‘new’ headfire/s without
substantial aerial suppression once they attain a quasi-state of spread and
an active head fire depth of more than 2m. In such instances the efficacy
of the HRB’s would be close to zero if the objective was defined as reducing
wildfire behaviour that would facilitate active suppression of the head fire by
firefighter direct attack using machinery.
In this same context, reliability is the probability that prescribed burns are
in the correct place when required, in other words they are intentionally
positioned so that they will be impacted by wildfire. For example, if the area
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affected by prescribed burns are always impacted by wildfires the reliability
is one (1). If the area affected by prescribed burns are impacted by wildfires
only half the time then the reliability is 0.5. In a study of 114 wildfires between
1990 to 1998, McCarthy and Tolhurst (2001) reported only 69 of all wildfires
analysed encountered a HRB, equivalent to a reliability of 0.61. This figure
increased 0.92 to when only fires within “Zone 1” were assessed. Zone 1 was
identified as the most proximal to development where the objective was to
protect human life, property and assets and therefore subject to significantly
reduced overall fuel hazard scores compared to outer lying zones.

The

same authors reported this figure dropped to less than 0.25 in Zone 1 areas
during a study of a different area involving 2425 wildfires on public land. This
variance is not unexpected, with as the reliability of HRB’s is highly dependent
on the area being examined.

45Figure 4.6. Probability of previous prescribed burn slowing the headfire of a subsequent
wildfire as a function of Overall Fuel Hazard and Fire Danger Index. (Probability of "1.0" means
"certain", probability of "0" means "not possible".)

Reproduced with permission of the

Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning Victoria
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Fire services throughout Australia, America, Canada, Europe and New
Zealand consider predicted and reported wildfire behaviour including head
fire RoS, fire line intensity (I) and flame length (LF) when determining the
suitability of suppression strategies and tactics.

Penney et al. (2019a)

reported that out of the literature reviewed from the various jurisdictions, only
Western Australia utilised RoS as a marker for wildfire suppression strategies in
forest or woodland fuel structures.

The reported thresholds were readily

suppressed (<0.06kph); hand tool attack possible (<0.14kph); direct machine
attack possible (<0.4kph); direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed
(>0.4kph); and indirect attack likely to fail (>0.8kph).
Even within fire services some variance exists between strategy thresholds
as detailed in Tables 4.8 (DFES, 2014) and 4.9 (Smith, 2013) which show values
for forest fuels. DFES (2014, p79) also identifies that for tall eucalypt forest,
“aerial suppression is of limited effect with fire intensities over 2000kW/m”.
International literature revealed marked variance between jurisdictional
thresholds.

Thresholds for the United States of America are identified in

Tables 4.10 and 4.11 (Deeming et al., 1978 cited in Hirsch and Martell, 1996;
Andrews and Rothemel, 1982 and Rothemel, 1983, also cited in Hirsch &
Martell, 1996). Canadian thresholds, Alexander and DeGroot (1988) cited in
Hirsch and Martell (1996) are shown illustrated in Table 4.12. European
thresholds (EuroFire, 2012) are identified in Table 4.13 whilst thresholds
adopted by New Zealand (Alexander, 2000) are detailed in Table 4.14.
22Table 4.8: Fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia
Fire Danger

Flame Height (m)

Intensity (kW/m)

Significance

Low

0-0.5

0-50

Fires generally self-extinguish

Moderate

0.5-1.5

50-500

Hand tool line should hold the fire.
Direct attack possible.
97

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

High

1.5-3.0

500-2000

Fire too intense for direct attack.
Parallel attack recommended.

Very high

3.0-10.0

2000-4000

Crown fire at upper intensities.
Indirect attack recommended.

Extreme

>10

>4000

Crowning, spotting and major runs
likely.

Control

ineffective.

efforts

probably

Defensive strategy

recommended.

23Table 4.9: Head fire behaviour and firefighting strategies in Western Australia
Rate of Spread

Intensity (kW/m)

Significance

<60

<800

Readily suppressed.

<140

<800

Hand tool attack possible.

<400

<2000

Direct machine attack possible.

>400

>2000

Direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed.

>800

>4000 or >5000*

Indirect attack likely to fail.

(m/hr)

*both values are cited in the same table and category

24Table 4.10: Head fire behaviour and strategies - USA (Deeming et al. 1978)
Flame Length

Intensity (kW/m)

Significance

0.9

<173

Behaviour associated with most prescribed burns.

1.2

346

Limit of control for manual attack methods.

2.4

1730

The prospects for control by any means are poor

(m)

above this limit.
2.8

2422

The “heat load” on people within 30 feet of the fire is
dangerous

3.3

3460

Spotting,

fire

whirls

and

crowning

should

be

expected.
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25Table 4.11: Head fire behaviour and strategies - USA (Andrews & Rothemal, 1982;
Rothemel, 1983)
Flame Length

Intensity (kW/m)

Significance

<1.2

<346

Manual attack on the head fire possible.

1.2-1.4

346-1730

Machine attack on the head fire possible.

2.4-3.4

1730-3460

Control efforts at the head fire will probably be

(m)

ineffective.
>3.4

>3460

Crowing, spotting and major fire runs are probable.
Control efforts at the head fire are ineffective.

26Table 4.12: Head fire behaviour and strategies - Canada
Flame Length

Intensity (kW/m)

Significance

<0.2

<10

Readily suppressed.

0.2-1.4

10-500

Direct manual attack possible.

1.4-2.6

500-2000

Direct machine attack possible.

2.6-3.5

2000-4000

Control efforts at head fire may fail.

>3.5

>4000

Intermittent

(m)

crown

fire

to

active

crown

fire

development (at >10000kW/m). Suppression efforts
must be restricted to fire flanks.

Violent fire

behaviour at intensities >30000kW and suppression
activities should not be attempted until burning
conditions ameliorate.

27Table 4.13: Head fire behaviour and strategies - Europe
Flame Length

Significance

(m)
<0.5

Fires generally self extinguish.

0.5-1.5

Direct hand tool attack possible.

1.5-2.5

Direct machine attack possible. Flank / parallel attack recommended.

2.5-3.5

Too intense for direct attack.

3.5-8

Indirect attack possible.

>8

Extreme fire behaviour. Defensive strategies recommended.
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28Table 4.14: Head fire behaviour and strategies - New Zealand
Intensity

Significance

(kW/m)
<500

Direct hand tool attack possible.

500-2000

Direct machine attack possible.

2000-4000

Helitanks and airtankers using chemical fire retardants.

>4000

Very difficult if not impossible to control.

Applying the Noble et al (1980) forest model, as illustrated in Figure 4.7,
Penney et al (2019a) reported the operational RoS thresholds identified by
Smith (2011) are exceeded in all but the sparsest of understorey (w) fuel loads
and mildest fire weather conditions associated with an FDI less than 20.
Hand tool attack is not considered possible once available understory fuel
loads exceed 5 t/ha, regardless of FDI, whilst the direct machine attack
threshold is also rapidly exceeded once the FDI exceeds 20 for understory
fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha.

Indirect attack thresholds are exceeded

once an FDI of 45 is reached in understory fuel loads of 15 t/ha.

At an

understory of 25 t/ha, identified as the standard fuel load in AS3959 (2019),
direct machine attack is only suitable at FDIs ≤10 and the indirect attack
threshold is exceeded once the FDI exceeds approximately 23.
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46Figure 4.7. Tactic suitability according to RoS

When considering fire line intensity (I) thresholds, Penney et al. (2019a)
reported whilst there is general agreement across international jurisdictions
regarding direct attack tactical thresholds in forest or woodland fuel
structures, discrepancy occurs between direct machine attack thresholds as
well as when the head fire is considered uncontrollable. Western Australian,
New Zealand and Canadian thresholds are the most aggressive, identifying
direct machine attack on the headfire suitable to 2000 kWm-1 and indirect
attack suitable to 3000-4000 kWm-1 compared to the United States which
considers the headfire control limit to be 1730 kWm-1, dangerous conditions
present within 30 feet (9.14m) of the head fire at 2422 kWm-1 and the head
fire to be undefendable at 3460 kWm-1. Only Canada identified a limit for
suppression efforts to cease, being 10,000 kWm-1 almost three times higher
than the undefendable threshold set by the United States.
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Illustrated in Figure 4.8, Penney et al. (2019a) reported that once understory
fuel loads exceed 20 t/ha headfire behaviour is recognised as undefendable
across all jurisdictions regardless of the FDI. Utilising American thresholds, I is
recognised as resulting in dangerous conditions within 30 ft of the head fire
at all FDIs once a surface fuel load of 15 t/ha is exceeded.

The lower

Canadian intensity threshold of 10,000 kWm-1 to cease all wildfire suppression
activities can be exceeded under the right fire weather conditions once
surface fuel loads reach 10 t/ha, and can be breached at an FDI as low as
30 when surface fuels exceed 20 t/ha. The higher Canadian I threshold of
30,000 kWm-1 is breached once surface fuels exceed 20 t/ha and the FDI
exceeds 80.
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47Figure 4.8. Tactic suitability according to fire line intensity
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Penney et al. (2019) reported Western Australia adopted the most
aggressive LF tactical thresholds in forest or woodland fuel structures. Whilst
there is again general agreement at lower flame length, there is increased
variance as LF increases. Western Australia’s Parallel Attack LF threshold of 3
m is greater than both the 2.5m European limit for Parallel Attack and the
2.8m LF the United States recognises as creating dangerous conditions within
30ft of the head fire, whilst the Western Australian indirect attack limit of 10 m
is almost three times greater than the head fire undefendable threshold of
3.4m set by the United States.
As detailed in Figure 4.9 (Penney et al, 2019a), when LF thresholds are used,
offensive suppression strategies are considered unsuitable or dangerous for
all landscape scale wildfires burning in understory fuel loads exceeding
15t/ha regardless of fire weather conditions.

Further, fire behaviour is

recognised as dangerous within 30ft of the head fire in all understory fuel
loads once an FDI of 30 is attained.

There is strong agreement between

direct personnel attack thresholds between jurisdictions with direct personnel
attack / manual attack on the head fire identified as inappropriate due to
LF across all scenarios regardless of understory fuel loads and at all FDIs. Only
two jurisdictions suggest a direct machine attack on the head fire is suitable,
and only in the mildest head fire behaviour arising from understory fuel loads
of 5 t/ha and at an FDI of 5 (USA) and 10 (Canada).
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48Figure 4.9. Tactic suitability according to flame length
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Penney et al (2019a) reported little agreement between the results of the
Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model (DEFFM) and Noble model analysis.

In

comparison to Noble, DEFFM analysis under predicted RoS, I and LF across all
geographic regions once fuels reached three to four years in age and a FDI
of 30 to 40 was attained.

Applying DEFFM alone, direct machine attack

RoS thresholds were reached across all geographical jurisdictions when fuels
reached four to five years of age, direct machine attack I thresholds were
reached at five to nine years of age whilst direct machine attack LF thresholds
were reached across all geographical jurisdictions at fuel ages between
three to nine years.
Comparative Nobel and DEFFM modelling across all fire weather
conditions and utilising typical forest fuel loads in Western Australia (a sample
of these results is illustrated for RoS in Jarrah Mosaic -Figure 4.10; I in Jarrah
South - Figure 4.11; and LF in Jarrah East - Figure 4.12) revealed DEFFM analysis
typically over estimated wildfire behaviour below an FDI of 30 to 50, above
this range DEFFM analysis typically significantly underestimated wildfire
behaviour across all fuel ages and jurisdictions. Fire line intensity suppression
thresholds were typically exceeded across all jurisdictions once fuel ages
reached 3 to 4 years and an FDI of 30 was reached, with the United States
‘dangerous within 30ft’ threshold rapidly exceeded under the same
conditions. LF suppression thresholds were typically exceeded with most
jurisdictions considering the head fire to be undefendable due to fire
behaviour once fuels reached 3 to 5 years of age and an FDI of 30 attained.
Only Western Australia and Europe considered head fires to be defendable
above these limits, albeit using indirect suppression tactics.
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49Figure 4.10. Tactic suitability – the relationship between rate of spread, fuel age and
various suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah Mosaic)
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50Figure 4.11. Tactic suitability – the relationship between fire line intensity, fuel age and
various suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah South)
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51Figure 4.12. Tactic suitability – the relationship between flame length, fuel age and various
suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah East)
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Comparing the calculated fire behaviour outputs (RoS, IFL and LF) with the
associated base inputs of FDI, w and fuel age and comparing the results to
international wildfire suppression thresholds a single strategic guidance table
can be produced (Penney et al., 2019). As shown in Table 4.15, the result is
that safe offensive strategies on the head fire are identified as appropriate in
only the mildest of conditions or where fuel structure does not facilitate
significant head fire propagation (Penney & Stevenson, 2019). It is important
to note this guidance is intended for established siege wildfires of significant
proportion such as those reviewed by Keelty (2011, 2012), Ferguson (2016)
and the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2010).

As discussed in

Sections 2 and 3, smaller wildfires such as those experienced within closed
urban environments do not achieve the same Heat Release Rates or
produce the same behaviour outputs as established wildfires which may
subsequently allow more aggressive offensive suppression strategies and
tactics. In these instances, as opposed to utilising Table 4.15, it is necessary
to apply the Vegetation Availability Factor as appropriate when predicting
potential wildfire behaviour and manually determining whether suppression
and tenability thresholds are exceeded.
29Table 4.15: Wildfire head fire suppression guide
Siege Wildfire Head Fire Suppression
FDI/w (t/ha)
10

20

30
40

5

10

15

Legend

20

25

30

DM – Direct

DM
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Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age
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Fuel Age

attack

< 5yrs

< 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

IA

IA

DEF

DEF

DEF
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IA – Indirect

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

attack

< 10yrs

< 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

≥ 10yrs

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF
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Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Fuel Age

Defensive

≥ 10yrs

≥ 10yrs
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≥ 10yrs
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DEF
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–

for
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4.4. Defensive tactics
Defensive tactics are utilised when fire behaviour is too intense to be safely
or effectively attacked. As opposed to offensive tactics, defensive tactics
do not attempt to suppress the bushfire itself, but rather limit the
consequences of its impacts through evacuation, community information
and the protection in place of vulnerable communities and critical
infrastructure.

The protect-in-place / shelter-in-place defensive Rural Urban Interface
(RUI) firefighting tactic is typically utilised where communities and
infrastructure are located within or immediately adjacent to vegetation that
will support landscape scale bushfire behaviour, (DFES, 2013). It can be a
high risk approach as not all homes are defensible (Cova, 2005) or
constructed to withstand wildfire impacts.

Illustrated in Figure 4.13, RUI
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defense essentially requires firefighting crews to position themselves between
an identified asset and the approaching bushfire front (DFES, 2013).

As

detailed in Penney, et al. (2019a) however, it should be noted that this type
of suppression tactic may expose firefighters to untenable conditions well in
advance of the wildfire front itself and may be ineffective due to insufficient
water flow rates. These factors are explored further in Sections 5 and 6. As
an alternative RUI defense to this high risk tactic, particularly where buildings
are constructed in accordance with AS3959 (SAI Global, 2018), protection of
houses and the sheltering population may be achieved by firefighters
sheltering inside the buildings until after the passage of the head fire and they
can safely extingish spot fires and reminant flames. Where evacuations of
large vulnerable communities are not possible, as may be the case for
hospitals, schools, aged care facilities and trapped communities etc, the
shelter-in-place defense remains a necessary approach. In such instances
sheltering in the safest possibly buildings distal from the fire front should be
considered. Preemptive retardent line building from fixed wing and rotary
firefighting aircraft, coupled with enhanced direct aerial suppression of the
section of the head fire impacting the protected structures should also be
undertaken wherever possible.
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52Figure 4.13: RUI defense

The Rural Urban Interface Model or RUIM (Penney et al., 2020 – under
consideration) can be used when considering whether there is sufficient time
to set up RUI defense prior to the impact of the head fire. Based on Australian
and international RUI wildfire fighting strategies and tactics, the RUIM
represents the expansion of the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (AFAC, 2004)
to the specific context of firefighting defense at the RUI. When completed,
the RUIM assists the Incident Management Team determine whether there is
sufficient time for taskforce’s assigned to protect life, property and critical
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infrastructure at the RUI, subsequently known as RUI taskforce’s, to safely
mobilise, prepare for, and find shelter prior to the arrival of the wildfire and
the untenable conditions which can occur well in advance of the headfire
front. deterministic analysis of Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT)
versus Required Safe RUI Preparation Time (RSRPT) can be applied:

ASRPT is calculated by:

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

(4.2)

(4.3)

Where the distance between the headfire and RUI is the lineal separation
between the headfire and the structures under threat; and the headfire rate
of spread is calculated using appropriate equations for the vegetation type
and fuel structure involved, such as those described in (Gould et al, 2007, SAI
Global 2018, Cruz et al., 2015).
Illustrated in figure 4.14, RSRPT is calculated by:
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

(4.4)

Where TR is the time taken for the RUI taskforce to respond; TT is travel time
(to a base, staging area and/or the RUI itself); THL is time to complete and
assessment of the immediate area and set up hose lines; TS is the time taken
for crews to seek shelter within a structure prior to the arrival of untenable
conditions associated with the wildfire front. Safety factors (FS) are included
at each stage of the process. Each of these components are discussed
separately in this manuscript.
The main differences between the RUIM and FBIM are:
1. FBIM requires the firefighting strategy and associated tactics to be
determined. In RUI firefighting, the strategies are limited to either
‘backstop defense’ or sheltering within the structures. The RUIM
reflects this accordingly;
2. Wildfire suppression during large campaign wildfires such as those
in California (CAFS, 2018; USFD & CDFFP, 2003), Greece (CBS, 2018)
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or Victoria (BCRC, 2009) required the mobilization of military,
interstate

and

even

international

firefighting

assistance.

Suppression efforts are protracted, lasting weeks and firefighting
crews will be drawn from many regions and are likely to be
unfamiliar with the operational area, particularly during the
escalation phases of the incident.

This results in greater

uncertainty compared to metropolitan structural fire response,
therefore some of the decision points and pathways of the FBIM are
not appropriate to the wildfire context;
3. RUI firefighting does not involve crews committing to internal
structural firefighting as structures actively on fire are identified as
undefendable (DFES, 2013 & 2014). Therefore external suppression
of structures only is considered in the RUIM; and
4. The RUIM also allows for Available Safe Time to Critical Points or
ASTCP to be calculated, enabling critical components of the
response including wildfire impacts on access routes, evacuations
and other aspects to be deterministically assessed.

This further

enhances firefighter safety when responding to areas involving
active wildfire.
Similarities between the RUIM and FBIM are:
1. Both models rely on the systematic completion to determine the
total time to complete the required activities;
2. Both models require the identification of the critical path, being the
sequence of activities determining the minimum time required for
the firefighting intervention;
3. Whilst neither model provides a definitive answer for the duration
of mobilization and suppression efforts, both the RUIM and FBIM
provide useful guidance for Incident Controllers when making
operational decisions; and
4. Both models can be improved with enhanced data.
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One limitation of the RUIM is the presence of spot fires that grow into new
head fires well in advance of the original fire front are not automatically
considered due to the difficulty in accurately forecasting spot fire formation.
Where spotting results in new wildfires in advance of the original head fire
result from spotting, the ASRPT must be revised appropriately.

This is not

unique to the RUIM however as new fires within an urban structure require a
new timeframe to be established. As with any model, they are only one tool
firefighters and Incident Controllers can utilise to assist the decision making
process.

Field validation and current and reliable intelligence will further

assist to increase the accuracy of predictions.
For each of the RUIM stages in the boxes of Figure 4.14, separate flow
charts and associated tables are required to be referred to in order to
calculate the total RSRPT.

Whilst firefighters will complete property

protection tasks prior to seeking shelter inside the building of refuge, the time
available to complete the property protection (shaded in Figure 4.14) is
calculated after the other stages as it is not in the critical path of completing
RUI defense. To calculate RSRPT, the Incident Controller or relevant officer
should commence at Box 1 in Figure 4.15 and work their way through the
RUIM until all time components have been calculated. The incorporation of
safety factors and/or percentiles into the RUIM is also essential (AFAC, 2004;
ICC et al., 2005; SFS, 2007) due to:
1. Fire safety engineering, especially wildfire engineering, being a
discipline based on complex science which is neither exact or
complete (AFAC, 2004);
2. The potential for mass fatalities associated with firefighters’ convoys
being caught in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil
& Killalea, 2010; Blanchi et al., 2014);
3. The potential for untenable conditions occurring well in advance
of the wildfire front (Penney et al., 2019); and the complexity of
significant wildfire events, the incorporation of a safety factors
and/or percentiles is also required.
116

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

As AFAC (2004, p26) reports
“Fire safety engineering is a discipline based upon a complex science
which is neither exact nor complete. For a realistic result to be achieved,
informed approximations and expert judgement must be employed. In
order to ensure safety, appropriate margins are required in the analysis.”
To account for firefighter fatigue, varying levels of firefighter proficiency and
other uncertainties that can affect fire service response, utilizing a percentile
approach can also be incorporated into the RUIM. The mean values
provided in this manuscript are sourced from AFAC (2004) and are
representative of the particular activity being completed within the stated
duration, 50% of the time.

Due to the severity of the consequences of

burnover, it is suitable to incorporate a greater percentile. For reference,
AFAC (2004) suggests a 90th percentile is suitable, meaning a particular
activity will be completed within the stated duration 90% of the time.
Adopting a conservative approach, the relationship between X percentile
and k standard deviations can be expressed as:

𝑘𝑘 = �

100
100 − 𝑋𝑋

(4.5)

When the distribution is unknown, for X = 90, k = 3.17 (AFAC, 2004), however
where the average time is at least several standard deviations greater than
zero, it is reasonable to assume the distribution to be normal and for X = 90, k
= 1.28 (AFAC, 2004). Using the example of an “officer size up” where the
mean (μ) is 135 seconds and the standard deviation (σ) is 20 seconds, the
90th percentile can then be expressed as:
90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇 + 1.28𝜎𝜎

(4.6)

90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 135 + (1.28 × 20) = 160.6 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

Where the calculation involves speed as opposed to time, the equation
becomes:
90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇 − 1.28𝜎𝜎

(4.7)
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The use of safety multipliers or factors is also recommended. As AFAC (2004)
describes, where the scientific basis for a well-established discipline is sound,
a relatively small safety factor (FS) as low as 1.2 may be suitable. In keeping
with the recommendations of the FBIM, a safety factor of 2 should be
considered for the RUIM. As opposed to applying a single safety factor at
the completion of the model, the correct approach to incorporating safety
factors is to apply them after each individual stage. This is demonstrated in
the case study presented later in this section.

53Figure 4.14: Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) methodology

This represents the time taken for firefighters to respond to the dispatch /
turnout message and respond to either the staging area, or the RUI to be
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defended. It considers whether the taskforce is pre-assembled or must first
mobilise to the staging area from various locations.

54Figure 4.15: RUI taskforce dispatch time flow chart.

Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 3,

p56)
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30Table 4.16: RUI taskforce dispatch flow chart explanation.

Adapted from AFAC (2004,

Table E, p106)

Box /
diamond
1

Description

This flowchart determines the time taken for firefighters
to respond to the dispatch / turnout message. It is the
time taken from activation of the turnout signal to the
time when the taskforce proceeds to the RUI to be
defended.
2
The RUI taskforce assembles at the staging point prior to
mobilizing to the RUI to be defended.
3
When assembled at the staging area and wearing PPC,
firefighters receive their briefing and crew their
machines immediately prior to mobilizing to the RUI to
be defended.
4
If the RUI taskforce hasn’t been assembled then
firefighters must first mobilize to the RUI taskforce
staging area from their home fire stations.
5
If firefighters are on station then they must respond to
the message to proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC
and depart.
6
If firefighters are not on station then (as may be the case
with volunteer stations) they must first drive to the fire
station prior to responding to the dispatch/turnout
message. Once on station the firefighters must respond
to the message to proceed to the RUI staging area, don
PPC and depart.
7
Figure 4.17 details the flowchart used for calculation of
fire appliance travel times.
8
Time for RUI taskforce to respond = sum of times in
shaded boxes along chosen paths.
*Sourced from AFAC (2004, Table E, p106)

Time (s)
n/a

n/a
60* to
1,200**

n/a

90*

480*
to
1,200**

Fig. 4.17
n/a

**Suggested realistic worst case scenario

This process can be used for determining both the time it takes for individual
appliances to reach the taskforce staging area (the area all crews assemble
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prior to being briefed and dispatched as one taskforce), and the time it takes
for the assembled taskforce to reached the RUI to be defended.

55Figure 4.16: RUI taskforce travel time flow chart.

Adapted from AFAC (2004, Chart 4, p60)
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31Table 4.17: Fire appliance and RUI taskforce travel flow chart explanation.
Box /
diamond
9

10

11

12

13

14

Description

Value

Time taken for individual appliances to reach RUI taskforce
staging area (use greatest time). Also the process used to
determine the time taken for the assembled taskforce to
reach the designated RUI.
If the response is along a defined route then the actual road
distance can be used (Box 11). If the route or the exact
distance of a route is unknown then the radial distance
multiplier (Box 12) applies.
Use the actual road distance.

n/a

n/a

Actual
route
(km)
Radial
distance
X 1.5 (km)
Table
4.18

AFAC (2004, p61) reports the radial distance multiplied by 1.5
provides a reasonable approximation of actual road distance
to be travelled.
AFAC (2004, Tables F1-F5) provide typical fire service travel
times for different Australian jurisdictions. The average of
these times is provided in Table 4.18 and may be used where
other data sets are not available (AFAC, 2004, p61).
Total travel time = distance travelled (Box 11 or 12) divided by
average expected speed (Box 13)

32Table 4.18: Mean fire appliance travel times, in kph.

n/a

Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables

F1-F5).
Context

Melbourne

Tasmania

South Australia

Average

μ

σ

μ

σ

μ

σ

μ

σ

Major city CBD

38.8

12.8

45.1

24.1

36.6

8.7

40.2

15.2

Major city inner suburb

44.3

12.0

51.0

20.3

41.4

7.3

45.6

13.2

Major city outer suburb

60.5

16.2

43.9

18.2

42.6

8.8

49.0

14.4

Rural town centre

-

-

54.9

25.6

-

-

54.9

25.6

Rural country

-

-

55.7

23.6

-

-

55.7

23.6

Travel through site

8

-

8

-

-

-

8

-

Note: other datasets from AFAC (2004) included firefighter response times which are
considered separately in RUIM Figure 4.15
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to set up
hose lines for the RUI defense. It provides flexibility around the individual RUI
tactics that individual fire services utilise.

56Figure 4.17: Time to set up RUI defence hose lines flow chart.

Adapted from AFAC (2004,

Charts 7&10)
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33Table 4.19: Time to set up RUI defence hose lines flow chart explanation.
Box /
diamond
15
16

17
18

19

20

Description

Value

Time taken for individual crews to set up hose lines in
preparation for RUI defense.
The Office in Charge must first complete a size up of the RUI
and determine which properties the taskforce will focus on.
This is considered to be equivalent to complex wayfinding in a
structure fire context (AFAC, 2004, Table K) and the time taken
to gather information in an area >10,000m2 (AFAC, 2004, Table
L). Total 135 seconds.
If lay flat hoses are used proceed to Box 18. If high pressure
hose reels are to be used proceed to Box 19.
Lay flat hose must be removed, connected and charged
from the appliance. Guidance is provided in Table 4.20,
amended from AFAC (2004, Table V, p110).
Appliance hose reel must be removed from appliance and
carried to position. Guidance is provided in Table 4.20,
amended from AFAC (2004, Table Q, p109) and is considered
equivalent to firefighter horizontal speed in PPC with
equipment.
Total time taken to set up RUI = sum of shaded boxes (16 + 18
or 19) along chosen path.

n/a

34Table 4.20: RUI defense activities and times.

135
seconds
Table
4.20
n/a
Table
4.20
Table
4.20

n/a

Adapted from AFAC (2004, Tables K, L, Q, V)

Activity

Time (s)
μ

σ

Officer in Charge size up

135

-

Remove and position high pressure hose reel*

15.8

23.1

Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 65mm

39.4**

17.4**

33.3**

15.4**

20.3**

13.2**

18.4**

10.2**

diameter hose
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 38mm
diameter hose
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 65mm diameter
hose
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 38mm diameter
hose
*Movement speed of firefighter in turnout uniform carrying equipment (AFAC, 2004, Table Q)
**Per 30m length of hose
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to seek
shelter in an appropriate refuge prior to the arrival of the wildfire front.
Assuming firefighters are only required to travel horizontally (i.e. no stairs
are involved) and firefighters move at μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3 (AFAC, 2004, Table
Q ‘dressed in turnout uniform with equipment’) the time taken for firefighters
to reach the building of refuge can be estimated by:
𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 (𝑚𝑚)
𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −1 )

(4.8)

Where Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge; SF is the
speed of the firefighters. In the absence of available data it is suggested
that as a worse case credible scenario it is appropriate to consider this
distance to be 90m, being three lengths of 30m hose consistent with the
tactics of RUI defense (DFES, 2013 & 2014).
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57Figure 4.18: Time for firefighters to seek shelter flow chart.

The time taken for a group of people (including firefighters) to pass a point
in a path of travel (corridor, aisle, ramp, doorway) is expressed as (Gwynne
& Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008, Eqn 11):

𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃⁄[(1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 ]

(4.9)

Where tp is the time for passage in seconds, P is the population size in persons,
D is the population density in persons per m2, k is 1.40, a is 0.266ms-1, and We
is the effective width in metres of the component being transferred (door,
corridor, ramp etc.). In the absence of alternate data, We of a door can be
assumed to be 0.6m and D assumed to be 1.9 persons per m2 (Gwynne &
Rosenbaum in DiNenno et al., 2008).
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Whilst the time available to complete property protection tasks (TF) is not on
the critical path for RUI defense, removal of proximal fuel from houses can
increase their resilience to wildfire impacts (Leonard, 2009; Blanchi et al.,
2006). TF is calculated by:
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

(4.10)

If ASRPT<RSRPT then Incident Controllers need to consider the high potential
for the responding taskforce to be caught by the approaching headfire in
the open, either on route or during RUI preparation.

In order to provide the pathway between firefighting theory and practice,
and demonstrate the practical application of the RUIM to a realistic wildfire
scenario, the following case study based on recent (i.e. Margaret River 2011,
Yarloop 2016) and potential wildfire events in Western Australia (illustrated in
figures 4.19-4.21) is presented:
A wildfire ignition is reported in the Blackwood State Forest in the south west
of Western Australia. Aurora wildfire simulation completed by the IMT predicts
the wildfire will impact Nannup, a town approximately 47km to the east in 3034 hours post ignition.

The fire will also impact the road between the

taskforce staging point and Nannup in 26-30 hours post ignition. For the first
11 hours suppression is unsuccessfully attempted through aerial firefighting
and the construction of containment lines. Community warnings are issued
and residents are advised to evacuate north towards the regional city of
Bunbury, however a large aged care facility of 80 high dependency residents
cannot be evacuated and a critical radio communications tower is also
located in Nannup townsite.

At the 12 hour mark the IMT determine a

defend-in-place strategy is required to protect the aged care facility.

A

request for a taskforce is issued however it is not known whether the taskforce
will arrive too late to protect the town.

The taskforce of 30 personnel

(including the Officer in Charge) will be coming from the regional city of
127

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

Bunbury and the state capital city of Perth. Bunbury is approximately 70km
to the north, whilst Perth is approximately 220km to the north (both distances
measured lineally). Whilst the Bunbury Taskforce is already assembled and
ready to depart to the RUI staging area, the Perth Taskforce is to be made up
of fire appliances from various metropolitan and regional volunteer fire
stations, including Lancelin (114km northwest of Perth) and Northam (90km
northeast of Perth). The crew of Northam have advised there will be a four
hour delay due to appliance technical issues before they can depart to the
Perth staging area where the convoy will depart. The IMT are situation in the
town of Busselton, 50km northwest of Nannup. This is also the location of the
RUI Taskforce Staging point.

To provide the IMT guidance, the RUIM is

applied. An overview map is provided in figure 7.
Step One – Determining ASRPT and safety factors
From the Aurora modelling, the town of Nannup wll be impacted by the
headfire in 30-34 hours post ignition. It is critical however to acknowledge
the request for the taskforce is issued 12 hours post ignition, reducing the
Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) to 18-22 hours. The Incident
Controller takes a precautionary approach and requires the lower 22 hour
period to be used.
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 22 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

However, another critical point is also identified for the scenario, being the
available time before access road is impacted by fire, being 28-30 hours post
ignition. It is equally as critical to acknowledge this event is forecast to occur
16-18 hours after the request for the taskforce is issued. This is termed the
Available Safe Time to Critical Point 1 or ASTCP1 = 16 hours = 960 minutes.
The Incident Controller also requires 90th percentile margins and safety factors
to be applied where possible, except for the initial travel to the taskforce
staging area located well away from the fireground or any smoke impacts
etc, and requires a Safety Factor (FS) of 2 to be applied in all instances.
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Step Two – Calculating time taken for RUI taskforce to respond (TR)
Separate TR must be calculated for each section of the taskforce,
subsequently denoted Bunbury TF and Perth TF. With reference to figures
4.15-4.16, the process for determining TR for each section is detailed in tables
6-7 from initial dispatch to arrival at the Busselton staging point to receive their
briefing and then table 8 from Busselton to the RUI staging point. The process
results in TR for the Bunbury TF calculated as 58.5 minutes and the TR for the
Perth TF as 637 minutes. When considering the two separate taskforces are
to join into a single taskforce to respond to the RUI, the greater value of 637
minutes is applied.
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58Figure 4.19: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com

59Figure 4.20: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com
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60Figure 4.21: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com
35Table 4.21: TR Bunbury TF
Step

Comment

Time

1

Start of RUIM. Proceed to step 2.

n/a

2

Task force is ready to depart Bunbury but is not at the RUI staging area.

n/a

Proceed to step 4.
4

Firefighters are at their station. Proceed to step 5.

n/a

5

Firefighters dress, assemble, assimilate information and leave station.

1.5 min

Duration 90 seconds. Proceed to Step 7.
7

Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step

n/a

9.
9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a

10

Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.

n/a

11

Actual distance of 52km is used, 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’

n/a

and 42km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.

n/a

14

Travel time to taskforce staging area = (10/49.0) + (42/55.7) = (0.2 + 0.75) =

57 min

0.95 hours
End

Total Bunbury TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals

58.5

time to respond plus travel time, being 1.5 + 57 min. Equal to 58.5 minutes.

minutes

36Table 4.22: TR Perth TF
Step

Comment

Time

1

Start of RUIM. Proceed to step 2.

n/a

2

Task force is not assembled. Proceed to step 4.

n/a

4

Firefighters are not at their station. Proceed to step 6.

n/a

6

For all stations except for Northam, time to travel to fire station, dress,
assemble, assimilate information and leave station is 1,200 seconds = 20

240 min

minutes.
For Northam station, the stated delay is 4 hours = 240 minutes.
The highest value is used for the purposes of calculation.
Proceed to step 7.
7

Calculation of travel time to Perth base for Perth TF to form starting at step

n/a

9.
9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a
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10

Exact distance by road is not known, travel times calculated for the two

n/a

stations required to travel the greatest distance, being Lancelin (114km)
and Northam (90km).

Assumption made that as all other metropolitan

appliances are within 20km of the Perth base they will arrive prior to either
Lancelin or Northam.
Proceed to step 12.
12

Maximum radial distance from staging area calculated as:

n/a

Lancelin = 1.5 x 114 = 171km; and
Northam = 1.5 x 90 = 135km
Both distances assumed to include 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’
and the remaining distance through ‘rural country’.
Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.

n/a

14

Travel time to taskforce staging area is calculated as:

156 min

Lanceline = (10/49.0) + (161/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.9) = 3.1 hours = 186 minutes
Northam = (10/49.0) + (135/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.4) = 2.6 hours = 156 minutes.
As the Lancelin crew will arrive at the Perth base prior to the Northam crew
leaving their station, the Northam value of 156 minutes is the critical value
used for the purposes of calculation.
Proceed to step 1 to determine time required for Perth TF to respond to TF
staging area in Busselton.
1

No action required. Proceed to step 2.

2

Perth TF is assembled at the Perth base and ready to depart to the staging

n/a

area in Busselton. Proceed to step 4.
4

Crews are at the Perth base. Proceed to step 5.

5

Crews receive their briefing and depart. Duration 60 seconds. Proceed to

1 min

step 7.
7

Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step

n/a

9.
9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a

10

Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.

n/a

11

Actual distance of 222km is used, 20km through ‘major city outer suburb’

n/a

and 202km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.

n/a

14

Travel time to taskforce staging area = (20/49.0) + (202/55.7) = (0.4 + 3.6) =

240 min

4 hours
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End

Total Perth TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals time

637 min

to respond plus travel time, being 240 + 156 + 1 + 240 min. Equal to 637
minutes.

This is greater than the Bunbury TF travel time and is used for

subsequent calculations.

Step Three – Calculating time taken for joint taskforce to travel to RUI (TT)
Now the taskforce is united, subsequently referred to as the Joint TF, at the
Busselton staging area, a single travel time (TT) to the RUI staging area can be
calculated. With reference to figure 4.15, the process for determining TT is
detailed in table 4.23.

Noting that the Joint TF is now proceeding to the

fireground, the IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of
2 to be applied will be in effect. Importantly, the calculations demonstrate
ASTCP1 of 960 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the taskforce can be safely
deployed to the RUI with reasonable confidence that they will not be
impacted by the headfire during the journey. The total TT is calculated as
288 minutes.
37Table 4.23: TT Joint TF
Step

Comment

Time

9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a

10

Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.

n/a

11

Actual distance of 60km is used, 5km through ‘major city outer suburb’

n/a

and 55km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used and 90th percentile applied.

n/a

90th percentile= μ-1.28σ, therefore major city outer suburb speed =
(49.0 – (1.28x14.4) = 30.7kph and ‘rural country’ speed = (55.7 – (1.28 x
23.6) = 25.5kph. Proceed to step 14.
14

Travel time to RUI staging area = (5/30.7) + (55/25.5) = (0.2 + 2.2) = 2.4

144 min

hours.
FS

Safety factor of 2 applied.

ASTCP1

For the taskforce to travel to the RUI without being impacted by the fire

288 min

front, ASTCP1 > (TR+TT). Using the forecast time of impact of the access
road and the calculated TR and TT:
ASTCP1 = 960 minutes
TR = 288 minutes and TT = 637 minutes, therefore TR+TT = 925 minutes
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Step Four – Calculating time taken to set up hose lines (THL)
Once the taskforce arrives at the Nannup RUI the time taken to set up hose
lines and establish the urban defense must be calculated. With reference
to figure 5, the process for determining THL is detailed in table 4.24. The IC
requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of 2 to be applied is
incorporated into the calculation. The total THL is calculated as 10 minutes.
38Table 4.24: THL Joint TF
Step

Comment

Time

15

No action required. Proceed to step 16.

n/a

16

Time taken for Officer in Charge (OIC) to complete size up is 135 seconds

2.3 min

= 2.3 minutes. Proceed to step 17.
17

The OIC determines that hose lines will consist of 1 length of 65mm hose

n/a

and 2 lengths of 38mm hose. Proceed to step 18.
18

Table 5 values used and 90th percentile applied.

1.7 min

90th percentile= μ+1.28σ, therefore time to remove and connect 65mm
hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (39.4 + (1.28
x17.4)) = 61.7 seconds and time to remove and connect 38mm hose from
appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (33.3 + (1.28 x 15.4) = 53.0
seconds.
Time to charge hose is the time to charge the 65mm length and both 38mm
lengths of hose. This is calculated by (20.3+(1.28 x 13.2)) + 2(18.4+(1.28 x
10.2) = (37.2+62.9) = 100.1 seconds = 1.7 minutes
Proceed to step 14.
20

THL = 2.3 + 1.7 min = 5 minutes

5 min

FS

Safety factor of 2 applied.

10 min

Step Five – Calculating Time taken for firefighters to seek shelter (TS)
With reference to figure 4.18, the process for determining TS is detailed in
table 4.25. The required time for firefighters to seek shelter prior to the arrival
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of untenable conditions associated with the head fire are calculated in
accordance with equations 4.8 and 4.9, where Rd is the distance of the
firefighters from the building of refuge = 90m; SF is the speed of the firefighters
μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3, therefore SF = 2.3 – (1.28 x 1.3) = 0.6 ms-1; P is 30, We is 0.6m;
and D is 1.9 persons per m2.

The FS of 2 is again applied.

The total TS is

calculated as 12.6 minutes.
39Table 4.25: TS Joint TF
Step

Comment

Time

21

No action required. Proceed to step 22.

n/a

16

Time taken for firefighters to reach shelter, applying equation 6.

2.5 min

∴ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

90 (𝑚𝑚)
= 150 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 2.5𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
0.6 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −1 )

Apply Safety factor.
FS

Safety factor of 2 applied.

5 min

Proceed to step 23.
18

Time taken for firefighters to enter shelter, applying equation 7.
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 = 30�[(1

− 0.266 × 1.9)1.4 × 1.9 × 0.6]

Apply Safety factor
FS

0.65 min

= 38 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.

Safety factor of 2 applied.

1.3 min

Proceed to step 24.
24

TS = 5 + 1.3 min = 6.3 minutes

6.3 min

FS

Safety factor of 2 applied.

12.6 min

Step Six – Deterministic analysis and calculating TF
Equation 4.4 is now applied to determine whether there is sufficient RSRPT for
the taskforce to be deployed. ASRPT was previously determined to be 22
hours.
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (637 + 288 + 10 + 12.6)

∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 947.6 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 15.8 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
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∴ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

In this scenario, the deterministic analysis provides guidance to the IMT that
there is sufficient time for the taskforce to safely reach the Nannup RUI and
ready the defense of the nursing home. The calculation of RSRPT also enables
evidence based trigger points to be set by the IMT.

For instance, should

spotting result in a new headfire that will impact the access road into Nannup
20 hours post ignition (8 hours after the taskforce request is submitted) and
impacting the Nannup RUI 26 hours post ignition (15 hours after the taskforce
request is submitted), then the revised ASTCP1 of 480 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925
minutes and the revised ASRPT of 900 minutes > RSRPT of 947.6 minutes.
Having completed the RUIM process, the IMT are aware that without waiting
for the Perth TF, the Bunbury TF RSRPT is 369.1 minutes (6.2 hours); and only 310
minutes (5.2 hours) if they are already assembled at the Busselton staging
area.

This analysis supports the IMT to enact the contingency plan of

deploying a smaller taskforce to the Nannup RUI as opposed to no taskforce
at all. It also supports the establishment of operational ‘go/no-go’ trigger
points to reduce the potential for responding firefighters to be caught in
burnover.

Evacuations of communities in the path of large wildfires is a growing
problem for both land use planners and Incident Management Teams alike
(Cova, 2005; Taylor & Freeman, 2010). If left too late or incorrect routes are
taken during evacuations, fatalities may result, particularly in the wake of
significant wildfires (Haynes et al, 2008; Blanchi et al, 2014; Handmer et al,
2010; Ronchi et al, 2019). When considering whether community evacuations
are possible, a hydraulic model which simplifies egress behaviour and
enables evacuation to be described by a set of equations can be used
(Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008; ICC et al, 2005). This subsequently
enables deterministic analysis of Available Safe Evacuation Time (ASET) versus
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Required Safe Evacuation Time (RSET) as described in the wildfire context by
Ronchi et al, (2017 & 2019):

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 + 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣ℎ + 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

(4.11)

where td is the time for the incident to be detected after ignition, tFDA is the
time spent by the fire department assessing the situation on site, tFDI is the time
spent by the fire department intervening and attempting to control the
incident, tN is the time for the population to be notified once intervention has
been deemed unsuccessful, tprep is the time for a resident to complete
preparations after they have initially been notified, tfoot is the time for the
population to move on foot (e.g. walk to a place of safety or to a vehicle),
tveh is the time for the population to move into a vehicle, and finally tref is the
time for the individual to be on-boarded at a place of safety. An additional
consideration not inherently contained within the model is the requirement
for assisted evacuations from schools, aged care facilities, hospitals etc.
When considering evacuations from such places it may be more suitable to
adopt a shelter-in-place strategy with dedicated urban firefighting
appliances.
As illustrated in Figure 4.22, the timing and adequacy of decisions made
by Incident Controllers can have significant impact on the ability of the
community to safely evacuate.

Whilst td, and tprep are often beyond the

control of responding fire services, rapid and accurate assessment of the
incident and subsequent selection of appropriate strategies and tactics (tFDI),
including evacuation as a tactic, coupled with detailed and timely
community warnings tN can increase the available time for evacuees to find
safe refuge.

It is important to note that this approach implies various

assumptions about human behaviour and has several limitations including
(Gwynne & Rosenbaum in DiNenno, 2008, p3-376):
1. Behaviours that detract from movement are not explicitly
considered;
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2. People are considered as a group as opposed to their own
personal identity and attributes;
3. Movement between egress components is considered, rather than
within them; and
4. The results are deterministic and will therefore remain the same
unless changes are made to the scenario or the assumptions
employed.
As a result it is important to include a safety factor when considering the
suitability of an evacuation strategy. For example, depending on the size of
the population to be evacuated, the complexity of the situation and the
Incident Controller’s own risk tolerance they may require ASET ˃ 2.7RSET prior
to approving and evacuation plan. As a point of reference, whilst AFAC
(2004) identifies that the safety factor for a well-established discipline
supported by robust evidence may be quite small and as low as 1.2, for
structural firefighting efforts a factor of 2 is appropriate. Given the relative
infancy of wildfire engineering as a discipline, the lack of robust data and the
potential for mass fatalities associated with evacuating people being caught
in a burnover (Haynes et al., 2008; Handmer, O’Neil & Killalea, 2010; Blanchi
et al., 2014) the authors suggest a minimum safety factor of 2.5 is utilised for
community evacuation purposes in the landscape wildfire context. In sublandscape scale wildfire scenarios within the urban environment, where
head fire suppression is possible and smaller community movements need to
be considered, a safety factor of 1.5 may be suitable.
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61Figure 4.22: (a) ASET; (b) RSET with delayed community notification; (c) RSET with rapid
community notification and early evacuation decision.

tfoot and tref include movement and queuing times for all evacuees and can
become complicated where large numbers of evacuees are moving to
different refuges. In such instances guidance can be found in Gwynne &
Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008), however in simple cases flow of persons
through a certain point (such as the doors of buildings) can be calculated
by:

𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒

(4.12)

where Fc is calculated flow (m/s), S is speed of movement(m/s), D is
population density (persons/m2), and We is effective width of component
being traversed such as a door or stairwell (m).

𝑆𝑆 = 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(4.13)

where k and a are both constants, obtained from sources including Gwynne
& Rosenbaum (in DiNenno, 2008, Table 3-13.2) or Vaughan and Bain (2001).
The complexity of mass evacuations during natural disasters and
emergencies requires dynamic modelling software to be used (Shiwakoti et
al., 2013). Dynamic traffic simulation enables the comparison of different
evacuation plans under a variety of situations (Yuan et al., 2006), however
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there is often a trade-off between accuracy, cost, data requirements and
the time required for simulations to be completed (Shiwakoti et al., 2013). In
addition to recommending minimum traffic means of egress standards for
urban design in wildfire prone areas, Cova (2005) also identifies the major
factors that can impede community evacuation.
Whilst accurately calculating tveh remains problematic (Cova et al, 2011;
Intini et al, 2019; Ronchi et al, 2017), in an urban design and planning
assessment context when a shelter in place strategy is adopted, calculation
of tveh is not required as occupants are not leaving the site. To improve the
design of wildfire prone communities (including visiting tourists) in regards to
large scale evacuation and egress, Cova (2005) recommends a number of
safety aspects. These recommendations are summarized in Tables 4.26-4.29.
40Table 4.26: Wildfire prone road design safety aspects. Adapted from Cova (2005)
Component
Occupant

Standard
load

(density)

factor

The density of homes along the roads in any fire-prone
community or portion thereof should not exceed: that
specified in Table 4.16 (reproduced with permission from
ASCE)

Number of exits

The

number

of

means-of-egress

from

any

fire-prone

community or portion thereof shall meet the minimum
specified in Table 4.28 (reproduced with permission from
ASCE)
Exit capacity

The total egress capacity from a fire-prone community or
portion thereof shall meet the factors specified in Table 4.29
(reproduced with permission from ASCE)

Exit arrangement

The closest distance between any two points along any of
the n exits from a fire-prone community must be at least 1/n
the maximum diagonal distance across the community. The
maximum diagonal of a community is defined as the
greatest Euclidean distance between any two households
that rely on the same exit set, and the minimum distance
between exits is defined as the shortest Euclidean distance
between any two points along two exiting roads.
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Maximum exist distance

No household in a fire-prone community shall be further than
3 km by road from its closest exit. The maximum exit distance
for a community is defined as the household with the greatest
shortest-path distance on the road network to an exit
discharge in the most constraining bottleneck set i.e., the end
of one of the exiting roads from the community.

Exit vulnerability (distance to

Exits in a fire-prone community shall have a 10m buffer on

fuel)

each side that is clear of fuel.

41Table 4.27: Occupant load factor (density). Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from
ASCE
Use

Hazard

Road
length
household (m)

Residential

Low

12.5

6.3

Moderate

16.7

8.3

High

20.0

10.0

Low

12.5

4.2

Moderate

16.7

5.6

High

20.0

6.7

Residential
& Tourism

per

Road
length
vehicle (m)

per

42Table 4.28: Minimum exits. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE
Number of
households

Minimum number of
exiting roads

Maximum households
per exit.

1-50

1

50

51-300

2

150

301-600

3

200
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600+

4

200

43Table 4.29: Exit capacity. Cova (2005), reproduced with permission from ASCE
Use

Hazard

Minimum
total
capacity (vehicles
hour per household)

Residential

Low

1

2

Moderate

2

1

High

4

0.5

Low

1.5

2

Moderate

3

1

High

6

0.5

Residential
& Tourism

exit
per

Minimum evacuation
time (hours)

4.5. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists and IMT’s
Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in late 2019
and early 2020 throughout Australia are dynamic and complex disasters that
require significant interstate and international resourcing over prolonged
durations.

When such events occur they will inevitably impact life and

property as well as overwhelming firefighting efforts. This section discussed
the strategies available to firefighters, their limitations, and where the
evidence suggests they may be successful.

Detailed and accurate

planning is required to be completed by IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists
to ensure firefighting operations are suitable and to minimise the potential for
firefighter injury.

When applied correctly and in the right context, the

findings of new research including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist IMT’s
to achieve this.
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As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega wildfires,
detailed predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in itself is insufficient.
Care must be taken to bridge the theory – practice gap and ensure planning
is operationally relevant.

The research presented in this section

demonstrates that even in mild conditions, the head fire will often be
unstoppable where it occurs in continuous vegetation fuel bed geometry.
This is further supported by the findings presented in Sections 5 and 6.The use
of existing wildfire scars and prescribed burns for wildfire suppression can only
be considered opportunistic and with marginal chance of success unless the
burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and significant in area. As climate
change continues to result in worsening fire conditions, frontline firefighters,
IMT’s and fire behaviour specialists need to apply increased scrutiny to fuel
bed structure and geometry, focusing suppression efforts where fuels are
discontinuous and broken.

4.6. Implications for urban planners
By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression strategies,
urban planners can significantly influence the defendability and resilience of
communities to wildfire impacts through appropriate design of development
at the RUI.

The research and increased analysis presented in this section

enables wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered at the
design stage of RUI development. Evidence based design that incorporates
minimum

measures

for

evacuations

and

eliminates

the

unrealistic

expectation that firefighters will be able to defend every property will lead to
more appropriate passive 3 wildfire resilient design

3

Passive systems do not require action or maintenance.

For instance,

ensuring road design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without
additional control measures is a passive measure that can be supported by
appropriate and timely community evacuation messages.

Firefighters

being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.
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The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire
Engineering Reports, similar to the standard fire engineering processes within
the urban fire engineering profession will only further increase the standard of
safety in bushfire prone areas. These are detailed and complex technical
documents however that required a high degree of technical knowledge
and proficiency from both the engineer and the agencies involved.

Section 5 – Firefighter tenability in the wildfire context
5.1. Introduction
Whilst the wildfire suppression thresholds discussed in Section 4 are utilised
internationally by fire services, they fail to sufficiently consider firefighter
tenability. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (ICC, 2005) defines
untenable conditions as “environmental conditions associated with fire in
which human life is not sustainable.” This should not be confused with the
conditions required to facilitate effective firefighting suppression which are
significantly milder than those able to be withstood for short periods of time.
Therefore, improving firefighter safety during wildfire suppression by clearly
defining fire ground environmental conditions that are considered tenable,
or safe for firefighters is paramount. Both the Society of Fire Safety (2014)
and Poh (2010) identify four primary hazards associated with fires within the
built environment that affect tenability being convected heat, radiant heat,
toxic gases and smoke obscuration. However, as Poh (2010) reports, there
is no single set of related values for tenability criteria which is universally
accepted.

This section defines and discusses firefighter tenability in the

wildfire context to assist Incident Controllers to make critical incident
decisions during chaotic and large wildfire incidents.

5.2. Defining Tenability
Smoke obscuration is excluded as a factor affecting firefighter tenability in
the wildfire context due to the lack of injuries and incidents associated with
visual obscurity during wildfire events (Hayes et al, 2008; Penney, 2019 – risk).
144

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

Knight, Brown and Leonard (2001) identify the toxic gases produced during
the thermal degradation of vehicle componentry, particularly the interior
vehicle componentry, will be subsequent to the loss of tenability due to
radiant heat and other factors.

The same authors do note that hydrogen

chloride (HCl), a severe irritant released when vinyl interiors thermally
degrade even without combustion, formaldehyde (HCHO), hydrogen
cyanide (HCN) and carbon monoxide (CO) may cause significant irritation
to occupants in the vehicle cabin, however not to the extent of affecting
tenability. The concentration for each of these gases that are immediately
dangerous to life or health (IDLH) are detailed in Table 5.1.

Brown et al.

(2003) reports fire truck cabins will generally remain tenable in regards to toxic
gases unless there is catastrophic window failure with glass falling from the
frame.
44Table 5.1: IDLH concentrations
Material

IDLH (ppm)

Source & Comments

CO

1000-8000

(Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2014)

HCHO

20-100

(Brown et al., 2003; Kent, 1998; NIOSH, 2014a)
@20ppm – severe respiratory irritation
@50ppm – pulmonary oedema
@100ppm – immediate death

HCl

50-1000

(Brown et al., 2003; Hull et al., 2008; NIOSH, 2014b)
@50ppm – barely tolerable
@1000ppm pulmonary oedema

HCN

50-280

(Brown et al., 2003; NIOSH, 2016)
@ 100 death after 1 hour
@181 fatal after 10 minutes
@280 immediately fatal

Radiant heat transfer is primarily responsible for the propagation of
landscape scale bushfire and subsequent impacts on firefighters (Penney &
Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Butler, 2014; Frankman et al., 2012;
Leonard, 2010) therefore it is proposed any impacts of convective heat
transfer, or noxious gases on firefighters would first occur from radiant heat
transfer.

Direct flame contact from the passing fire front or adjacent

involved fuels (including burning fuels underneath the vehicle) have the
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potential to result in rapid vehicle fire involvement and untenable conditions
in as little as 90 seconds (DFES, 2012a & 2016; Pearce et al, 2004).

Post

burnover investigations support the conclusion radiant heat remains the
greatest threat to firefighters (Sullivan et al., 2003) and conditions within the
vehicle cabin may become untenable in a much shorter timeframe than this
(Linton, 2016; Johnstone, 2002; Pearce et al., 2004; WFA, 2013). Calculated
potential peak radiant heat flux from large wildfires can exceed 76 kWm-2,
even at greater than 10 m separation from the head fire under mild fuel loads
and weather conditions (Penney et al., 2019a). By comparison experiential
forest fire field data reported by Frankman et al. (2013) identified peak heat
fluxes of 179 kWm-2 and 263 kWm-2, whilst an analysis of 216 homes post the
Springwood wildfire in New South Wales, Australia in 2013 by Newnham et al.
(2014) estimated peak radiant heat fluxes experienced by houses to be as
much as 52.5kWm-2.
Purser (2008) cites three methods of incapacitation from exposure to fire
are possible, being heat stroke, body surface burns and respiratory tract
burns.

The sensation of pain occurs prior to burns, incapacitation and

ultimately death, however in the case of significant bushfire such events may
be almost simultaneous as opposed to the more prolonged onset of
hyperthermia.
In considering pain and burns two assumptions detailed in both Poh (2010)
and Purser (2008) are retained:
1. Thermal burns to the respiratory tract will not occur unless the air
temperature / or humidity are sufficient to cause (unprotected)
facial skin burns; and
2. Heat flux and temperature tenability limits designed to protect
victims from incapacitation by skin burns should be adequate to
protect them from burns to the respiratory tract.
Whilst the protective effects of Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) and
Equipment (PPE) are acknowledged, this report includes a third assumption
that unprotected skin thresholds are suitable for modelling purposes (and as
a result incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPC
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and PPE are worn). Limited experimental data involving human test subjects
is available to support tenability thresholds and variance between the
literature exists. Although Raj (2008) suggests exposure to as much as 5 kWm2

may occur without pain or injury in clothed subjects, Poh (2010) identifies 2.5

kWm-2 is sufficient to result in both skin and respiratory burns. The Australasian
Fire Authorities Council (2004) provides further guidance for firefighters in
structural firefighting PPC (including Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) as
detailed in Table 5.2, however the Society of Fire Safety (2014) suggest the
‘Routine’ exposure threshold may be inappropriate considering radiant heat
flux received whilst sunbaking may be as high as 1.1 kWm-2. For firefighters
sheltering inside a fire appliance cabin Knight et al. (2001) utilise a 60 second
radiation limit of 2 kWm-2 and air blast temperature limit of 200°C however
the lower temperature of 150°C for exposed personnel is adopted in Europe
(2010). Further guidance regarding human tolerance to thermal radiation is
provided by Purser (2008, Table 2-6.19] as summarised in Table 5.3.
45 Table 5.2: Firefighter exposure limits
Routine

Hazardous

Extreme

Critical

Condition

Condition

Condition

Condition

Maximum Time

25 minutes

10 minutes

1 minute

< 1 minute

Maximum Air Temperature

100°C

120°C

160°C

>235°C

Maximum Radiation

1kWm-2

3kWm-2

4-4.5kWm-2

>10kWm-2

46Table 5.3: Radiant heat flux effects
Heat Flux kWm-2

Time to Effect (seconds)
Pain

Burn

Full Burn

2.5

40

-

-

4.2

-

30 (blisters)

-

10.5

5

-

-

23.5

1.6

-

-

30

6

10

>15

35

5

9.5

>15

40

4.5

9

>15

50

4

7

>15
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100

2

4

6

150

1

2.5

4

The time taken for various effects as a result of exposure to thermal radiation
can also be calculated by Purser’s (2008) equation:
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =

𝑟𝑟

4�
3

𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟

(5.1)

4�
3

where trad is the time to reach end effect for the identified thermal radiation
(minutes), qr is the given radiant heat flux, and r is the radiant heat exposure
[(kWm-2)min-1] for the identified endpoint detailed in Table 5.4:

47Table 5.4: Radiant heat exposures
Thermal radiation [(kWm-2)min-1]

Endpoint

1.33

tolerance limit / pain / first-degree burns

10

severe incapacitation and second-degree
burns

16.7

fatal exposure with third-degree burns

Applying Purser’s equation, Penney et al. (2019a) provided comparison of
the various times to reach the identified endpoint as a function of radiant
heat flux. This is shown in Figure 5.1 and illustrates that incapacitating burns
can occur within relatively small timeframes at the lower end of possible
wildfire induced radiant heat flux. The results demonstrate fatal exposure
occurs within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2, whilst
incapacitating injuries occur within 1 minute once radiant heat flux exceeds
20 kWm-2.
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6

Time (minutes)

5

4

3

2

1

0

5kW/m2
35kW/m2

10kW/m2
40kW/m2

15kW/m2
45kW/m2

20kW/m2
50kW/m2

25kW/m2
55kW/m2

30kW/m2
60kW/m2

62Figure 5.1: Time to effect as a function of thermal radiation

5.3. Radiant heat flux suppression and tenability thresholds
Penney et al. (2019) reported that when setting firefighter tenability
thresholds, the worse cast credible scenario should be adopted.

This is

defined as firefighters in personal protective clothing (PPC) suitable for
wildland fire suppression are exposed to radiant heat effects of a rapidly
advancing flame edge that is part of a continuous landscape scale wildfire
flank or head. This is a deliberate measure to account for burnover situations
in appliances are disabled and firefighters attempt to flee by foot. In these
situations sheltering behind appliances and other small structures will provide
little if any shielding from radiant heat flux (Penney & Stevenson, 2019).
Whilst the literature identifies several potential tenable limits as previously
discussed, it is recommended the AFAC (2004) “Hazardous Condition” limit of
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3 kWm-2 is adopted as the threshold for suppression operations involving
personnel (the “Suppression Threshold”). This is less than both the “Extreme”
limit of 4 kWm-2 (AFAC, 2004) and the acceptable 5 kWm-2 exposure in normal
clothing reported by Raj (2008) which were considered to provide an
insufficient margin for error to firefighters to retreat to a safe area as
incapacitating injury may occur within 30 seconds depending on the
individual, but greater than the limit adopted by Knight et al. (2001).

As

illustrated in Figure 5.1, the “Critical” limit of 10 kWm-2 [58] can result in
incapacitating burns in less than one minute and is subsequently identified as
the “Tenability Threshold”.

The “Suppression Threshold”, being the radiant

heat flux the firefighters in PPC can withstand whilst being able to undertake
suppression activities is inherently lower than the “Tenability Threshold”, being
the radiant heat flux those same firefighters could physically survive. Whilst
different PPC affords firefighters various levels of protection however exposed
skin and respiratory tracts (in the absence of closed circuit breathing
apparatus) remain vulnerable.

As a result the thresholds reported by

Penney et al. (2019) incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural
firefighting PPE is worn.
Illustrated in Table 5.5, even in the mildest of fuel loads and fire weather
conditions, when attempting to suppress a fully developed forest head fire in
continuous fuel structures, firefighters will need to remain at least 20 m from
the head fire (Penney et al., 2019). At understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and
assuming no shielding, the Suppression Threshold is exceeded even at an FDI
of 10 until 20 m separation from the head fire is achieved, whilst tenability
limits are exceeded for the first 6 m from the head fire.

The required

separation for the Suppression Threshold increases with FDI, with 28 m
separation necessary to reach suitable conditions once an FDI of 40 is
reached. Conditions supportive of suppression efforts are not experienced
within 30 m of the head fire at or above an FDI of 50. As illustrated in Figures
5.2 and 5.3, representative of typical Woodland and Forest fuel loads [28],
conditions worsen as fuel load increases. For typical Woodlands fuel loads,
depending on FDI, radiant heat flux falls below the Tenability Threshold at 15
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m-35 m whilst 35 m-80 m separation is required for conditions to be conducive
to safe suppression efforts. These distances increase to 20 m to 50 m and 45
m to >100 m respectively for typical Forest fuel loads.

None of the scenarios

analysed resulted in conditions that would facilitate suppression efforts on the
head fire within 10 m of the flame edge, being the typical maximum
separation from the flaming zone for firefighters to effectively apply
suppressants from hand held attack lines or machine monitors.
48Table 5.5: Separation (distance between firefighters and flaming zone) required for
suppression and tenability thresholds
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (based on 5 m increment data)
Surface
Fuel

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

(t/ha)

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

w5
w10
w15
w20
w25
w30

FDI
FDI 80

FDI 90

100

Tenability

10

10

10

10

15

15

15

15

15

20

Suppression

20

25

25

30

35

35

35

40

40

45

Tenability

10

15

15

15

20

20

25

25

25

30

Suppression

30

35

40

45

45

50

55

60

60

65

Tenability

15

15

20

20

25

30

30

30

35

35

Suppression

35

40

50

55

60

65

70

70

75

80

Tenability

15

20

25

25

30

35

35

40

40

45

Suppression

40

50

55

65

70

75

80

85

90

90

Tenability

20

25

30

30

35

40

45

45

50

50

Suppression

45

55

65

70

75

85

90

95

100

>100

Tenability

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

50

55

60

Suppression

50

60

70

80

85

90

95

>100

>100

>100
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70

60

Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

50

40

30

20

Window of safe & effective
firefighting

10

0
0
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FDI 10

Separation from head fire (m)
FDI 20

FDI 30

FDI 40

FDI 50

FDI 60

FDI 70

FDI 80

FDI 90

FDI 100

Suppression Threshold

Tenability Limit

63Figure 5.2: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between
radiant heat flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Woodlands fuel structures
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70

Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

60

50

40

30
Window of safe & effective

20

firefighting

10

0
0

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Separation from head fire (m)
FDI 10
FDI 30
FDI 50
FDI 70
FDI 90
Suppression Threshold

FDI 20
FDI 40
FDI 60
FDI 80
FDI 100
Tenability Limit

64Figure 5.3: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between
radiant heat flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Forest fuel structures

Applying Purser’ equation and assuming 10 m separation from the head
fire, the reality of the environmental conditions faced by firefighters becomes
evident across understory fuel loads and FDI (Table 5.6). In the mildest of
conditions, the time taken for pain tolerance thresholds to be reached and
for first degree burns to occur is 8 seconds. In foreseeable circumstances,
such as an FDI of 60 and understory fuel loads of 25 t/ha, this time is reduced
to less than a second.

In comparison, the time taken for severe

incapacitation to occur in the mildest conditions at 10 m separation from the
head fire is approximately 120 seconds, whilst at an FDI of 60 and understory
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fuel load of 25 t/ha this drops to approximately 10 seconds.

At 10 m

separation and at the lowest FDI and fuel load, fatal exposure limits are also
rapidly reached, occurring in under 233 seconds. At understory fuel loads
of 25t/ha and an FDI 60 fatal exposure will occur in less than 17 seconds (Table
5.6).
The time frame for incapacitating burns to occur is a critical factor when
identifying safe zones for firefighter retreat and for assessing the appropriate
wildfire suppression strategies and tactics. When interpreting the results of
this study, it is suggested that once incapacitation occurs a firefighter will
likely be imminently exposed to fatal levels of radiant heat and the shorter
time frame should be applied.

It is also important to consider the shielding

effects of intervening unburnt vegetation may provide firefighters a false
sense of fire intensity until the flames engulf the vegetation in front of them.
Firefighters surprised by the rapid emergence of landscape scale wildfire
from behind thick vegetation could be rapidly incapacitated and may have
insufficient time to retreat to vehicles and activate protective systems such
as sprinklers and radiation shields fitted to the vehicles.

Even if protective

systems are activated, the flow rates required to extinguish or substantially
lessen fire impact is likely to exceed the capacity of the protective systems
(Penney et al., 2019b; Penney et al. 2020 – under consideration) which
suggests fatal burnovers may still occur.
49Table 5.6: Time to pain, incapacitation and fatal exposure from radiation at 10m
separation from the head fire
Time (seconds) taken to tolerance limit / pain / first degree burn at 10m separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

w5

8.0

6.4

5.3

4.5

3.9

3.4

3.0

2.7

2.4

2.2

w10

4.8

3.6

2.8

2.3

1.9

1.7

1.4

1.3

1.1

1.0

w15

3.4

2.4

1.9

1.5

1.2

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

w20

2.5

1.8

1.3

1.1

0.9

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

w25

2.0

1.4

1.0

0.8

0.7

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

w30

1.6

1.1

0.8

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

Time (seconds) taken to severe incapacitation and second degree burns at 10m separation
w/FDI
w5

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

117.5

94.4

78.2

66.3

57.3

50.2

44.5

39.8

35.9

32.7
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w10

71.4

53.2

41.8

34.1

28.5

24.4

21.2

18.6

16.6

14.9

w15

49.7

35.7

27.3

21.9

18.0

15.2

13.1

11.4

10.1

9.0

w20

37.3

26.2

19.7

15.6

12.8

10.7

9.1

7.9

6.9

6.1

w25

29.5

20.3

15.2

11.9

9.6

8.0

6.8

5.9

5.0

5.0

w30

24.1

16.4

12.1

9.4

7.6

6.3

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

Time (seconds) taken to fatal exposure with third degree burns at 10m separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

w5

232.8

187.0

155.0

131.4

113.4

99.4

88.1

78.9

71.2

64.7

w10

141.4

105.5

82.9

67.6

56.6

48.3

42.0

36.9

32.8

29.4

w15

98.4

70.6

54.1

43.3

35.7

30.2

25.9

22.6

19.9

17.8

w20

74.0

51.8

39.1

30.9

25.3

21.2

18.1

15.6

13.7

12.1

w25

58.4

40.3

30.0

23.5

19.1

15.9

13.5

11.6

10.0

10.0

w30

47.8

32.5

24.0

18.7

15.1

12.5

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

As discussed in Section 3, emissivity will vary depending on the depth of
the active fire front.

Table 5.7 illustrates the effect of emissivity on the

Tenability and Suppression thresholds.

For Woodlands fuels, the Tenability

Threshold is not achieved until a minimum 25 m separation from the head fire
flames is reached whilst the Suppression Threshold is not achieved until a
minimum 60 m separation is reached. For Forest structures, these distances
increase to 40 m and 80 m respectively. These results suggest suppression
efforts will be ineffective against siege head fires where the flame emissivity
exceeds 0.6, representative of optically thick flames in head fires with an
active flame depth of more than 1 m to 1.5 m (Boulet et al., 2009; SAI Global,
2019; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011).
50Table 5.7: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds
– sensitivity to emissivity
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data)
Surface
Fuel
(t/ha)
w15
w25

Ԑ 0.6
25

Ԑ 0.65

30

Ԑ 0.7

30

Ԑ 0.75

30

Ԑ 0.8

35

Ԑ 0.85

35

Ԑ 0.9

35

Ԑ 0.95

Suppression

60

65

65

70

70

75

75

80

Tenability

40

40

40

45

45

50

50

50

Suppression

80

85

85

90

95

95

100

>100

Tenability

35
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As illustrated in Table 5.8, as the FDI and understory fuel loads increase,
slope has a greater effect on the separation distance required to achieve
tenable and operational conditions. In all scenarios presented, increased
positive slope and associated increase in fire behaviour decreases tenability
and suppression potential compared to equivalent siege wildfire burning
over flat terrain.
51Table 5.8: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds
– sensitivity to slope
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data)
FDI
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90

0° Slope

10° Slope

15° Slope

20° Slope

Tenability

20

20

25

25

30

Suppression

45

50

55

60

65

Tenability

25

25

30

35

45

Suppression

55

60

70

80

85

Tenability

30

30

40

45

55

Suppression

65

70

80

95

>100

Tenability

35

40

50

60

70

Suppression

75

80

90

>100

>100

Tenability

35

40

50

60

70

Suppression

75

90

100

>100

>100

Tenability

40

45

55

65

80

Suppression

85

95

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

45

50

60

70

85

Suppression

90

100

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

45

55

65

75

90

Suppression

95

>100

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

50

60

70

80

100

100

>100

>100

>100

>100

50

60

75

85

>100

>100

>100

>100

>100

>100

Suppression

100

5° Slope

Tenability
Suppression

5.4. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists and IMT’s
It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do
not systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, I
and LF) and the associated potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters
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attempting suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario.
Current fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not specifically
address the tenability of environmental conditions in the proximity of the
flaming zone where firefighters are often working to suppress the fire. Once
tenability thresholds are considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack
on the head of large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all
but the mildest of conditions.
Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous
defensive rural urban interface firefighting is. Firefighters exposed to head
fire fronts will potentially be subjected to levels of radiant heat that are
capable of causing severe incapacitating burns in as little as five seconds in
elevated fire weather conditions and higher fuel loads.

Incident Controllers

and fire crew leaders must therefore carefully consider whether properties
and the occupants that shelter inside them are defendable or whether the
credible risk to their own crews is too high.

As discussed in Section 7,

firefighters have a personal risk tolerance higher than that of their
commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more likely than
their ranking officers to commit themselves to defending occupants from
insuppressible wildfire fronts.

This is

potentially due to firefighters’ own

personal expectations that they should put themselves in personal danger to
protect and rescue civilians, whist officers also consider the responsibility of
keeping their crews safe and potential greater reaching consequences on
the firefighter’s family should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire
suppression operations (Penney, 2019).
As opposed to being part of an RUI strategy, sheltering inside or behind
firefighting appliances during the passage of a wildfire front should be
considered an absolute last resort only.

Instead, firefighters should seek

refuge in suitable structures well before the expected impact of the wildfire
front and emerge to salvage property where they are able to do so.
Committing to a RUI defense by positioning firefighters in between a
landscape scale forest wildfire front and private property or critical
infrastructure with the expectation that suppression efforts will be either safe
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or successful is at best, reckless. Even the intervention of aerial firefighting
suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this approach safe or effective.
Given the extreme danger associated with RUI firefighting, it should be
considered only as a contingency plan except in extreme circumstances
where large populations of vulnerable communities including school, nursing
homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior to the arrival of the
wildfire front.

5.5. Implications for urban planners
Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia typically set
deemed to satisfy set the ‘acceptable’ 4 threshold for development at 10kW2

(NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for vulnerable, critical or hazardous land

use 5 and between 19kWm-2 to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017)
for standard development such as subdivision. As detailed in this section,
10kWm-2 is considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural PPC and
breathing apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60 seconds. At the
same

level,

for

a

healthy

person

without

protective

equipment,

incapacitating burns are predicted in approximately 60 seconds, with severe
pain and first degree burns expected to occur after substantially less
exposure. By adopting these thresholds, communities are effectively being
designed to be undefendable by firefighters.

At 29kWm-2, firefighters in

structural PPC and breathing apparatus are likely to face incapacitating
burns in less than 30 seconds. This realisation is also significant for firefighters
and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of threatened
communities who must consider whether they are expected to, or are indeed
themselves expecting to do the impossible and un-survivable.
The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several
approaches that require consideration on a case by case basis:

4

Planning approval will typically be provided.

5

Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.
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1. If development is required to be actively defendable by firefighters
during the passage of a wildfire front, the maximum radiant heat
impact at any point within the development needs to be within the
window of safe and effective wildfire suppression.

In turn, this

arguably either requires extensive and permanent vegetation
modification and fuel reduction around the development, or
appropriate landscaping that forms part of a passive wildfire
engineered design;
2. If development does not require active firefighter defense then the
actual level of wildfire radiant heat impact can, in theory, be
addressed by the application of enhanced wildfire resilient
engineering construction such as that detailed in AS3959. In turn,
this may also allow the fire truck related road access standards to
such as those described in existing guidelines (NSWRFS, 2019;
WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA, 2012; ) to be revisited;
3. Development of an evidence based performance based wildfire
urban planning code, similar to that of the Building Code of
Australia and that adopted by Tasmania (2017). This would need
to go beyond the existing and largely subjective planning
guidelines and carry throughout the planning and building
legislation and process, as is the case in Victoria (VSG, 2019);
4. Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering
industry. Whilst the existing Bushfire Planning and Design (BPAD)
accreditation scheme is the first step in this process, the technical
knowledge and expertise required of wildfire engineers arguably
requires greater accreditation and regulation.
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Section 6 – Critical flow rates and deluge protection systems
6.1. Introduction
Globally various retardants are applied during wildfire suppression efforts,
yet water remains the primary extinguishing agent (Hansen, 2012). Whilst
prediction of water suppression requirements and its impacts on firefighting
strategies and logistics within the urban environment has been the subject of
many previous publications (Grimwood, 2017; Barnett, 2004), the same level
of research has yet to be applied in the field of wildfire suppression (Hansen,
2012; Simpson et al., 2019). With fire services around the globe advocating
offensive wildfire fighting strategies (DFES, 2012, 2014a; DBCA, 2014; Hirsch et
al., 1996; Eurofire, 2012) heavily reliant the application of both water and
other suppressants, it is suggested this knowledge gap and a lack of suitable
data may be impeding firefighting efforts of significant wildfires, known as
siege or campaign wildfires amongst fire services internationally.
Existing water extinguishment models reported by Hansen (2012) have
been validated against field data from low intensity experimental burns with
fire line intensities of less than 1 MWm−1 and flame lengths of less than 2.5 m.
These experimental conditions are far from the conditions faced during siege
wildfire events which can include fire line intensities of 88 MWm−1 and flame
heights extending 10–20 m above the crowns of trees (Cruz et al, 2012).
Further limiting the application of existing research to dynamic emergency
conditions is the lack of consideration for the capabilities of firefighting
vehicles and aircraft that have limited water capacities and may be away
from the active fire front for considerable durations whilst they refill.
To work towards addressing the identified knowledge gap, this section
applies a fire engineering analysis of water flow rates required for head fire
suppression during wildfires. Guidance is provided in relation to critical water
flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of forest
fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. The impacts of the results
on current suppression strategies and logistics are discussed in order to
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facilitate enhanced effectiveness and safety of operational response to
siege wildfire incidents.

6.2

Calculating critical flow rates

The prevention or extinguishment of fire through the application of water
occurs by three methods (Hansen, 2012; Grimwood, 2017):
1. Water is applied to fuel surfaces not yet involved in fire, preventing
pyrolysis and the production of combustion gases;
2. Water is applied directly into the flames, cooling the flame below
the critical temperature; or
3. Water is applied directly to the burning fuel surface, cooling the
fuel and resulting in a reduced pyrolysis rate and quenching of the
flames.
When considering active suppression efforts during high intensity bushfires
only surface cooling should be considered as evaporating water vapour is
rapidly dispersed and will not noticeably affect the flame temperature
(Hansen, 2012). As a result, by applying Fire Point Theory and accounting for
external radiant and convective heat flux, the critical flow rate (CF) in Lm−2s−1
can be calculated for the wildfire scenarios using Equation (6.1). CF is the
flow rate of water required to extinguish a burning surface, with an infinite
period of time available (Särdqvist, 2002). As the wildfire length and depth of
the active flame front changes over time and is influenced by many factors
including but not limited to terrain, wind, fuel structure and fuel geometry
(Cruz et al., 2015, Penney & Stevenson, 2019), the CF can only be calculated
at a specific point in time. The limitations of fire ground suppression, including
appliance or aircraft capacity and available must be considered and are
addressed later in the section.
𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑚𝑚̇ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 +
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 × 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
”

where:

(6.1)
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𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 is the critical water application rate assuming no external heat

flux, identified as ≈0.0129 Lm−2s−1 (Hansen, 2012), 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is the efficiency of

water application, representing the portion of water leaving the firefighting

branch which actually contributes to fire extinguishment, conservatively
assumed to be 0.7 (Hansen, 2012), 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is the enthalpy change of water,

identified as 2640 kJkg−1, 𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸 is external heat flux, calculated using Equation
(6.2),

𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸 = �

0.27 × 𝐼𝐼

�2 × 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 + 𝐷𝐷�

× 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏� + �ℎ × �𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 − 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ��

(6.2)

Where 𝐼𝐼 is fire line intensity in kWm−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is flame length in m, 𝐷𝐷 is depth of

the active flame in m, 𝜏𝜏 is atmospheric transmissivity, assumed to be 1 due

to the proximity of the unburned fuel in respect to the flames, 𝜙𝜙 is view
factor, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the unburned fuel in respect

to the flames, h is the convective heat transfer coefficient set at 0.077 kW/m2K
assuming a forced convection and air velocity at 10 ms−1 (Hansen, 2012), Tg
is gas temperature of the flame, assumed to be 1090 K, representative of
siege wildfire conditions (Penney & Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon,
2003; Rossi et al., 2011; Wotton et al., 2011), Tfuel is the fuel temperature of the
fuel, assumed to be 588 K, being the ignition surface temperature for pineneedle fuel beds (Hansen, 2012).
Penney et al., (2019b) completed analysis of CF using Equation (6.1) across
variations of fuel load, FDI and active flame depth to simulate a large range
of wildfire conditions and scenarios. Six variations of forest understory fuel
loads at 5 tha−1 increments between 5–30 tha−1 with corresponding total fuel
loads between 15–40 tha−1 (Note: the assumption that the canopy
contributes 10 tha−1 reported in SAI Global (2018) is retained) were simulated,
representing a broad spectrum of forest fuel loads (Penney et al., 2019a). Ten
variations of FDI at increments of 10 between 10–100, identified as the 99.9th
percentile of fire weather conditions across Australia (Dowdy et al., 2012)
were incorporated into the simulations. Nine variants of active flame depth
(D) were also modelled at 1m increments between 2–10 m, representative of
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the optically thick head fire flame experienced during severe wildfire events
(Penney & Stevenson, 2019; SAI Global, 2018; Poon, 2003; Rossi et al., 2011).
In total, 540 wildfire scenarios were analysed. Appliance and aircraft water
suppression capabilities were derived from technical literature (DFES 2013,
2014c, 2014d, 2016c, 2017) and discussions with technical experts (Parks,
2018). These capabilities are summarized in Table 6.1, with maximum
potential flow rates, representing best case scenario, selected for the study.
Deterministic analysis of calculated required CF to available flow rates was
completed. For the purposes of deterministic analysis, it was assumed that
appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m
length of active head fire front. These values can be easily converted should
different active head fire lengths be required.
52Table 6.1. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities.
Type
Name
Water Capacity (L) Flow Rate (Ls−1)
1
Aircraft-Rotary
Dauphin Type 2
1000–1200
~333–400
Aircraft-Rotary 2
Erikson S64E Aircrane
7560
~1512
Aircraft-Fixed wing 3
AirTractor AT802F
3150
~1050
Appliance 4WD 4
Light Tanker
~500
2.5
4,5
Appliance 4WD
Heavy Tanker
~3000
3.8–7.9
1 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~15 m, full deployment in 3 s; 2 Drop width >8 m, drop length
~30 m, full deployment in 5 s; 3 Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~30 m, full deployment in 3 s;

4

Branch jet spray width ~1 m; 5 700 L water required for appliance sprinkler protection which
activates at 3 Ls−1 from each head.

6.3

Implications for wildfire suppression

As reported in Penney et al. (2019 b), figure 6.1a–f illustrate critical flow (CF)
rates per 10 m section of active head fire range from 0.94 Ls−1 in a 2 m deep
active flame front through understorey fuels of 5 tha−1 at a FDI of 10 through
to 21.10 Ls−1 in a 10 m deep active flame front through understorey fuels of 30
tha−1 at an FDI of 100. As previously described, this study assumes appliances
and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m length of active
head fire front and the results are presented on this basis.
Deterministic analysis of required CF to available CF identifies that a single
Light Tanker cannot apply the required flow rate to 10 m section of wildfire
front once an active flame depth of 6 m is attained, irrespective of fuel loads
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and FDI. Prior to the active head fire attaining a 6 m depth, in limited Light
Tankers can engage in head fire suppression for a duration of 200 s in limited
circumstances. Larger appliances such as the Heavy Tanker have a
maximum flow rate of 7.9 Ls−1 and can supply enough water to extinguish at
10 m section of active wildfire front at all FDI’s in understorey fuel loads of 5
tha−1. As conditions worsen, the capacity of a single Heavy Tanker to
extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire rapidly diminishes. With
significantly higher capabilities, all aircraft assessed are found to provide
enough flow rates to extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire, regardless
of flame depth, FDI or understorey fuel load.
The results demonstrate small firefighting appliances such as light tankers
cannot deliver sufficient water flow rates to extinguish wildfire, regardless of
FDI, once the active flame depth reaches 2.5 m in typical Woodland fuels of
w = 15 tha−1 or 3 m in typical Forest fuels of w = 25 tha−1 [22,26]. In larger
appliances with higher delivery capacities, the required CF cannot be
achieved once the active flame depth reaches approximately 5 m with an
FDI of 40. All aircraft reviewed are capable of achieving the required CF.
However, they remain restricted by the inherent limitations of availability, turn
around, restricted ability to operate at night where they may be most
effective due to reduced fire behaviour, and the increasing presence of
privately operated drones over fire grounds which requires the cessation of
aerial suppression on safety grounds (Parks, 2018).
In translating the theory to practical application during a wildfire
emergency, Figure 6.1a–f may assist Incident Controllers quickly determine
the suitability of appliance-based suppression strategies where fuel load, FDI
and active flame depth are known. In jurisdictions that do not rely on FDI or
surface fuel loads, it is suggested Table 6.2 (with an appropriate safety factor)
may be suitable to provide a deterministic assessment required CF to
available CF, and therefore determine whether ground suppression efforts
are potentially suitable. Used in conjunction with existing suppression
thresholds and newer thresholds that consider radiant heat flux and firefighter
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tenability (Penney et al. 2019a), these results will assist provide greater
justification for the selection of appropriate wildfire suppression strategies.
The results also demonstrate the importance of active flame depth when
analyzing wildfire severity and the suitability of suppression strategies. In
addition to having a significant impact on CF as shown in this study, the depth
of the active flame front has significant effects on emissivity and
subsequently, radiant heat flux. It is therefore proposed that active flame
depth may be a better measure of wildfire intensity than the traditional
measures of RoS, intensity or Lf utilized internationally. Where active flame
depths remain less than 3 m, traditional suppression strategies may remain
suitable as long as firefighter tenability is considered and due care is
exercised.
In order to meet the required CF to extinguish a wildfire in accordance with
the assumptions applied in this research, firefighters must be able to have
appliances consistently attacking each 10m section of wildfire. Whilst it is not
in any way suggested incident logistics is as simplistic as providing a single
suitable ground appliance for every 10 m section of fire front, it may be
applied for determining initial resourcing turnout to developing wildfires that
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65Figure 6.1. Critical flow, (CF) per 10 m length of head fire across the selected range of FDI’s
for Forest with surface fuel loads (w) of: (a) 5 tha−1; (b) 10 tha−1; (c) 15 tha−1; (d) 20 tha−1; (e)
25 tha−1; (f) 30 tha−1.

CF as functions of (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) are illustrated in
Figures 6.2–6.4. This also enabled CF as a function of active flame depth (CFD)
to be expressed as equations of the corresponding the fire behaviour,
summarized in Table 6.2. The advantages of this approach are:
1. The analysis incorporates the full spectrum of fire weather
conditions and understorey fuel loads. Therefore the CF can be
rapidly estimated by Incident Controllers without requiring current
or predicted fire weather conditions (an essential component for
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calculating FDI) or understorey fuel loads (w) which may vary
across the landscape.; and
2. It provides Incident Controllers both visual and mathematical tools
to assess the potential suitability of suppression strategies.
The limitation of this approach is that as wildfire behaviour intensifies the
power functions appeared to under-predict CF at active flame depths
greater than 6m compared to using Fire Point Theory and Equation (6.1)
directly. This may be explained however as the equations are trend lines of
the data, which are influenced by the somewhat clustered data at lower
levels of wildfire behaviour.
53Table 6.2. CFd as functions of Rate of Spread, intensity and flame length.
Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1)
Active Flame Depth (m)
Function
2
CF2 = 2.72 RoS0.42
3
CF3 = 3.97 RoS0.43
4
CF4 = 5.12 RoS0.44
5
CF5 = 6.24 RoS0.44
6
CF6 = 7.23 RoS0.45
7
CF7 = 8.30 RoS0.45
8
CF8 = 9.23 RoS0.45
9
CF9 = 10.20 RoS0.45
10
CF10 = 11.11 RoS0.46
Intensity, I (kWm−1)
Active Flame Depth (m)
Function
2
CF2 = 0.11(I)0.33
3
CF3 = 0.15(I)0.34
4
CF4 = 0.12(I)0.35
5
CF5 = 0.22(I)0.35
6
CF6 = 0.24(I)0.36
7
CF7 = 0.27(I)0.36
8
CF8 = 0.30(I)0.36
9
CF9 = 0.32(I)0.36
10
CF10 = 0.35(I)0.36
Flame Length, Lf (m)
Active Flame Depth (m)
Function
2
CF2 = 0.64 Lf0.62
3
CF3 = 0.90 Lf0.63
4
CF4 = 1.14 Lf0.65
5
CF5 = 1.35 Lf0.65
6
CF6 = 1.56 Lf0.66
7
CF7 = 1.74 Lf0.67
8
CF8 = 1.93 Lf0.67
9
CF9 = 2.11 Lf0.68
10
CF10 = 2.28 Lf0.68
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66Figure 6.2. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of
head fire Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1).
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67Figure 6.3. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of
intensity, I (kWm−1).
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68Figure 6.4. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of
flame length, Lf (m)

Sensitivity to variations in the base inputs was conducted to evaluate how
they influence CF. To complete the sensitivity analysis the following inputs
were assumed: FDI = 80, w = 25 tha−1, W = 35 tha−1, D = 4 m, Lf = 19.8 m, I =
43,000 kWm−1, h = 0.077 kW/m2K, Tg = 1090 K, Tfuel = 588 K, 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 = 0.7, 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

= 2640 kJkg−1, 𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 ≈ 0.0129 Lgm−2s−1, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8, 𝜙𝜙 = 0.8. As the effects of

FDI, fuel load (and thereby Lf and I due to the mathematical relationships

identified in Section 2) and flame depth are investigated throughout the
study, sensitivity to the remaining inputs was assessed by decreasing and
increasing the subject base input by 20%, all other inputs as assumed. The
results are summarized in Table 6.3. With the exception of 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜙𝜙, there was

little if any change to CF as a result of a 20% to the base input. It is worth
noting that in the context of wildfire where the fuel and the flame are in close
proximity, both 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜙𝜙 should be set at 1 (Hansen, 2012).
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54Table 6.3. Sensitivity analysis.

Input
% Change to Base Input % Change to Critical Flow (CF)
h
±20%
±1%
Tg
±20%
±2%
Tfuel
±20%
±1%
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
±20%
±1%
𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
±20%
±1%
”
𝑚𝑚̇ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0
±20%
±0%
𝜏𝜏
±20%
±24%
𝜙𝜙
±20%
±24%

6.4

Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists and IMT’s

The outcomes of this research are perhaps best represented using the
following analogy:
Imagine a small campfire less than 1m in diameter. That is the wildfire.
Now imagine a thimble of water. That is a small firefighting aircraft. Pour
the thimble of water on the campfire. The effect is negligible, and would
continue to be so even if 30 thimbles were applied in rapid succession.
However, if the vegetation fuel in the campfire is instead only one matchstick
size portion, then that thimble of water will extinguish the fire.
Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to
landscape scale forest and woodlands fires drops significantly as the active
flame depth of the head fire increases. By understanding this concept, as
well as how vegetation structure influences fire behaviour and fire front
geometry, IMT’s and firefighters can more realistically assess the potential for
suppression success.

At the same time, if fire behaviour specialists

understand these relationships, they are better prepared to describe the fire
behaviour in terms that are meaningful for the IMT and frontline firefighters.
The use of guiding analysis such as that presented in this and other sections
may assist IMT’s determine that suppression strategies are unlikely to succeed
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and resources would be better spent in evacuations or allowing crews more
time to prepare to defend vulnerable assets.

6.5

Implications for urban planners

The data and results presented in this section reinforce the implications for
Urban Planners discussed in Section 5.

Section 7 – Vehicle protection systems during entrapment and
burnover
7.1. Introduction
During wildfire operations the use of inappropriate suppression tactics
[Penney et al, 2019a] or sudden changes in wind direction (Lahaye et al.,
2018) can result in firefighters being directly caught by wildfire smoke and fire,
a situation known as entrapment. The occurrence of wildfire flame directly
impacting firefighters is known as burnover.

The threat posed from

entrapment and burnover is significant and has resulted in 411 firefighter
deaths in the USA from 1910 to 2006 (Mangan, 2007), 92 Australian firefighter
deaths from 1901 to 2011 (Blanchi et al., 2014) and 165 Canadian firefighter
deaths between 1941 and 2010 (Alexander & Buxton-Carr, 2011). In many
cases multiple fatalities resulted from a single entrapment and burnover.
The causes entrapment and burnover are well known (Wilson,1977), although
more recent studies have increased this understanding by defining human
factors and fire behaviour leading up to these events (Blanchi et al. 2012;
Butler et al. 1998; Diakakis et al. 2016; Page & Butler, 2017; Lahaye et al., 2016,
2018; Viegas et al. 2009).

7.2. Vehicle Protection Systems
In an effort to improve firefighter safety and aiming to protect the integrity of
firefighting vehicles, enabling escape and improving the tenability for
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entrapped occupants, Australian fire services have invested in vehicle
protection systems (VPS).
Vehicle protection systems include (DFES, 2016a; IDES, 2014) (figure 2):
1. Installation of deluge sprinklers, drop down thermal shielding blankets
and personal fire blankets;
2. Protect components essential to vehicle mobility against thermal
damage, through shielding, relocation and lagging;
3. Protect components critical to firefighting against thermal damage,
through shielding, relocation and lagging;
4. Ensuring the cabin is a suitable refuge and provides a continuous
enclosure of non-combustible materials through:
i.
removal of wheel arches, mudguards, step shrouds, cabin
body aesthetic panels, side mirror mounts, door handles,
backing plates and underbody panels; or
ii.
Where this is not possible, making these products fire resistant;
5. Protection of windows that are not essential for vision including the
replacement of rear and side rear windows with solid panels;
6. Adding infill panels between the cabin and the vehicle tray; and
7. Modifying the air-conditioning system to prevent smoke and heated
gases entering the cabin.

(a)

(b)

(c)
69Figure 7.1: Burnover protection systems (a) Drop down shielding blanket deployed (DFES,
2013c); (b) Firefighter under a personal fire blanket (DFES, 2013f); (c) Typical wildfire fighting
appliance showing position of side deluge sprays (DFES, 2013a).
172

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

The vehicle protection system deluge sprays designed to (DFES, 2016b):
1. Prevent glass failure, i.e. to ensure integrity of the cabin;
2. Cool the cabin to reduce occupant heat exposure; and
3. Cool the tyres to reduce risk of ignition.
The deluge system is required to be activated from the cabin, operate for a
minimum of 5 minutes from the time the ‘crew protection water alert’ sounds
which occurs once water tank reserves reach 600L, and to have a nominal
flow rate of 120Lmin-1 with a flow pressure of 3 bar (DFES, 2016a). An audible
and visual warning device alerts crews once they have reached the deluge
system reserve capacity, however the crew can continue to utilise this
reserve without restriction. Not all appliances can be fitted with deluge
systems. For instance Light Tankers, a small four wheel drive appliance with
a 500L water tank, cannot be fitted with deluge systems due to insufficient
water capacity to generate the required protection duration and existing
vehicle weight restrictions (IDES, 2014; Knight et al, 2003). Note that existing
design specifications do not consider water droplet size or their effect on
thermal attenuation.
Limited field experimentation has been completed (Cruz et al., 2016) and the
inherent danger of wildfire suppression during elevated fire weather
conditions has prevented the potential effectiveness of vehicle protection
systems being suitably quantified in full scale field experimentation.
Addressing this gap is vital and forms a critical component of thorough fire
engineering safety analysis [ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007]. Current external
vehicle protection systems utilised in Australian fire service vehicles
incorporate drop down thermal shielding blankets and sprinkler deluge
systems have been tested against fire line intensities of between 250010000kWm-1 and designed to withstand 7500kWm-1 (Nichols, Gould, Knight,
Leonard, & Brown, 2005). In similar tests, Nichols et al. (2003) reported that
cabin tenability was maintained when simulated fire line intensities of up to
12000kWm-1 were maintained for up to 14 seconds when water spray
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protection systems were used in conjunction with window radiation shields,
whilst Sargeant et al. (2003, p7) reported that
“In general vehicle orientated front on remained tenable at radiation levels
up to 30kWm-2. while side on and rear facing vehicles lost integrity at around
10 to 15 kWm-2”
By comparison forensic wildfire analysis(Cruz et al., 2012) and field
experimentation (Cruz et al., 2011; Frankman et al., 2012) identified fire line
intensities of up to 88MWm-1 and radiant heat fluxes in excess of 100kWm-2
can be experienced for longer durations during landscape scale wildfires, far
exceeding the limits of crew protection systems (Nicholas et al., 2003).
The potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems in providing an
adequate

level

unquantified.

of

fireifghter

protection

during

burnover

remains

Without validation firefighters may overestimate their

personal safety during wildfire suppression based on the belief they will be
adequately protected.

To address this knowledge gap and provide further

guidance the potential effectiveness of VPS in improving firefighter tenability
during entrapment and burnover, Penney et al. (2020b) completed:
1. Systematic analysis of historical entrapments and burnover; and
2. Simulated wildfires encompassing the 99th percentile of weather
conditions and fuel structures.
In order to verify the effectiveness of fire safety systems clear objectives
and performance criteria must be defined (ICC et al., 2005; SFPE, 2007; Yung,
2008). Effectiveness is defined as the product of fire safety system efficacy
and reliability (Thomas, 2002). The objective of vehicle protection systems is
to increase the tenability of firefighters during vehicle entrapment and
burnover.

For the purposes of the study the performance criteria (PC)

required to meet this objective were subsequently defined as:
PC1. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than 7500kWm-1 (the current rating of VPS);
PC2. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than 10000kWm-1 (the maximum intensity VPS
have been tested to);
PC3. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than 12000kWm-1 (maximum short duration
intensity VPS can withstand);
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PC4. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than the mean historical upper reported /
calculated intensity for all entrapments resulting in fatality or
injury;
PC5. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant
heat flux (RHF) is less than 15kWm-2, assuming vehicles are
orientated side on or with the rear to the advancing headfire;
and
PC6. VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant
heat flux (RHF) is less than 30kWm-2, assuming vehicles orientated
front on to the advancing headfire.

7.3. Historical entrapment analysis
Of the 4856 reports initially reviewed in the study (Penney et al., 2020b),
4336 were excluded as they did not meet the initial inclusion criteria. Of the
remaining 520 reports, 56 reports were excluded because they did not
involve a fatality or injury; two reports were excluded because they detailed
accidents unrelated to entrapment (one structure fire propane tank
explosion and one ATV rollover); eight reports were excluded as they related
to controlled burns; and 392 reports were excluded because they contained
insufficient information to extract or calculate fire line intensity. A total of 62
reports were included in the final study, 42% (n=26) containing firefighter
fatalities and 58% (n=36) reports containing firefighter injuries only.
By vegetation, forest fuel structures accounted for approximately 62%
(n=16) of fatal entrapments, scrub 23% (n=6), shrub 7.5% (n=2) and grassland
7.5% (n=2).

For entrapments involving injury only, forest accounted for

approximately 25% (n=9) of incidents, woodlands 14%

(n=5), scrub 11%

(n=4), shrub 17% (n=6) and grassland 33% (n=12).
For all entrapments resulting in either fatality or injury, forest accounted for
approximately 40% (n=25) of incidents, woodlands 9% (n=5), scrub 16%
(n=10), shrub 13% (n=8) and grassland 22% (n=14). Wildfire behaviour (lower
and upper reported / calculated values) during entrapments and burnover
at the time of fatality, injury and all incidents is detailed in Table 7.1, with
distribution across all incidents illustrated in Figure 7.2. The highest RoS by
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vegetation type was Forest 8.3ms-1, Woodland 4.53ms-1, Scrub 7.23ms-1, Shrub
6.73ms-1, and Grass 5.63ms-1.

The highest intensity and flame length

occurred in planation Forest fires during fatal entrapments, with the highest
reported intensity being 249226kWm-1, the highest calculated intensity being
318990kWm-1 and the largest flame length being reported as between 45.7
to 61m. The mean (μ) upper reported / calculated intensity across all
entrapments was 64453kWm-1 and was subsequently adopted as the
intensity threshold for Performance Criteria 4. Acknowledging the limitations
and assumptions of the wildfire models used in the study, these figures are
consistent with explosive wildfire behaviour over short runs (Alexander & Cruz,
2016; Tedim et al., 2018; Penney et al., 2019a).
55Table 7.1. Wildfire behaviour at point of impact during entrapments resulting in injury or
fatality, showing minimum and maximum reported or calculated values, mean (μ) and
standard deviation (σ)

Wildfire behaviour
RoS lower reported value (ms-1)

Fatality only incidents
min
max
0.1
7.2

RoS upper reported value (ms-1)
I lower reported / calculated value
(kWm-1)
I upper reported / calculated value
(kWm-1)
LF lower reported value (m)

μ
2.0

σ
2.1

0.1

8.3

2.3

2.4

1012

318990

68523

87142

3113
1.8

318990
45.7

83545
13.7

85912
13.0

19.8

18.5

Wildfire behaviour
RoS lower reported value (ms-1)
RoS upper reported value (ms-1)
I lower reported / calculated value
(kWm-1)
253
209250
I upper reported / calculated value
(kWm-1)
850
227850
LF lower reported value (m)
0.6
45.7
LF upper reported value (m)
1.2
76.2
All incidents considered

μ
1.5
2.2

σ
1.4
1.8

32937

7481

50664
8.5
11.8

60349
10.9
15.5

Wildfire behaviour
RoS lower reported value (ms-1)
RoS upper reported value (ms-1)
I lower reported / calculated value
(kWm-1)

LF upper reported value (m)

3.0
61
Injury only incidents
min
max
0.2
4.5
0.2
6.7

min
0.1
0.1

max
7.2
8.3

μ
1.8
2.2

σ
1.8
2.1

253

318990

47860

67687
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I upper reported / calculated value
(kWm-1)
LF lower reported value (m)
LF upper reported value (m)

850
0.6
1.2

318990
45.7
76.2

64453
10.6
15.0

73373
11.9
17.1

(a) RoS all incidents by vegetation

(b) Intensity all incidents by vegetation
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(c) LF all incidents by vegetation

70Figure 7.2: Wildfire behaviour all incidents by vegetation type (a) RoS; (b) Intensity; (c) LF

Efficacy is the ability of a fire safety system to successfully achieve its
required objective, assuming it functions as intended (SFPE, 2008; Thomas,
2002, Yung, 2008).

Table 7.2 details the efficacy of vehicle protection

systems against Performance Criteria 1 to 4 using the results from the historical
entrapments analysed. Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up
to an intensity 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) have an efficacy
between 0.12 to a maximum of 0.36. An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to
0.42 is observed when vehicle protection systems performing to Performance
Criteria 2, i.e. 10000kWm-1, are considered.

Vehicle protection systems

designed to operate up to an intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance
Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.

Applying

Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance threshold equal to the mean
historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1), efficacy of
vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81.

By

comparison, Yung (2008) reports the efficacy of sprinklers in suppressing a
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‘large’ fire in buildings as between 0.89 to 1.00, with an overall effectiveness
(efficacy multiplied by reliability) of 0.77 to 0.96.

In conjunction with the

analysis of historical entrapments, this suggests that existing vehicle
protection systems may be unreliable in protecting vehicle occupants from
entrapment and burnover.

Improvements in vehicle protection system

efficacy could be achieved by increasing the performance standard they
are required to meet, whilst further research into the reliability of vehicle
protection

systems

will

facilitate

greater

understanding

of

overall

effectiveness.
56Table 7.2. Vehicle protection system efficacy based on historical entrapments
considering

Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)
Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)

Fatality only incidents (n=26)
lower intensity
0.19 (n=5)

upper intensity
0.12 (n=3)

0.31 (n=8)
0.31 (n=8)
0.69 (n=18)
Injury only incidents (n=36)
lower intensity
0.36 (n=13)

0.12 (n=3)
0.12 (n=3)
0.62 (n=16)

0.42 (n=15)
0.47 (n=17)
0.81 (n=29)
All incidents (n=62)
lower intensity
0.29 (n=18)

0.28 (n=10)
0.33 (n=12)
0.67 (n=24)

PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)
Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)

0.37 (n=23)
0.42 (n=26)
0.76 (n=47)

upper intensity
0.22 (n=8)

upper intensity
0.18 (n=11)
0.21 (n=13)
0.24 (n=15)
0.66 (n=41)

7.4. Design wildfire analysis
Where full scale systems testing is prohibitive, fire safety systems analysis
using simulations and modelling (International Code Council et al., 2005;
SFPE, 2007, 2008) is required.

Assessing the effectiveness of existing VPS

against the full scale of wildfires experienced in Australia using field testing is
not achievable due to the inherent dangers associated with catastrophic
wildfire events and the costs associated with the burnover of firefighting
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appliances.

To in part address this and provide some guidance to

firefighters, Incident Management Teams and fire safety engineers, simulated
design fires are used for the study. Yung (2008, p80) defines define fires as
“prescribed fires that can be used by fire protection engineers for
performance-based fire safety designs”.
The approach adopted by Penney et al. (2020b) enabled vehicle
protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 1 to 6 (intensities of
7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1, 12000kWm-1, 64453kWm-1; and radiant heat flux of
15kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) to be assessed across Forest, Woodland, Scrub, Shrub
and Grassland fuel structures, fuel loads, forest and grassland fire danger
indices, windspeeds, slope and fuel age.

A total of 90 simulations were completed during the first phase of the study.
As expected wildfire intensity increased with slope, windspeed (V) and Forest
/ Grassland Fire Danger Indices (Figure 7.3a-j), which is consistent with the
principles of established wildfire behaviour. Forest simulations on flat ground
resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 (7500kWm-1) and
Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 10 to
20, and Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a
Fire Danger Index of 20 to 30.

Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance

threshold equal to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity
of 64453kWm-1) was not exceeded regardless of the Fire Danger Index. By
comparison Woodland simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity
exceeding Performance Criteria 1 (7500kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index
of 30 to 40, intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 2 (10000 kWm-1)
between a FDI of 40 to 50, and Performance Criteria 3 (12000 kWm-1) being
exceeded between a Fire Danger Index of 50 to 60. Echoing the results of
Forest simulations, Performance Criteria 4 (64453kWm-1) was not exceeded in
Woodland regardless of the Fire Danger Index.

In Grassland under

equivalent conditions, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 1-3 prior to a
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Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50 while Performance Criteria 4 was not
exceeded at any Fire Danger Index.
To put these figures into context, Blanchi et al. (2010) report virtually all
house loss from wildfire in Australia occurs on days when the FDI exceeds the
99.5th percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the
regions considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire
Danger Index greater than 100. Further, they report there is little house loss
on days where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50. This indicates that
vehicle protection systems designed to current performance criteria are
unlikely to be effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively
involved in the protection of houses during significant wildfire events.
The influence of windspeed on fire line intensity in Scrub and Shrub
wildfires is illustrated in Figures 7.3g and 7.3i. Scrub simulations on flat ground
resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 to 3 between
windspeeds (V) of 5 to 15kmh-1.

Unlike all other simulations, intensity

exceeded Performance Criteria 4 in simulated Scrub wildfire, but only once
windspeed exceeded approximately 55kmh-1. By comparison, Shrub
simulations in equivalent conditions resulted in intensity exceeding
Performance Criteria 1 and 2 between windspeeds of 5 to 15kmh-1, and
Performance Criteria 3 being exceeded between windspeeds of 25 to
35kmh-1.

Intensity did not exceed Performance Criteria 4 regardless of

windspeed in Shrub simulations.
Sensitivity analysis was completed to determine the effect of changing
slope across all vegetation structures.

Simulations in each fuel structure

were completed at 0° to 20°. When simulating the effect of increase in slope
(Figures 7.3b,d,f,h,j), a positive relationship was confirmed between slope
and wildfire intensity (Table 7.3). This subsequently resulted in Performance
Criteria 1-3 thresholds being exceeded more rapidly as slope increased.
Increased slope may also result in Performance Criteria 4 being exceeded
where it previously provided adequate protection.

These outcomes were

expected given the mathematical relationship between slope, rate of
spread and intensity detailed in Penney et al (2020b).
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Sensitivity analysis of intensity to fuel load in Forest and Woodland also
confirmed consistent increase of intensity as understory (w) and total fuel (W)
load increased (Figure 7.4). At a Fire Danger Index of 80 and assuming flat
ground, fire line intensities exceeded Performance Criteria 1 and 2 when
Forest fuels reached 40-50% of their default design wildfire values (w= 1012.5tha-1 and W= 14-17.5tha-1) and Performance Criteria 3 was exceeded
once Forest fuels reached 50-60% (w= 15-17.5tha-1 and W= 21-24.5tha-1) of
default design wildfire values.

Under the same conditions, Performance

Criteria 1 was exceeded when Woodland fuels reached 60-70% (w= 7.4-9tha1

and W= 12.5-15tha-1) of default design wildfire values and both

Performance Criteria 2 and 3 were exceeded once Woodland fuels reached
70-80% (w= 10.5-12tha-1 and W= 17.5-20tha-1) of their default design wildfire
values (the fuel loads assigned in AS3959). Performance Criteria 4 was not
exceeded in Forest or Woodland simulations at any fuel load up to 100% of
default values detailed in AS3959. These results indicate that whilst sparser
fuels result in reduced intensity, vehicle protection systems designed to
existing performance criteria may still be exceeded, however vehicle
protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 4 would provide a
significantly higher level of firefighter protection.
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71Figure 7.3: Wildfire intensity by vegetation type
57Table 7.3. Relationship between slope and intensity, all vegetation types

Slope
Flat

Intensity factor
compared to flat ground
1

5°
10°
15°
20°

1.4
2.0
2.8
4

50000
45000

Intensity (kW/m)

40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Understory (w) and Total (W) fuel load
Forest

Woodland

7500kW/m

10000kW/m

12000kW/m

72Figure 7.4: Sensitivity to fuel load – Forest & Woodland

184

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

Wildfire simulations (n=45) enabled radiant heat flux (RHF) to be calculated
at 5m increments for 0 to 100m of separation from the headfire for Forest,
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland vegetation structures (Figure 7.5).
As expected, radiant heat flux at each unit of separation increases with
slope, Fire Danger Index (FDI), Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) and
windspeed (V).
In all simulations, regardless of FDI, GFDI, V, slope or fuel load, Performance
Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) and Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) were exceeded
for 0 to 5m separation from the wildfire front.

Historical analysis (Table 3)

identifies the mean flame length during entrapments and burnover resulting
in either injury or fatality is 10.6 to 15m, with a maximum flame length of 45.7
to 76.2m.

This indicates vehicle protection systems would likely fail in the

event of protracted flame immersion associated with engulfment and
burnover during the passage of the headfire.
In Forest simulations (Figure 7.5a), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance
Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 14m separation from the headfire at a
Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 44m at a Fire Danger
Index of 100. Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2)
for approximately 8m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of
10, increasing to approximately 25m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.
As expected, the efficacy of vehicle suppression systems in Woodlands
fuels was slightly higher by comparison, Woodlands having less understory
fuel (15tha-1) compared to Forest (25tha-1).

Radiant heat flux exceeded

Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 10m separation from the
headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 30m at a
Fire Danger Index of 100 (Figure 7.5b).

Radiant heat flux exceeded

Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m separation from the
headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 17m at a
Fire Danger Index of 100.
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In Scrub simulations (Figure 7.5c), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance
Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 8m from the headfire at a windspeed
of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately 35m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.
Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for
approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to
approximately 20m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.

By comparison, in Shrub

simulations (Figure 7.5d), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5
(15kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh1,

increasing to approximately 25m at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.

Radiant

heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2)for approximately 4m
from the headfire at a windspeed of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately 13m
at a windspeed of 95kmh-1.
In Grassland simulations (Figure 7.5e) radiant heat flux exceeded
Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) for approximately 10m from the headfire at
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 17m at a
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.

Radiant heat flux exceeded

Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 10m at a
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.
These results again demonstrate that the operating parameters of existing
vehicle protection systems are likely to be exceeded well below the
conditions Blanchi et al (2006) report are most likely to be involved in the
defense of life and property.
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73Figure 7.5: Radiant heat flux (RHF) as a function of separation from headfire: (a) Forest; (b)
Woodland; (c) Scrub; (d) Shrub; (e) Grassland

Sensitivity analysis (table 7.4) demonstrates the separation required from
the headfire (all vegetation structures) in order for radiant heat flux to fall
below Performance Criteria 5 and 6 increases with slope. Similarly, sensitivity
analysis of understory fuel loads (w) in Forest/Woodland design wildfires
(Figure 7.6a-f) demonstrates a positive relationship between the separation
required from the headfire in order for radiant heat flux to fall below
Performance Criteria 5 and 6, and understory fuel loads (w). At surface fuel
loads (w) of 30tha-1, and a Fire Danger Index of 100, radiant heat flux exceeds
Performance Criteria 5 (15kWm-2) until approximately 45m separation from
the forest head fire is achieved. Under the same conditions radiant heat flux
exceeds Performance Criteria 6 (30kWm-2) until separation of approximately
25m is achieved.

The required separation from the head fire for RHF

decreases with FDI and w, with only approximately 6m separation required
for RHF to fall below 30kWm-2 at a FDI of 100 when w is 5tha-1; and 10m
separation required for RHF to fall below 15kWm-2 under the same conditions.

58Table 7.4. Effect of slope on reparation from headfire required before
Performance Criteria 5 & 6 are achieved.
Slope
Vegetation
0°
5°
10°
-2
Performance Criteria 5 (Radiant heat flux of 15kWm ) exceeded

15°

20°

Forest (FDI=80)
35-40m
45m
55m
Woodland (FDI=80)
25m
30m
35-40m
Scrub (V=45kmh-1)
20-25m
25-30m
30m
-1
Shrub (V=45kmh )
15-20m
15-20m
20-25m
Grassland (GFDI=110)
15m
15-20m
20m
-2
Performance Criteria 6 (Radiant heat flux of 30kWm ) exceeded

65m
45-50m
30-35m
20-25m
15-20m

75-80m

Forest (FDI=80)
Woodland (FDI=80)

20-25m
10-15m

25-30m
15-20m

30-35m
20-25m

40-45m
25-30m

50-55m

Scrub (V=45kmh-1)
Shrub (V=45kmh-1)
Grassland (GFDI=110)

10-15m
5-10m
5-10m

10-15m
5-10m
5-10m

15-20m
10-15m
10m

15-20m
10-15m
10-15m

20-25m
10-15m
10-15m

55-60m
35-40m
25-30m
25-30m

30-35m

188

Greg Penney PhD Thesis
70
Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Separation from head fire (m)

70

(b) w = 10tha-1
Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

(a) w = 5tha-1
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Separation from head fire (m)

Separation from head fire (m)

(d) w = 20tha-1
Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

(c) w = 15tha-1
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Separation from head fire (m)
(e) w = 25tha-1

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Separation from head fire (m)

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Separation from head fire (m)
(f) w = 30tha-1

74Figure 7.6: Effect of understory fuel load on RHF as a function of separation from the
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7.5. Discussion
The results identify that vehicle protection systems designed to operate in
fire line intensities of 7500kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 1) could reasonably
expected to have been successful in 0.12 to 0.36 of historical entrapments
and burnovers, assuming they operate without fault 100% of the time (i.e. a
reliability factor of 1.00).

An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 was

observed when vehicle protection systems performing to Performance
Criteria 2, i.e. 10000kWm-1, were considered.

Vehicle protection systems

designed to operate up to an intensity of 12000kWm-1 (i.e. Performance
Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47. This is well below
the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety systems (Yung, 2008; SFPE,
2008).

Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle

protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated
intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an
increase in efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62
to 0.81. To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is
recommended that significantly higher fire line intensity performance criteria
are adopted across fire services for vehicle protection systems.

Further

research

is

into

the

reliability

of

vehicle

protection

systems

also

recommended to enable the effectiveness of each system to be determined
as part of a detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering
analysis. Until this is completed the potential of unrealistic expectations of
the safety afforded to firefighters during entrapment and burnover may
contribute to increased injuries or fatalities during wildfire suppression.
Radiant heat flux analysis further highlights the performance limitations of
existing vehicle protection systems. Whilst the 95th and 99th percentiles of Fire
Danger Indices across Australia from 2000 to 2007 as reported by Dowdy et
al. (2009) are illustrated in figure 2.2 (refer to Chapter 2), fire weather in
Australia is increasingly worsening as a result of climate change Lucas et al.
(2007). As Blanchi et al. (2010) report, virtually all house loss from wildfire in
Australia occurs on days when the Fire Danger Index exceeds the 99.5th
percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions
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considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger
Index greater than 100. Further, they report there is little house loss on days
where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50. Fire line intensity simulations
identified Performance Criteria 1-3 (i.e. intensity of 7500kWm-1, 10000kWm-1
and 12000kWm-1 respectively) were exceeded on flat terrain in Forest below
a Fire Danger Index of 30; in Woodlands at Fire Danger Indices between 30
to 60; in Grassland at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of less than 50
(equivalent to a Fire Danger Index of 40); and in Scrub and Scrub at
windspeeds of less than 15kmh-1. By comparison, the mean historical upper
recorded / calculated intensity of 64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4)
was not exceeded in any simulation, regardless of Fire Danger Index or
windspeed except for Scrub fuels once windspeed reached approximately
55kmh-1.
Radiant heat flux modelling completed in Penney et al. (2020b)
demonstrated vehicle protection system Performance Criteria 5 and 6 (i.e. 15
kWm-2 and 30kWm-2) are likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment
where flame immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct possibility for
significant distances of separation from the headfire. To increase firefighter
safety it is recommended further research and development into vehicle
protection systems satisfying Australian Standard 1530.8.2 Methods for fire
tests on building materials, components and structures – Part 8.2 Tests on
elements of construction for buildings exposed to simulated bushfire attack –
large flaming sources, which specifically identifies performance criteria for
prolonged radiant heat flux exceeding 40kWm-2.

7.6. Implications for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists, IMT’s and fire services
This chapter identifies that vehicle protection systems designed to the
existing intensity standard of 7500kWm-1 may have been successful in 0.12 to
0.36 of historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate without
fault. An efficacy this low is highly unlikely to be tolerated in any traditional
fire safety system.

In conjunction with research into wildfire weather in
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Australia, the results of design wildfire analysis indicate existing vehicle
protection systems are unlikely to be effective on days that firefighters are
most likely to be actively involved in the protection of houses during
significant wildfire events.
wildfire

suppression,

and

In order to maximise firefighter safety during
to

avoid

providing

firefighters

unrealistic

expectations regarding vehicle protection systems and other fire safety
systems which may contribute to firefighters taking unacceptable risks, it is
recommended fire services should include training on the limitations of their
respective systems.
Significant improvements in firefighter safety during entrapment and
burnover may be made by increasing the required intensity threshold of VPS.
Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle protection
systems to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of
64453kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an increase in
efficacy of vehicle protection systems increases to between 0.62 to 0.81.
Adopting this intensity threshold would also result in vehicle protection
systems being theoretically effective in all design wildfires modelled, with the
exception of Scrub where VPS may potentially remain effective until
windspeeds reach 45 to 55kmh-1.
When considering radiant heat flux, this chapter identifies that both 15
and 30kWm-2 is likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame
immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct possibility for significant distances
of separation from the headfire.

To increase firefighter safety it is

recommended fire services not only ensure wildfire suppression training
includes analysis of the magnitude and effects of wildfire radiant heat flux,
but include credible worse case radiant heat flux thresholds of 30kWm-2 as
one of the mandatory performance criteria of VPS and any other wildfire
vehicle fire safety system.
The results of this study should not be considered in isolation, but rather
alongside the findings of other recent research (Penney et al., 2019a, 2019b,
2020a, 2020b) into wildfire suppression strategies and the limitations of
firefighters and the equipment they rely on. A recurring theme within the
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conclusions of this research is that when attempting to suppress landscape
scale wildfire, it may be more appropriate for fire services to consider early
instigation of indirect attack or defensive strategies including safeguarding,
evacuations and clear communication to the community and other
stakeholders that conditions at the head fire are not defendable.

It is

suggested offensive strategies involving personnel and appliances should be
employed with caution after detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity,
secondary to the increased use of aerial firefighting suppression.

Early

adoption of this approach will assist prevent crews being inappropriately
tasked to potential dangerous ‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be
at great risk, but will have little if any impact on the fire. Further, it will clearly
articulate the severity of the approaching head fire and will assist to prevent
unrealistic community expectations of fire services intervention during
catastrophic wildfire events.

Section 8 – Risk in the firefighting context
8.1 Introduction
Succinctly described by (Kunadharaju et al., 2011), “there is little protective
redundancy in firefighting.” Accordingly, effective risk management is an
essential component of dynamic firefighting operations throughout the
world. International Standard 31000 Risk management guidelines (ISO, 2018)
subsequently referred to as ISO31000, is the standard of risk management
within the Australian emergency services context.
Previous studies (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al. 2007) reported
decisions made on the incident ground to be reactionary rather than
considered, or to be adapted from previous experience at similar situations
or incidents potentially without thorough analysis (Tissington & Flin, 2007).
Dynamic risk management in the emergency rescue context is often
restricted to a qualitative selection of tactics guided by tacit professional
craft knowledge as opposed to quantified risk assessment and evidence
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based practice as part of the entire risk management process (Jacobs, 2010;
Loflin & Kipp, 1997). Buoyed by disasters of significant scale including, the
devastating Grenfell Tower fire of June 14, 2017 (GTI, 2018) and more frequent
siege and mega wildfires such as those experienced in California (CA Gov,
2018; USFS & CDFFP, 2004), Greece (CBS, 2018) and Australia (Bushfire CRC,
2009), fire services are facing increased public scrutiny and both firefighters
Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) are being held to a higher standard of
performance than ever before.
In response to the changing external environment, fire services throughout
the world are embracing new technologies and turning to research to
support evidence based practice.

At the same time, fire services are

collecting significant amounts of specific and information rich data.
Probabilistic analysis of this data can subsequently facilitate improvements in
operational risk management during emergencies and in pre-incident
planning (Penney, 2017, 2019) ultimately resulting in a safer workplace and
providing Incident Commanders evidence that can be used to support
operational decisions. This chapter not only defines risk management within
the dynamic emergency fire service context, but explores firefighters risk
attitudes and how these may influence Incident Controllers (IC’s).

8.2

Defining risk in dynamic fire and emergency situations

Whilst the term ‘risk’ is often used incorrectly instead of, or interchangeably
with the term ‘hazard’ within the majority of fire services literature (Penney,
2017, 2019), risk is specifically defined as the “effect of uncertainty on
objectives” (ISO, 2018). Risk is not an event (SAI Global, 2013a) such as an
explosion, fire or other emergency. Instead, risk is expressed as the likelihood
of a consequence, positive or negative, occurring. When applied to
emergency response it is essential to appreciate that incidents are dynamic,
occurring within an environment subject to constant change and therefore
the level of uncertainty and therefore risk, must be constantly reassessed.
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Often inappropriately described, three elements must be defined in order to
articulate risk:
1. The objective(s) being referred to;
2. The particular source of uncertainty; and
3. How the source of uncertainty may lead to consequences.
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may
include:
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved
in a high speed vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the
firefighters from mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards preventing all
firefighters completing the rescue unharmed. In this statement:
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed;
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead
to the consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured.
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may
include:
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved
in a high speed vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the
firefighters from mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards preventing all
firefighters completing the rescue unharmed.
In this statement:
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed;
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead
to the consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured.
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8.3

Risk management in the dynamic emergency
context

The term ‘risk management’ refers to the structure (principles, framework
and process) for managing risk effectively whilst ‘managing risk’ refers to the
application of that structure to the decision making process (SAI Global,
2013a). The risk management process provides the architecture for decision
making and must be applied in every situation, including emergency
response, for risk to be deemed to have been considered sufficiently
(Penney, 2016).

Further, SAI Global (2013a,p45) provides the following

example of how the process must be applied in even the most dynamic
emergency situations:
“A military special forces section leader might have a split second in
which to make a tactical decision on which personal wellbeing and that
of subordinates as well as the success of the mission, might depend. In that
time the leader must recall the objectives, appreciate the external and
internal environment, assess the risks, consider the options, review those
against the objectives and take the appropriate action. Despite the very
short decision making window, the quality of each of these steps must be
of the highest standard.”
Failure to comprehend risk or to apply the entire risk management structure
to dynamic decision making in the emergency environment can result in
decisions that exacerbate rather than mitigate adverse consequences.
Should adverse outcomes eventuate it may also lead to post incident
scrutiny of the decisions made by ICs. Existing studies suggest risk assessment
in accordance with (ISO, 2018) may not occur during frontline emergency
response in most jurisdictions (Ash & Smallman, 2012; Sadler et al., 2007;
Penney, 2019). In contrast to these findings however, the risk management
methodology for dynamic emergency incidents adopted by United
Kingdom Fire Services as published by the Department for Communities and
Local Government is comprehensive and requires specific attention.
The first of these publications, the Fire and Rescue Authorities “Health,
safety and welfare framework for the operational environment” (DCLG,
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2013), details a comprehensive architecture for management of dynamic
incident risk that commences with the brigade’s senior officers and ends with
the individual emergency responder on the incident ground. This publication
is unique amongst the literature reviewed in that it not only acknowledges
Health and Safety legislation, often viewed as encumbrance to emergency
response, but embraces it as a pillar of dynamic emergency risk
management. In doing so the United Kingdom Fire Services succinctly define
both internal and external organisational risk contexts as they apply to
frontline operations. Further, DCLG (2013) not only articulates the dynamic
incident risk assessment process through the hierarchy of command but also
provides multiple fire service specific examples for ICs and front line personnel
of all ranks and operational roles to reference. Perhaps most importantly from
an organisational context is the recognition that “standard operational
procedures need to be sufficiently flexible to allow the Incident Commander
to exercise discretion on the resources and the procedures required to
resolve the emergency” (DCLG, 2013, p23). The flexibility for ICs and
personnel to use ‘operational discretion’ is carefully articulated and “should
be based on a balance in terms of risk versus benefit, and the Incident
Commander knowing the action which they are normally required by the
relevant standard operational procedure” (DCLG, 2013 ,p23). In these
statements the term Incident Commander and IC are interchangeable.
The second publication is the Fire and Rescue Manual 2nd Volume “Fire
Service Operations – Incident Command” (DCLG, 2008). It is the doctrine of
fire service dynamic incident management at all levels and embraces
incident risk management as one of the three key elements required for
effective incident command. Most significantly DCLG (2008, p64) recognises
“in order to provide an acceptable level of protection at operational
incidents, the organisations health and safety management must operate at
three different levels – Strategic, Systematic and Dynamic.” At a strategic
level, the doctrine defines the fire service’s risk attitudes and establishes
internal context whilst complying with relevant external contexts. This is
achieved through appropriate policy and doctrine that embrace the risk
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philosophy of the fire service. Systematic risk management is completed by
operational subject matter experts in each discipline. The results subsequently
guide the development and implementation of operations including but not
limited to safe work systems, procedures, equipment, training and
supervision. Dynamic risk management occurs during an operational
incident and encompasses all risk management carried out by all personnel
involved in the incident whilst an emergency situation is present.
In considering the application of ‘dynamic risk management’ it is essential
to distinguish between time critical emergency situations, for instance where
lives are endangered and rescue is required, and non-emergency situations
such as body recovery. The distinction is critical as risk thresholds will vary
accordingly as demonstrated in the “Safe Person Concept” (NZFS, 2008) and
the philosophy of the DCLG [2008,p65],
“In a highly calculated way, firefighters:
•

Will take some risk to save saveable lives.

•

May take some risk to save saveable property.

•

Will not take any risk at all to try and save lives or property that are

already lost.”
Whilst NZFS (2008) considers dynamic incident risk management in
isolation, DCLG (2008, 2013) acknowledge it as only a part of the greater risk
management process applicable to the fire service as a workplace.
Through this approach the United Kingdom integrates the internal and
external risk contexts into the dynamic incident risk management process.
This holistic approach empowers ICs to manage risk in accordance with
ISO31000 regardless of the nature of the emergency encountered.

Klein’s (1989) Recognition-Primed Decision and Rasmussen’s Decision
Ladder (1976, cited in Naikar, 2010) represent two accepted models
representing the decision process of experienced personnel in dynamic
situations. Both models are dependent on a high level of expertise from the
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decision maker and the ability to process information in a structured
sequence that characterises rational, knowledge-based behaviour (Naikar,
2010). Neither model references the application of risk management into
the decision making process or how prior exposure may influence risk
tolerance and the cognitive process. Recognition Primed Decision Making
(RPDM) requires a level of operational maturity bordering on mastery that
can only be achieved through significant and repeated exposures that result
in both positive and negative consequences.

Basing training solely on

RPDM can be problematic as it relies on teaching rookie ICs the “experience”
of veterans and expecting them to respond as the veteran would, despite
not having the personal library of experience to draw upon. Alternatively,
the cognitive processes explained by Kahneman (2012) explain how
complex cognitive processes such as risk analysis during dynamic emergency
situations can be expedited by the development of advanced and efficient
cognitive processes that can be taught, practiced and mastered. Unlike
RPDM, Kahneman’s approach supports the implementation of ISO31000 risk
analysis during dynamic emergencies. This is not to say that RPDM does not
have a place in risk management during emergency operations, however to
introduce it to inexperienced ICs as the sole means of risk analysis is not
appropriate.
Risk analysis (also known as risk assessment) is the process to comprehend
the nature of risk and to determine the level of risk (SAI Global, 2013a). The
process of comprehension requires the risk manager to be able to
adequately interpret risk sources in a structured manner and to subsequently
understand the probability and consequences of an event occurring. During
even the most rapidly changing emergency situations the risk management
framework and structure remains the same. Each risk analysis must be
considered a new separate process, even if it builds upon a previously and
recently completed analysis of the same emergency situation at an earlier
point in time. This realisation is significant as it supports the understanding that
dynamic risk management does not involve a changing architecture or
process of analysis, but rather the same risk management architecture and
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analysis process applied multiple times during a rapidly changing (dynamic)
emergency situation.
Risk analysis may either be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of
both. Qualitative analysis involves descriptive and often subjective appraisal
of risk as described by the assessor. It is often useful when risk treatment
strategies involve multiple risks at different levels that cannot be accurately
measured on the same quantitative scale and may be suitable during
preliminary or scoping assessments. Importantly, when qualitative analysis is
applied “there should be a clear explanation of all the terms employed and
the basis for all criteria should be recorded” (SAI Global, 2013a, p18). Review
of fire services literature (ACT, unknown; NZFS, 2008; DFES, 2012; SACFS, 2014)
identified that whilst prioritised objectives of the protection of life, property
and the environment were common across jurisdictions, explanations of
terminology were largely absent from operational material. Yung (2008)
asserts that reliance on qualitative assessment alone must be considered
fundamentally flawed because subjective judgements cannot be verified
and may often differ between operators. Further, the same operator may
make different decisions given the same situation at various points in time.
Quantitative assessment requires the analysis of numerical data to
calculate probabilities, frequencies and distributions. Considered the
epitome of fire risk analysis probabilistic risk analysis requires detailed and time
consuming consideration of all possible outcomes as either a function of
incidence, Bayesean probability or life/dollar loss per unit time (Yung, 2008).
Such analysis requires availability of substantial high quality data as well as
the ability to numerically represent variability within defined confidence
levels, therefore it cannot be undertaken within the parameters and
constraints of a single emergency incident. This is supported in (ACTESA, date
unknown, p2] by the Dynamic Risk assessment overview statement that
“often, rescues have to be performed, exposures protected and hose lines
placed before a complete appreciation of all material facts have been
obtained”. Whilst typical quantitative analysis, including fault tree or event
tree diagrams, may be particularly useful for pre-incident planning and as a
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supporting assurance process, their complexity and time required for
completion render them impractical for incident ground completion. Review
of available literature identified that whilst significant international statistical
analysis of fire related fatality and injury data were available (DCLG, 2015;
FEMA, 2011 & 2012) a total absence of statistical analysis of Australian
firefighting injuries and risk management during dynamic operations was
noted in both published and internal brigade documentation.
For risk analysis during dynamic incidents to align to ISO31000, both
qualitative and quantitative components are arguably required. Reviews of
historical injury data may provide quantitative probabilities pertaining to the
effectiveness of certain personal protective equipment in reducing firefighter
injuries. At the same time, experience may provide an IC with valuable insight
into qualitatively assessing the effectiveness of specific tactics in certain
situations.

Risk treatment involves the application of mitigating processes, systems or
other inhibitors to reduce the likelihood or consequence of an event
occurring (ISO, 2018; SAI Global, 2013a & 2013b). Consequences of
inaccurate identification of risk and subsequent treatment can be
catastrophic with Ash & Smallman (2012) identifying 19% of all firefighter
deaths in the United States between 2000 and 2005 being a direct result of
human error. In the context of firefighting operations, risk treatments (also
known as controls) are subsequently presented in the contextualisation of the
traditional hierarchy of controls.
At the top of the hierarchy is “elimination” which refers to the removal of
the risk source. In the firefighting context this may be viewed as preoperational actions such as arson prevention or road safety campaigns.
During an emergency incident “elimination” may include the decision not to
commit crews, but rather to isolate a fuel source and permit it to ‘burn out’
so that lives are not endangered.
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Next in the hierarchy is “substitution” which is difficult to translate to the
firefighting context because firefighters often respond to emergency
situations where time and resourcing restrictions are encountered. It may be
considered that a decision to use defensive firefighting strategies, as
opposed to offensive internal firefighting strategies, may meet the definition
for substitution because even though the risk source is not eliminated, the
approach to resolving the incident is specifically varied in a manner that
reduces the potential for an adverse event to occur.
“Engineering” controls are those that isolate assets from the risk source. In
the firefighting context this may only be partially achieved because there is
likely to be a requirement for at least several firefighters to be present within
the ‘hot’ zone (DFES 2012, 2015a, 2015b) and this remains essential to
resolving many dynamic emergency situations. Isolation occurs through the
implementation of controlled access to areas within an emergency incident
that are the greatest risk source through Entry Control Officers and physical
demarcation (DFES, 2015a, 2015b). Despite the use of isolation controls at
emergency incidents, which may reduce the potential for greater numbers
of adverse outcomes, ICs are still required to commit sufficient firefighters into
hazardous situations in order to resolve the emergency.
“Administrative” controls are the policies, procedures and ‘doctrine’ that
provide organisational guidance as to the appropriate manner in which to
resolve a dynamic emergency situation. Extensive fire services literature in this
area was found, however, an absence of established risk criterion or
documented risk thresholds was also noted. No reason for this absence was
found.
“Personnel attitudes” are an addition to the traditional hierarchy of
controls and may be considered a critical component to the contextualised
hierarchy of controls within the firefighting environment. It may be considered
that personnel attitudes are significantly influenced by the internal context in
which they evolve (Lloyd, 2005, 2008) and the internal context of firefighters
is particularly influential. It is therefore surmised that the attitude of individual
firefighters under the command of an IC must be considered in the
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contextualised hierarchy of controls. Whilst good attitudes will afford some
benefit for the reduction of the likelihood of an adverse outcome, poor
attitudes will inevitably increase the potential for failure to implement or
abide by other controls and therefore increase both the probability and
severity of adverse outcomes on the incident ground.
“Personal protective equipment” colloquially known as PPE within fire
services represents the final line of defence between personnel and an
adverse outcome. Whilst some PPE may in fact reduce the potential for
realisation of an adverse effect, for instance breathing apparatus
theoretically preventing a firefighter inhaling toxic smoke and products of
combustion, it must also be considered that the presence of PPE may result
in firefighters undertaking greater risk taking behaviour due to a perception
that the PPE affords them complete or excessive levels of protection (Penney,
2013).

8.4

Risk attitudes amongst firefighters

Differences in the identification of objectives and the willingness to accept
and retain risk (risk tolerance) between strategic and tactical levels within an
emergency services organisation, as reported by Ash and Smallman (2012)
and Jacobs (2010), may result in risk management decisions being made by
ICs that could be later considered to be inappropriate or unjustified. Further,
Ash and Smallman (2012) identified the perception by emergency services
personnel that strategic (organisational) decisions and guidance may hinder
achievement of goals at a tactical level and actually contribute to
inappropriate risk management during emergency response. Further,
inappropriate or insufficient understanding and consideration of risk may
leave emergency services personnel with potentially dangerous familiarity
with the hazards they face (Sadler et al., 2007).
Also worth consideration is the intimate culture amongst firefighting crews
that can affect management of risk during dynamic emergencies.
Firefighters spend a significant amount of time together during both
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emergency incidents and routine station life (Childs et al., 2004). In this
environment, indoctrinated traits established by organisational culture
invariably flourish and form a unique environment that has the capacity to
directly influence an IC’s management of risk during dynamic emergency
operations. Reports including NIFC (1996) and Moore-Merrell et al. (2008)
identify an established culture of risk taking amongst firefighters in order ‘to
get the job done’ regardless of operational guidelines. This is supported by
the findings of Kunadharaju et al. (2011) who reported, in contrast to most
high hazard work, firefighting operations are actively based on hazard
engagement, typically compounded by acute time pressures. In addition to
these findings, Fender (2003) reported multiple firefighter specific traits that
directly affected personal risk tolerance. These included:
1. The age of a victim - the younger the victim the higher the threshold
to personal injury or death;
2. Respect for the officer in charge – firefighters were willing to
undertake more dangerous tasks if they respected the officer
giving a command;
3. A sense of pride in taking risks; and
4. Expectations of the community.
A previous study into the decontamination practices of firefighters
exposed to hazardous and toxic materials (Penney, 2013) found a tendency
amongst firefighters to perceive potentially life threatening incidents as
routine if they were regularly encountered without acute health effects
becoming evident. It is suggested the cultural acceptance of personal risk
taking amongst firefighting crews needs to be carefully understood by ICs
who are ultimately responsible for crew safety and may well have less risk
tolerance during incidents.
Recent research (Penney, 2016, 2019) provides insight into the risk
attitudes and perceptions of operational Australian firefighters.

The

research was conducted in two phases: (1) Semistructured interviews and (2)
subsequent in-depth structured surveys. This enabled exploration and
documentation of the beliefs, understanding, and attitudes of fire and
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emergency service ICs. Phase one involved ethnographic qualitative
interactive observation of 20 current serving professional fire and emergency
service ICs over a three-month period. All participants were experienced ICs
with a minimum of seven years operational experience across all fire service
hazards, including but not limited to structure fire, bushfire, hazardous
materials, road crash, and other rescue response. Semistructured interviews
and subsequent in-depth structured surveys designed to identify the
individual’s risk attitudes and beliefs were completed by all participants. The
participation of one candidate was interrupted by an incident call out,
resulting in 19 interviews and surveys being available for analysis. These
represented 7% of the overall officer population from a Western Australian
career fire service background.
The first question asked of participants in the semistructured interview was
“How do you define risk?” Whilst all participant responses acknowledged that
risk is a consideration of consequences and likelihood, only one participant
provided the answer “it is the effect of uncertainty on objectives” as defined
in ISO31000. Approximately a quarter of participants (26%) provided answers
that were specific to emergency response without consideration of the
greater application of risk, and only one participant provided the restrictive
definition “risk is the potential to injure me”. Consistent with the findings of
Tissington and Flin (2004) and Reinhardt-Klein (2010), these answers suggest
fire and emergency service ICs generally have a perception of risk as the
practical consideration of consequence and likelihood as it applies to a
reactive emergency environment, rather than as a considered and
managed process consistent with ISO31000.
The second question asked of participants was “How do you manage risk
in a dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations and
contexts?”

In

response,

nearly

all

participants

identified

that

risk

management in dynamic contexts was based on a similar process to risk
management in other situations, but with limited information available and
with restricted time frames in which to make decisions. Ten percent of
participants expressed the opinion that dynamic risk management required
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more “forward thinking” than risk management in other situations. These
responses again suggest the study group has adopted a definition of risk that
is reasonably consistent throughout their population and contextualised to
their perception of reality but does not consider all elements detailed in
ISO31000; especially when consideration is given to the example of the
special forces soldier in a hostage situation provided in SAHB436 (SAI Global,
2013a).
More than half of participants (58%) also expressed that they managed
risk in dynamic emergency environments according to how they believed
their organisation expected them to do so, or that they managed risk in
accordance with organisational procedures and protocols. This suggests the
majority of fire and emergency service ICs believed they managed risk using
the same risk attitudes as their organisation. This was despite a review of the
literature identifying an absence of organisational risk thresholds and
attitudes specific to dynamic emergency response environments.
Responses from the study group to the third question “How do you decide
whether risks are acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment?” were
varied. A quarter of participants (26%) reported they relied on organisational
procedures and protocols; almost half of participants (47%) reported they
relied on personal prior experience to determine whether risks were
acceptable; 16% of participants stated they simply relied on whether they
believed the risk was acceptable to themselves personally; and 10% of
participants responded that in the case of “life involvement” (being the fire
services terminology for when potential consequences include the loss of
occupant life), all risks are acceptable. The variation in answers provided by
fire and emergency service ICs represents significant variance in the risk
thresholds between ICs within the same organisation. Conflicts between risk
attitudes will foreseeably lead to increased risk at an emergency incident
because additional uncertainty is introduced when individuals work together
to form incident management teams or when they are responsible for
different sectors within the same emergency incident. When the answers
provided by participants to question three are considered in conjunction with
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the answers provided by participants to question two, the variance in risk
thresholds between participants suggests an absence of a defined
organisational internal risk context that may otherwise guide participants
towards similar answers. This notion is consistent with Fender (2003) and
reinforces the conclusion that, for risk management to be compliant with
ISO31000, it must be ingrained as part of the core culture of the fire service
inclusive of explicitly defined risk tolerances.
The final question posed to fire and emergency service ICs was “Does the
risk management process differ in the dynamic emergency environment
compared to other situations? If yes, then how?” Responses provided by
participants were far less varied than the responses to question three. Fortytwo percent of participants stated there was no difference in the process;
however, half of these participants also stated the time frame available for
completing the risk assessment was significantly reduced during dynamic
emergency environments. Interestingly, one participant also stated that risk
tolerance is significantly higher during dynamic emergency operations
compared to other situations, which suggests fluctuating risk thresholds
depending on the participant’s evolving perception of the severity of an
incident. In addition, only one participant identified that the risk
management process had to be repeated multiple times throughout an
emergency incident, suggesting the remaining participants did not consider
repeated risk application of the risk management process necessary.
More than half of participants (53%) stated that the risk management
process did differ in the dynamic emergency environment compared to
other situations. These participants all identified that the process changed
due to a significant reduction in both the available information on which to
make decisions, and the available time to gather further information. One
participant clarified their response by adding they felt “pushed to do things
you wouldn’t normally do due to expectations and pressure”. This indicated
they operated at risk thresholds they personally felt were unacceptable. Only
one participant stated the dynamic risk management process was reactive
as opposed to being a thought out process.
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These findings appear to contradict the previous findings of Ash and
Smallman (2012), Fender (2003), and Naikar (2010), all of whom identified
decision making during dynamic emergency incidents to be reactive and
based on recognition of specific cues. Whilst the finding from the study
reported may be interpreted with some caution, due to the moderate
sample size, the finding is supported by the answers provided by the fire and
emergency service ICs to the second question posed in the interview. One
participant stated they were unsure whether the risk management process
differed in the dynamic emergency environment compared to other
situations.
The first question in the structured survey relating to risk perceptions
required participants to identify the severity of potential consequence for 20
outcomes that may occur during fire and emergency incidents. From the
answers provided, probability analysis was completed across the entire
sample population. Conditional probability was then calculated on the basis
that participants had, or had not, been previously injured at an incident. Nine
participant fire and emergency service ICs had been injured at an incident
and 10 had not been injured at an incident, and these results were
compared to the severity assigned to the consequence in fire and
emergency services risk literature. Full results are provided in Table 8.1.
Analysis of the results revealed there was a conditional probability of 0.00
(zero) for all fire and emergency service ICs assigning the same severity to a
consequence given the event being realised. Only in a single instance did a
subgroup completely agree on the severity of a consequence. This was the
non-injured group agreeing that the death of a rescuer was of catastrophic
severity (represented by a conditional probability of 1.00).
Further analysis revealed there was an equal probability between the
group that had never been injured, with a conditional probability of 0.2 that
the survey groups’ perception of consequence severity would align with the
severity adopted by fire and emergency services. Whilst some variance may
be expected due to potential differences in individuals’ perception of the
consequence realised, a conditional probability of 0.2 signifies agreement
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between participants and fire and emergency services in the perception of
consequence severity of only a single occurrence each year. It is therefore
concluded that the internal context of risk attitudes is not harmonious
amongst fire and emergency service ICs and may lead to conflicting risk
management during dynamic emergency situations or post-incident
analysis. Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of
0.612 (standard deviation of 0.142) that the entire survey group would agree
on the severity of any given consequence. This further supports the findings
of the potential for conflicting risk attitudes between ICs and parties
conducting post-incident analysis.

59Table 8.1. Consequence severity across the entire sample and the injured/never been
injured subgroups.
Rating

Insignificant

Group

Consequence

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Minor

Moderate

Major

Catastrophic

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

0.42
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.26
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.44
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.40
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.30
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.53
0.21
0.00
0.05
0.05
0.68
0.83
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.79
0.42
0.68
0.05
0.00
0.00

0.44
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.67
0.88
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.89
0.44
0.44
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.60
0.20
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.70
0.80
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.70
0.40
0.90
0.10
0.00
0.00

0.05
0.58
0.11
0.11
0.26
0.05
0.06
0.68
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.06
0.26
0.17
0.16
0.42
0.26
0.42
0.37
0.00

0.11
0.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.13
0.67
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.56
0.56
0.33
0.22
0.00

0.00
0.60
0.20
0.20
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.70
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.10
0.40
0.22
0.20
0.30
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.00

0.00
0.16
0.42
0.63
0.47
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.05
0.63
0.42
0.61
0.63
0.72
0.00
0.16
0.00
0.37
0.58
0.53

0.00
0.22
0.44
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.00
0.33
0.11
0.56
0.44
0.67
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.44
0.78
0.44

0.00
0.10
0.40
0.50
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.70
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.67
0.00
0.30
0.00
0.30
0.40
0.60

0.00
0.00
0.47
0.21
0.21
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.95
0.37
0.47
0.33
0.11
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
0.05
0.47

0.00
0.00
0.56
0.22
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.89
0.44
0.56
0.33
0.11
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.56

0.00
0.00
0.40
0.20
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.30
0.40
0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.40

Consequences:

1. Near miss—cut finger
2. Near miss—broken arm
3. Near miss—death of rescuer
4. Near miss—exposure to acutely toxic material
5. Near miss—exposure to hazardous material with health effects that may take 20
years to occur
6. Scratch or dent to a vehicle
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7. Cut finger requiring first aid treatment
8. Broken arm requiring hospitalization
9. Death of a rescuer
10. Exposure to acutely toxic hazardous material requiring hospital admission
11. Exposure to hazardous material that results in lung damage only evident 20 years
post-exposure
12. Inhaling asbestos particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities
13. Exposure to silica particulates and dust as a result of rescue activities
14. Exposure to glass particulates and dusts as a result of rescue activities
15. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $1000 damage
16. Damage to a vehicle resulting in $20,000 damage
17. Damage to the environment that does not result in long term impact
18. Damage to the environment resulting in long term impact
19. Lung tissue damage without respiratory impairment
20. Lung tissue damage that limits physical activity
Group:
A. Total study population
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response
whilst working under a different IC
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency
response whilst working under a different IC

An individual’s beliefs and expectations can significantly affect the internal
context of the risk management process (SAI Global, 2013a). To investigate
how this may be a factor in risk management during dynamic emergency
operations, the second question of the survey required participants to state
their agreement to four statements regarding external and personal risk
attitudes and expectations using a Likert scale. The statements were:
1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk
their own lives to save others.
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk
their own lives to save property.
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk
their own lives to save the environment.
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4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put
themselves at a higher level of risk than the general public in the
course of their duties.
Full results are provided in Table 8.2. Analysis of these results reveals that
the overwhelming majority of the entire study group (74%), as well as the both
subgroups (injured 77% and never injured 70%), believed there were external
expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own lives to
save others. By comparison, only 52% of the entire study group, 78% of the
injured subgroup, and 30% of the never injured subgroup believed there were
external expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own
lives to save property. This difference in attitudes between the injured and
never injured populations appears to suggest personnel who had a higher
personal risk threshold may be more likely to be injured during emergency
operations; however, further research is required to confirm this hypothesis.
Analysis of the responses to the statement “There is an expectation that
emergency services personnel will risk their own lives to save the
environment” was less conclusive but appeared to suggest a less strongly
held belief amongst the study group of fire and emergency service ICs that
this was the case (37% of the total study group stating they either disagreed
or strongly disagreed with the statement).
60Table 8.2. Incident controller perceptions and expectations across the entire sample and
the injured/never been injured subgroups.
Response

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

Disagree
Group

A

B

Agree
C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

0.00

0.53

0.30

0.47

0.20

0.26

0.00

0.68

B

C

A

0.60

0.21

0.30

0.05

0.30

0.00

0.70

0.05

B

C

Belief
1

0.11

2

0.16

3

0.21

4

0.05

Beliefs:

0.1
1
0.1
1
0.1
1
0.0
0

0.1

0.11

0.20

0.11

0.30

0.16

0.10

0.16

0.0
0
0.0
0
0.1
1
0.1
1

0.2

0.05

0.20

0.21

0.20

0.37

0.20

0.05

0.1
1
0.1
1
0.5
6
0.1
1

0.4
4
0.6
7
0.2
2
0.6
7

0.3
3
0.1
1
0.0
0
0.1
1

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
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1. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives
to save others.
2. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives
to save property.
3. There is an expectation that emergency services personnel will risk their own lives
to save the environment.
4. Emergency services personnel have a moral obligation to put themselves at a
higher level of risk than the general public in the course of their duties.
Group:
A. Total study population
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response
whilst working under a different IC
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency
response whilst working under a different IC

To further define the risk attitudes and tolerance of the study group,
participants were required to identify whether potential scenarios were either
acceptable or unacceptable when the probability of realisation of the
consequence was low, moderate, and high. Participants were required to
answer the question in two contexts: First, that they were personally exposed
to the risk source and, second, that they were responsible for other
responders and it was these other responders who were exposed to the risk
source. The scenarios presented were:
1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where the
consequence is being severely injured or killed.
2. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage.
3. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where the
consequence is developing cancer.
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where the consequence is being
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage.
5. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where the
consequence is being severely injured or killed.
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6. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where the
consequence is being severely injured or killed.
7. Entering a burning building to save the property where the
consequence is being severely injured or killed.
Full results are provided in Table 8.3. Analysis of results revealed a
probability of certainty (where probability equals 1.00) amongst the study
group of only 0.143. This means there was a probability of 0.857 that
participants did not collectively agree on risk tolerance attitudes or
thresholds. Further analysis revealed a probability of only 0.286 that all
participants shared the same risk tolerance across the presented scenarios.
This probability increased to 0.381 amongst the “injured” population, whilst
there was no change in the probability of agreeance amongst the “never
injured” population compared to all participants. One potential explanation
for the increased consensus of risk acceptance amongst the “injured”
population may be that those participants who had been previously injured
held a higher risk tolerance and therefore were more likely to undertake
hazardous tasks that may result in injury compared to the “never injured”
group.
Risk acceptance with limited certainty was also higher for the entire study
population and both injured and never injured subpopulations where life
involvement was present. Participants would typically put both their own
safety and the safety of personnel under their command at increased risk to
facilitate occupant rescue (from all risk sources). This risk acceptance with
limited certainty increased marginally where rescue was of a colleague,
particularly when risk was transferred from the participant to those under the
participant’s control. Marginal increase in risk threshold was observed
between personal and personnel exposure where rescue involved a child
compared to an adult. It is hypothesised that this increase may be a
consequence of perceived community expectations and/or due to an
innate willingness to permit great risk to save a child. Further investigation is
required to explore this hypothesis.
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Risk acceptance with limited certainty declined quickly for the protection
of property, whilst the level of certainty decreased as the lead time to the
realisation of potential consequences increased. For example, the certainty
regarding risk acceptance involving immediate impacts, such as trauma,
was generally higher compared to those involving delayed impacts, such as
cancer or lung disease. This suggest participants were more likely to be
concerned with impacts they can witness immediately and is supported by
the findings of previous research (Penney, 2013).
Descriptive analysis of the results identified a mean probability of 0.529
(standard deviation of 0.336) that the entire survey group would agree on
the acceptability of any given situation where the risk was personal in nature.
By comparison, a mean probability of 0.449 (standard deviation of 0.321) was
found that the entire survey group would agree on the acceptability of any
given situation where the risk was to personnel under the participant’s
command. This further supports the findings that participants were more likely
to accept risk when they believed the consequences were limited to
themselves.
61Table 8.3. Risk tolerance to the participant themselves compared to those under their
command.
Risk to Participant Themselves
Risk Tolerance
Group
Context & Risk
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Acceptable

Risk to Personnel Under the
Command of the Participant
Acceptable
Unacceptable

Unacceptable

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

A

B

C

1.00
0.63
0.16
0.95
0.47
0.37
0.58
0.26
0.16
0.84
0.32
0.21
1.00
0.79
0.21
1.00
0.79
0.37
0.84

1.00
0.56
0.00
1.00
0.56
0.33
0.56
0.22
0.11
0.89
0.22
0.22
1.00
0.67
0.11
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.78

1.00
0.70
0.30
0.90
0.40
0.40
0.60
0.30
0.20
0.90
0.40
0.20
1.00
0.90
0.30
1.00
0.90
0.40
0.90

0.00
0.37
0.84
0.05
0.53
0.63
0.42
0.74
0.84
0.16
0.68
0.79
0.00
0.21
0.79
0.00
0.21
0.63
0.16

0.00
0.44
1.00
0.00
0.44
0.67
0.44
0.78
0.89
0.11
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.33
0.89
0.00
0.33
0.67
0.22

0.00
0.30
0.70
0.10
0.60
0.60
0.40
0.70
0.80
0.10
0.60
0.80
0.00
0.10
0.70
0.00
0.10
0.60
0.10

1.00
0.47
0.05
0.79
0.32
0.21
0.63
0.26
0.26
0.74
0.26
0.21
1.00
0.53
0.11
0.95
0.63
0.16
0.68

1.00
0.56
0.00
0.89
0.33
0.22
0.78
0.22
0.22
1.00
0.22
0.22
1.00
0.67
0.11
1.00
0.78
0.22
0.67

1.00
0.40
0.10
0.70
0.30
0.20
0.50
0.30
0.20
0.60
0.30
0.20
1.00
0.40
0.10
0.90
0.50
0.10
0.70

0.00
0.53
0.95
0.21
0.68
0.79
0.37
0.74
0.74
0.26
0.74
0.79
0.00
0.47
0.89
0.05
0.37
0.84
0.32

0.00
0.44
1.00
0.11
0.67
0.78
0.22
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.33
0.89
0.00
0.22
0.78
0.33

0.00
0.60
0.90
0.30
0.70
0.80
0.50
0.70
0.80
0.40
0.70
0.80
0.00
0.60
0.90
0.10
0.50
0.90
0.30
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20
21

Context and Risk:

0.16
0.00

0.11
0.00

0.20
0.00

0.84
1.00

0.89
1.00

0.80
1.00

0.16
0.00

0.22
0.00

0.10
0.00

0.84
1.00

0.78
1.00

0.90
1.00

1. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a low probability of
being severely injured or killed.
2. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a moderate
probability of being severely injured or killed.
3. Entering a burning building to rescue a person where there is a high probability
of being severely injured or killed
4. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage.
5. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage.
6. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause immediate lung damage.
7. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a low probability
of developing cancer.
8. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a moderate
probability of developing cancer.
9. Entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a high probability
of developing cancer.
10. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a low probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage.
11. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a moderate probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage.
12. Rescuing a person from a vehicle where there is a high probability of being
exposed to dust that may cause long term lung damage.
13. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a low probability of
being severely injured or killed
14. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a moderate
probability of being severely injured or killed.
15. Entering a burning building to rescue a child where there is a high probability of
being severely injured or killed.
16. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a low probability
of being severely injured or killed.
17. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a moderate
probability of being severely injured or killed.
18. Entering a burning building to rescue a colleague where there is a high
probability of being severely injured or killed.
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19. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a low probability
of being severely injured or killed.
20. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a moderate
probability of being severely injured or killed.
21. Entering a burning building to save the property where there is a high probability
of being severely injured or killed.
Group:
A. Total study population
B. Subgroup: Study population that had been injured during emergency response
whilst working under a different IC
C. Subgroup: Study population that had never been injured during emergency
response whilst working under a different IC

8.5

Probability of firefighter injury during emergency
response

To determine the probability of firefighter injury during emergency
response, a retrospective analysis of Western Australian fire service safety and
incident reports between January 1st 2001 and January 1st 2015 was
conducted (Penney, 2019). A retrospective analysis of Western Australian fire
service safety and incident reports between January 1st 2001 and January 1st
2015 was conducted. Initial analysis enabled the calculation of conditional
probability given a reportable incident occurs, and likelihood on the basis of
activity, risk source and nature of injury reported. The results are detailed in
Tables 8.4-8.6. Each table is ordered from highest to lowest frequency.
62Table 8.4. Analysis by activity.
Activity (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Firefighting

327

0.491

Occurrence per
year
21.800

RCR

110

0.165

7.333

Bushfire fighting

99

0.149

6.600

Rescue

36

0.054

2.400

Driving

30

0.045

2.000

Likelihood
Almost
certain
Almost
certain
Almost
certain
Almost
certain
Almost
certain
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Breathing
Apparatus
Suicide Response

20

0.030

1.333

15

0.023

1.000

Hazmat
Environmental
DBA
Not reported
Storm

12
8
5
2
2

0.018
0.012
0.008
0.003
0.003

0.800
0.533
0.333
0.133
0.133

Almost
certain
Almost
certain
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Unlikely
Unlikely

63Table 8.5. Analysis by risk source.
Occurrence per

Risk source (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Physical Strain

215

0.323

14.333

Almost certain

Exposure - asbestos

120

0.180

8.000

Almost certain

Exposure -

95

0.143

6.333

Almost certain

Impact

49

0.074

3.267

Almost certain

Exposure - smoke

37

0.056

2.467

Almost certain

Exposure - biohazard

24

0.036

1.600

Almost certain

Exposure - hazmat fire

24

0.036

1.600

Almost certain

Equipment failure

21

0.032

1.400

Almost certain

Exposure - chemical

20

0.030

1.333

Almost certain

Thermal

16

0.024

1.067

Likely

Operator error

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Animal

7

0.011

0.467

Moderate

Communications

5

0.008

0.333

Moderate

Environmental

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Impaired Vision

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Other person

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Blast/Explosion

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Entrapment

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Exposure - noise

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Violence

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Electrical

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

Not reported

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

year

Likelihood

psychological

64Table 8.6. Analysis by injury.
Nature of injury (A)

Count

P(A|B)

Occurrence
per year

Likelihood
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Inhalation

163

0.245

10.867

Almost certain

Psychological

96

0.144

6.400

Almost certain

Nil

70

0.105

4.667

Almost certain

Back

56

0.084

3.733

Almost certain

Knee

42

0.063

2.800

Almost certain

Eye

32

0.048

2.133

Almost certain

Heat illness

30

0.045

2.000

Almost certain

Shoulder

26

0.039

1.733

Almost certain

Leg

16

0.024

1.067

Almost certain

General

15

0.023

1.000

Likely

Head / spinal

13

0.020

0.867

Likely

Ankle

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Arm

11

0.017

0.733

Moderate

Finger

9

0.014

0.600

Moderate

Face

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Foot

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Multiple

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Neck

8

0.012

0.533

Moderate

Hand

7

0.011

0.467

Moderate

Elbow

6

0.009

0.400

Moderate

Ear

5

0.008

0.333

Moderate

Absorption

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Not reported

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Wrist

4

0.006

0.267

Moderate

Chest

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Groin

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Hip

3

0.005

0.200

Unlikely

Abdominal

2

0.003

0.133

Unlikely

Ingestion

2

0.003

0.133

Rare

Thermal

1

0.002

0.067

Rare

By frequency, firefighting was almost three times more likely to result in a
reportable event compared to any other activity with an occurrence of 21.8
times per year. Road crash rescue (RCR) response resulted in 7.3 reportable
events per year whilst bushfire fighting resulted in 6.6 reportable incidents per
year. This result suggests additional attention should be provided in training
personnel and developing suitable risk mitigation procedures the activities
most likely to give rise to a reportable incident, for example, firefighting, RCR
and bush firefighting.
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In terms of risk source, Physical Strain is almost 1.8 times more likely to result
in a reportable event compared to other risk sources. This is consistent with
the physically demanding nature of firefighting (DFES, 2013) and is
comparable to overexertion/strain injury rates in United States firefighters
(FEMA, 2011).
Exposure to various hazards including asbestos, chemicals and biohazards
collectively accounts for more reports than any other risk source (total of 225
incidents with a conditional probability of 0.338). Such exposures are
impossible to eradicate due to the inherent nature of all hazards emergency
response. However, the likelihood of adverse outcomes can be partly
mitigated through procedural and tactical measures. Such an approach is
best illustrated using a bow tie analysis (Robinson et al., 2010) as shown in
Figure 8.1. In this manner both pre-exposure and post exposure controls or
barriers can be implemented holistically to reduce the likelihood and severity
of adverse consequences. The bow tie analysis also facilitates the illustration
of relationships between various barriers. Figure 7.1 provides a simple
example of this in the firefighting context. Where a relationship exists between
barriers, the influence of the preceding barrier may be either agonistic or
antagonistic on the effectiveness of the following barrier. For example,
inappropriate or insufficient research and data may lead to inappropriate
organisational policy. This, in turn, can result in inappropriate training which
will ultimately weaken risk management at all operational and organisational
levels. The combined effect of the barriers and intrinsic relationships can
ultimately affect the severity of realised consequences.
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75Figure 8.1. Simplified bow tie analysis contextualized to firefighting operations

Just as firefighting is extremely physically demanding, it is also
psychologically demanding with exposure to psychological trauma
identified as the second most common risk source resulting in reportable
events. Other researchers (Carll, 2007; Trappler, 2014) concur that care must
be taken in addressing risks arising from exposures of a psychological nature
in firefighting which are unique to the emergency service profession. Just as
education, awareness and resilience training is important prior to exposure to
events of a psychological nature, specific psychological management
programs and counselling are required post exposure.
Analysis by injury yields results that, in limited circumstances, appear to
conflict with other available data sets. Inhalation ‘injuries’ are the most
probable of all classified injuries to occur. However, this may be explained by
the fact that all reported incidences of “inhalation” of smoke or other
chemicals were captured in this category, regardless of whether acute injury
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occurred. Psychological ‘injuries’ were the second most common reported
injury and this is consistent with the analysis of risk source data. Surprisingly
thermal injuries, being those resulting from heat transfer were the least
probable (0.002 conditional probability). This conflicts with data reported by
FEMA (2011, 2012) which identifies a significantly higher thermal injury
occurrence rate. The number of thermal injuries reported in this study may be
lower than the true number of injuries because many incidents may remain
unreported. The probability of “Nil” injuries occurring represents “Near Misses”
where no injury was actually sustained and is the third highest amongst
reported injuries sustained. Again, this figure may be lower than the true
number of near misses that occur during incidents because of a lack of report
completion when near misses occur.
Table 8.7 reports the conditional probability of a specific injury occurring
given an injury occurs during the specified activity. Across all activities, the
“Nil” injury or ‘near miss’ is prevalent. This is consistent with previous findings
and suggests a large number of incidents occur with the potential to cause
injury, but do not actually cause injury in the specific case reported.
Psychological injuries are also well represented throughout the reports,
particularly where the potential or realisation of human trauma is present (for
instance Road Crash Rescue and Suicide Response). In the case of reported
injuries during Suicide Response it is suggested it is likely the “Not Reported”
values should also be psychological injuries even though they have not been
documented as such in the relevant reports.
65Table 8.7. Conditional probability of specific injury during incident operations.
Operation

Injury

Conditional Probability

Breathing apparatus

Nil

0.300

operations

Back

0.150

Knee

0.150

Head / spinal

0.100

Heat illness

0.100

Neck

0.100

Ankle

0.050
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Shoulder

0.050

Bushfire fighting

Eye

0.253

operations

Knee

0.141

Nil

0.131

Back

0.081

Inhalation

0.061

Leg

0.061

Ankle

0.051

Shoulder

0.051

Foot

0.030

Heat illness

0.030

Finger

0.020

Neck

0.020

Arm

0.010

Chest

0.010

Elbow

0.010

Face

0.010

Multiple

0.010

Psychological

0.010

Wrist

0.010

Direct brigade alarm

Eye

0.800

response

Knee

0.200

Driving operations

Nil

0.800

Back

0.033

Ear

0.033

Leg

0.033

Psychological

0.033

Shoulder

0.033

Wrist

0.033

Inhalation

0.434

Back

0.092

Heat illness

0.067

Knee

0.064

Nil

0.064

Shoulder

0.046

Head / spinal

0.034

Leg

0.028

Arm

0.024

Multiple

0.018

Foot

0.015

Hand

0.015

Firefighting operations
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Ear

0.012

Psychological

0.012

Ankle

0.009

Elbow

0.009

Eye

0.009

Finger

0.009

Neck

0.009

Abdominal

0.006

Chest

0.006

Hip

0.006

Face

0.003

Groin

0.003

Thermal

0.003

Hazardous material

General

0.500

operations

Inhalation

0.417

Heat illness

0.083

Road crash rescue

Psychological

0.600

operations

Back

0.100

General

0.082

Face

0.045

Absorption

0.018

Inhalation

0.018

Shoulder

0.018

Ankle

0.009

Arm

0.009

Finger

0.009

Groin

0.009

Hand

0.009

Heat illness

0.009

Hip

0.009

Ingestion

0.009

Knee

0.009

Multiple

0.009

Neck

0.009

Nil

0.009

Wrist

0.009

Rescue (other than RCR)

Psychological

0.306

operations

Inhalation

0.194

Back

0.083

Nil

0.083

Absorption

0.056
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Shoulder

0.056

Ankle

0.028

Elbow

0.028

Groin

0.028

Hand

0.028

Ingestion

0.028

Knee

0.028

Not reported

0.028

Wrist

0.028

Suicide response

Psychological

0.800

operations

Not reported

0.200

Analysis reveals thermal injuries account for a relatively insignificant
conditional probability of only 0.003 during Firefighting activities only. No
thermal burns are reported during Bushfire or other response. This is in stark
contradiction to the probability of thermal injuries reported in United States
statistics (FEMA, 2012). However, it is hypothesised that this may be due to
under reporting of thermal injuries, or due to thermal injuries being referred to
as injuries to specific body parts without reference to the burn trauma, or due
to differences in firefighting tactics between Australia and the United States
which may result in different mechanisms and frequencies of injury.
For example, inhalation injuries appear over-represented in the data which
is considered surprising given the significant respiratory protection available
to responding crews(DFES, 2013, 2014 & 2015a). Analysis of descriptions with
the reports suggests a significant proportion of inhalation exposures may be
due to partial-face fitting respiratory protection masks that do not completely
prevent ingress of smoke and other products of combustion. This has been
rectified since the study commenced, through the implementation of full
face respirators available for firefighting personnel. The conditional
probability of heat illness occurrence also warrants attention with prevalence
amongst all operations and responses that require the responder to wear
structural firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Wearing PPE
requires significant physical effort.
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Review of the conditional probabilities detailed above should assist
incident controllers having enhanced evidence based awareness of
potential consequences and likelihoods prior to their occurrence during an
emergency incident. Analysis of the conditional probability of injury given an
injury occurs during each of the specific operations will also facilitate the
review and improvement of strategic and tactical planning; personnel relief
requirements; the potential effectiveness of PPE; and even guide the
potential development of targeted prophylactic physical training programs.
Table 8.8 provides useful data to facilitate the development of evidence
based risk mitigation strategies prior to and on the incident ground. Physical
Strain recurrently accounts for high, if not the highest, level of Risk Source
giving rise to a reportable incident across almost all activities. This finding is
consistent with the previous results of both this study and FEMA (2011) and
reaffirms the notion that firefighting is extremely physical in nature. By
comparison, Moore-Merrill et al. (2008) reported that physical strain was the
second highest contributing factor to firefighter injury in the United States (the
first being a lack of situational awareness).
66Table 8.8. Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during incident
operations.
Operation

Injury

Conditional Probability

Breathing apparatus

Physical Strain

0.550

operations

Impact

0.150

Entrapment

0.100

Equipment failure

0.100

Communications

0.050

Electrical

0.050

Physical Strain

0.515

Exposure - smoke

0.253

Exposure - chemical

0.061

Impact

0.051

Thermal

0.051

Exposure - asbestos

0.030

Equipment failure

0.020

Exposure - psychological

0.010

Bushfire fighting operations
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Violence

0.010

Physical Strain

0.358

Exposure - asbestos

0.315

Impact

0.104

Exposure - hazmat fire

0.073

Exposure - smoke

0.037

Thermal

0.034

Equipment failure

0.024

Communications

0.012

Exposure - chemical

0.009

Exposure - psychological

0.009

Blast/Explosion

0.006

Exposure - noise

0.006

Operator error

0.006

Not reported

0.003

Violence

0.003

Exposure - chemical

0.583

Exposure - asbestos

0.333

Physical Strain

0.083

Exposure - psychological

0.600

Physical Strain

0.209

Exposure - biohazard

0.164

Exposure - asbestos

0.018

Impact

0.009

Rescue (other than RCR)

Exposure - psychological

0.306

operations

Physical Strain

0.278

Exposure - asbestos

0.194

Exposure - biohazard

0.111

Impact

0.056

Equipment failure

0.028

Exposure - chemical

0.028

Firefighting operations

Hazardous material operations

Road crash rescue operations

Psychological Exposure was also well represented in the data, particularly
amongst incident response involving human life and trauma including Road
Crash Rescue and Suicide Response. This again supports previous findings of
the study.
Exposure to various contaminants was also prevalent throughout the
majority of fields. This may be significant as potential effects may be
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mitigated through appropriate strategic and tactical response; appropriate
PPE and suitable decontamination procedures (DFES, 2015 & 2015a).
Breathing Apparatus operations are amongst the most hazardous of all
firefighting activities. These operations involve the use of self-contained
breathing apparatus in atmospheres not conducive to life due to the
presence of smoke, heat, oxygen deficiency and/or excessive temperature
[28]. During Breathing Apparatus operations, teams of two firefighters will
work in close proximity to, or inside, burning structures. Typically they rely on
a single line of firefighting hose for fire protection. The margin for error is
therefore

understandably

narrow

and

the

severity

of

potential

consequences comparatively high (as reported in Table 7.9). Breathing
apparatus operations are extremely physical in nature and this is represented
by a conditional probability of 0.55 that the responsible risk source for the
reportable event will be Physical Strain. Analysis also revealed a conditional
probability of Impacts being the responsible risk source for the reportable
incident of 0.15. It is suggested Impacts (as compared with Explosion / Blasts)
are more likely to occur within a burning structure. Subsequently, this figure
may be reduced through the defining of organisational risk acceptance
thresholds. In turn, this would facilitate a reduction in the potential for incident
controllers committing crews to internal firefighting in the absence of life
involvement because of a perceived internal or external obligation to do so.
Table

8.9

provides

the

comparisons

between

actual

reported

consequence severity and potential consequence severity for each Activity.
Analysis reveals the conditional probability of moderate to catastrophic
potential consequence severity is higher than actual reported consequence
severity across all Activity groups. In part this may be explained by the lack
of subsequent reports or follow up detail for consequences that may have a
long period of latency (for instance psychological exposures, or exposures to
contaminants), or for injuries that are initially reported but worsen over time.
Results of this analysis also support previous findings of the prevalence of “Nil”
reported injuries in that there is a high conditional probability of ‘near misses’
within the incidents reported.
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67Table 8.9. Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during
operations
Operation

Consequence Severity

Actual

Potential

Breathing apparatus

Insignificant

0.300

0.000

operations

Minor

0.700

0.150

Moderate

0.000

0.400

Major

0.000

0.250

Catastrophic

0.000

0.200

Insignificant

0.818

0.000

Minor

0.131

0.505

Moderate

0.040

0.101

Major

0.010

0.212

Catastrophic

0.000

0.182

Insignificant

0.967

0.133

Minor

0.033

0.100

Moderate

0.000

0.100

Major

0.000

0.167

Catastrophic

-

-

Insignificant

0.933

0.031

Minor

0.034

0.147

Moderate

0.021

0.199

Major

0.012

0.098

Catastrophic

0.000

0.526

Hazardous materials

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

operations

Minor

0.000

0.000

Moderate

0.000

0.000

Major

0.000

0.083

Catastrophic

0.000

0.917

Road crash rescue

Insignificant

0.973

0.000

operations

Minor

0.018

0.073

Moderate

0.009

0.218

Major

0.000

0.027

Catastrophic

0.000

0.682

Rescue (other than RCR)

Insignificant

0.972

0.000

operations

Minor

0.000

0.111

Moderate

0.028

0.306

Major

0.000

0.056

Catastrophic

0.000

0.528

Insignificant

1.000

0.000

Bushfire fighting
operations

Driving operations

Firefighting operations
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Suicide response

Minor

0.000

0.133

operations

Moderate

0.000

0.000

Major

0.000

0.000

Catastrophic

0.000

0.867

Further analysis reveals that, based on actual consequence severity, there
was a conditional probability of zero (0.000) for a consequence of
catastrophic severity occurring across the entire Activity range. This result is
not consistent with numerous international studies (FEMA, 2011 & 2012;
Moore-Merrell et al., 2008) and whilst acknowledging the differences in
incidents responded to in different jurisdictions, this result potentially suggests
Western Australian firefighting strategies are safer than those utilised by
international counterparts. By comparison, a mean potential consequence
of catastrophic severity revealed a conditional probability across all Activities
of 0.408 (standard deviation of 0.328). These results represent a significant
potential for increased severe injury, permanent disability and even death
amongst the study group, and should be considered in the establishment of
the internal context for risk management during dynamic emergency
operations.

8.6

Implications for frontline firefighters and IMT’s

In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services, this
chapter provides important qualitative and quantitative data that can be
used to improve risk management during dynamic emergency operations.
When considered together with literature reviewed, the results of the first
study explicitly reject any notion of the validity of “dynamic risk
management” being a stand-alone process for managing risk during
emergency situations. For best practice to be realised, the architectural
structure or process of risk management as defined in ISO31000 cannot
change. The context in which risk management is completed may vary in
dynamic emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms;
however, it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency situations that
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only further requires the risk management process to be completed in its
entirety each and every time risk is assessed and subsequently managed.
The data presented in this chapter identified recurrent thermoregulatory
and critical incident related risk trends across all activity groups.

These

trends are significant because they are associated with greater potential for
serious consequences of hospitalisation or long term disability compared to
less severe, but more frequently occurring, physical strain related injuries. In
terms of affecting risk management during frontline operations, these results
suggest Incident Controllers need to take enhanced steps to mitigate
thermoregulatory related and physical strain related risks.

Proactive

management may include enhanced mobilisation and rotation of personnel
at incidents to reduce physical loading, whilst the risks may be reactively
managed through implementation of active recovery procedures and
medical monitoring of crews at incidents by qualified medical practitioners
to ensure it is safe for them to continue working.

Both during and post the

emergency phase of incidents, the Incident Controller should ensure crew
mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to psychological events.
During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or
catastrophic adverse outcomes is present.

The potential consequence is

consistently greater than the actual consequence realised in the data
analysed.

This may be explained by the mitigating effects of post event

barriers (PPE, physical conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the personnel
involved escaped more serious injury due to a combination of events that
led to them being close to the impact, as opposed to being in the direct line
of impact. In light of this finding it is important that incident controllers and
operational personnel remain vigilant to the potentially ‘normalising’ effect
of recurrent exposure to potentially catastrophic, albeit low frequency,
situations.

8.7

Implications for urban planners

Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable
communities. Through careful and appropriate urban design that considers
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potential wildfire behaviour, defendability of communities, evacuation
requirements and firefighter tenability using evidence based fire engineering
analysis, urban planners can enhance the safety of communities in areas
prone to wildfire and the firefighters that protect them.

Section 9 - Conclusions
9.1 Introduction
This section details the key outcomes from each Section.

9.2

Key outcomes for frontline firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists and IMT’s

1. Vegetation structure plays a critical role in the development and
severity of wildfires.

During periods of elevated fire weather

conditions, mega-wildfires in through continuous vegetation
structures (particularly in forest and woodlands), no amount of
resources or water (see Sections 4-6) will be able to suppress the
head fire.

Firefighting strategies in these situations should

therefore focus on areas of opportunity where vegetation
structure, particularly surface, near surface and elevated fuels are
limited and the vegetation geometry does not support a
continuous wildfire front.

The removal of fuel immediately

adjacent to assets and communities through ‘dry’ firefighting
strategies such as backburning (see Section 4) may need to be
considered early in firefighting campaigns.

1. Section 2 covers the basic modelling of wildfire development and
behaviour. As the suitability of firefighting strategies are gauged
against these inputs it is essential that all firefighters, fire behaviour
specialists and IMT’s alike not only understand the presented
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models, but are effective in accurately applying them. Incorrect
predictions may result in inappropriate strategies being devised,
leaving frontline personnel exposed to overwhelming wildfire
conditions with potentially fatal consequences (see Sections 5 and
7). Whilst fire behaviour specialists are required to accurately and
competently predict wildfire behaviour, all personnel from
firefighters to the IMT should be able to verify predictions thereby
increasing the margin for safety for both firefighters and the
community.

1. When considering the defendability of urban areas where the
geometry of vegetation fuel beds prevents landscape scale
wildfire behaviour:
i.

The case studies presented in Section 3 indicate potential
significant over-estimation of radiant heat flux using the
approach outlined in AS3959 in cases involving noncombustible obstructions and point-source ignition fires for a
minimum of 20m separation from the fire front. This is
significant as it is in this distance that wildfire flame radiation
is considered to have its greatest impact (Cohen & Butler,
1996; Newman et al, 2013). Such situations are common in
urban environments. The results demonstrate the importance
of

appropriately

considering

fuel

geometry,

wildfire

behaviour, and the effect of shielding structures when
calculating

radiant

heat

impacts

on

buildings

and

emergency responders within urban environments where
vegetation fuel bed geometry prevents wildfires reaching
landscape proportions.
ii.

Over estimation of potential radiant heat flux impacts could,
in turn, result in firefighters not being deployed to suppress
wildfires and defend homes as a result of over-estimation of
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wildfire behaviour that indicates suppression efforts are not
suitable, resulting in avoidable house loss and impacts on
communities. This may occur as firefighting suppression
thresholds are related to wildfire behaviour parameters
throughout jurisdictions internationally. Where inappropriate
predictions fail to consider vegetation geometry that does
not support the assumptions of landscape wildfire modelling,
otherwise defendable areas may be left unguarded due
inappropriate evaluation of suppression strategies.

1. Wildfires, particularly mega wildfires such as those experienced in
late 2019 and early 2020 throughout Australia are dynamic and
complex

disasters

that

require

significant

interstate

international resourcing over prolonged durations.

and

When such

events occur they will inevitably impact life and property as well as
overwhelming firefighting efforts.

Section 4 discussed the

strategies available to firefighters, their limitations, and where the
evidence suggests they may be successful.

Detailed and

accurate planning is required to be completed by IMT’s and fire
behaviour specialists to ensure firefighting operations are suitable
and to minimise the potential for firefighter injury. When applied
correctly and in the right context, the findings of new research
including Table 4.15 and the RUIM may assist IMT’s to achieve this.
2. As will be the case in many landscape scale wildfires and mega
wildfires, detailed predictions and analysis of wildfire behaviour in
itself is insufficient.

Care must be taken to bridge the theory –

practice gap and ensure planning is operationally relevant. The
research presented in this section demonstrates that even in mild
conditions, the head fire will often be unstoppable where it occurs
in continuous vegetation fuel bed geometry.

This is further

supported by the findings presented in Sections 5 and 6.The use of
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existing wildfire scars and prescribed burns for wildfire suppression
can only be considered opportunistic and with marginal chance
of success unless the burn scar is both recent (within 2-3 years) and
significant in area. As climate change continues to result in
worsening fire conditions, frontline firefighters, IMT’s and fire
behaviour specialists need to apply increased scrutiny to fuel bed
structure and geometry, focusing suppression efforts where fuels
are discontinuous and broken.

1. It is concerning that existing operational wildfire suppression
thresholds do not systematically or quantifiably take account of
wildfire behaviour (RoS, I and LF) combined with the associated
potential radiant heat flux received by firefighters attempting
suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire scenario.
Current fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not
specifically address the tenability of environmental conditions in
the proximity of the flaming zone where firefighters are often
working to suppress the fire.

Once tenability thresholds are

considered it is evident that offensive, direct attack on the head of
large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters under all but the
mildest of conditions.
2. Consideration of radiant heat flux also reveals how truly dangerous
defensive rural urban interface firefighting is. Firefighters exposed
to head fire fronts will potentially be subjected to levels of radiant
heat that are capable of causing severe incapacitating burns in as
little as five seconds in elevated fire weather conditions and higher
fuel loads.

Incident Controllers and fire crew leaders must

therefore carefully consider whether properties and the occupants
that shelter inside them are defendable or whether the credible risk
to their own crews is too high. As discussed in Section 7, firefighters
have a personal risk tolerance higher than that of their
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commanding officers, this means that frontline firefighters are more
likely than their ranking officers to commit themselves to defending
occupants from insuppressible wildfire fronts.

This is

potentially

due to firefighters’ own personal expectations that they should put
themselves in personal danger to protect and rescue civilians, whist
officers also consider the responsibility of keeping their crews safe
and potential greater reaching consequences on the firefighter’s
family should they be severely injured or killed during wildfire
suppression operations (Penney, 2019).
3. As opposed to being part of an RUI strategy, sheltering inside or
behind firefighting appliances during the passage of a wildfire front
should be considered an absolute last resort only.

Instead,

firefighters should seek refuge in suitable structures well before the
expected impact of the wildfire front and emerge to salvage
property where they are able to do so.

Committing to a RUI

defense by positioning firefighters in between a landscape scale
forest wildfire front and private property or critical infrastructure
with the expectation that suppression efforts will be either safe or
successful is at best, reckless.

Even the intervention of aerial

firefighting suppression is unlikely to be sufficient to make this
approach safe or effective.

Given the extreme danger

associated with RUI firefighting, it should be considered only as a
contingency plan except in extreme circumstances where large
populations of vulnerable communities including school, nursing
homes and hospitals cannot be safely evacuated prior to the
arrival of the wildfire front.

1. The outcomes of this section are perhaps best represented using
the following analogy:
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Imagine a small campfire less than 1m in diameter. That is the wildfire. Now
imagine a thimble of water. That is a small firefighting aircraft.
thimble of water on the campfire.

Pour the

The effect is negligible, and would

continue to be so even if 30 thimbles were applied in rapid succession.
However, if the vegetation fuel in the campfire is instead only one matchstick
size portion, then that thimble of water will extinguish the fire.
2. Put simply, the effectiveness of suppression by applying water to
landscape scale forest and woodlands fires drops significantly as
the active flame depth of the head fire increases.

By

understanding this concept, as well as how vegetation structure
influences fire behaviour and fire front geometry, IMT’s and
firefighters can more realistically assess the potential for suppression
success. At the same time, if fire behaviour specialists understand
these relationships, they are better prepared to describe the fire
behaviour in terms that are meaningful for the IMT and frontline
firefighters. The use of guiding analysis such as that presented in
this and other sections may assist IMT’s determine that suppression
strategies are unlikely to succeed and resources would be better
spent in evacuations or allowing crews more time to prepare to
defend vulnerable assets.
3. The findings of this section should also be a reminder to firefighters
of the limitations of vehicle mounted sprinkler protection systems.
Whilst vehicle protection systems including sprinklers may be
successful in increasing the survivability of mild burnovers against
which they’ve been tested, existing specifications are unlikely to
afford sufficient protection against the wildfires modelled in Section
5. An unrealistic expectation of vehicle protection system
performance may contribute to firefighters having a false sense of
safety and security, and thereby being more likely to commit to
suppression strategies in untenable circumstances.
4. The solution to these issues may, in part, rest with:
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i.

Updated wildfire suppression training for firefighters clearly
identifying the limitations of vehicle protection systems and
effects of vehicle orientation during burnover events;

ii.

Greater acknowledgement by IMT’s of the physical limits of
wildfire suppression and an earlier consideration of defensive
firefighting strategies with opportunistic ‘surgical’ offensive
tactics;

iii.

Increased fire services investment in wildfire appliance
design with a focus on passive design protection elements
that mirror AS3959, particularly surrounding glazing and
cabin construction.

1. In the absence of any similar studies within Australasian fire services,
this section provides important qualitative and quantitative data
that can be used to improve risk management during dynamic
emergency operations. When considered together with literature
reviewed, the results of the first study explicitly reject any notion of
the validity of “dynamic risk management” being a stand-alone
process for managing risk during emergency situations. For best
practice to be realised, the architectural structure or process of risk
management as defined in ISO31000 cannot change. The context
in which risk management is completed may vary in dynamic
emergency situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms;
however, it is this unique and dynamic context of emergency
situations that only further requires the risk management process to
be completed in its entirety each and every time risk is assessed
and subsequently managed.
2. The

data

presented

in

this

section

identified

recurrent

thermoregulatory and critical incident related risk trends across all
activity groups.

These trends are significant because they are
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associated with greater potential for serious consequences of
hospitalisation or long term disability compared to less severe, but
more frequently occurring, physical strain related injuries. In terms
of affecting risk management during frontline operations, these
results suggest Incident Controllers need to take enhanced steps to
mitigate thermoregulatory related and physical strain related risks.
Proactive management may include enhanced mobilisation and
rotation of personnel at incidents to reduce physical loading, whilst
the risks may be reactively managed through implementation of
active recovery procedures and medical monitoring of crews at
incidents by qualified medical practitioners to ensure it is safe for
them to continue working.

Both during and post the emergency

phase of incidents, the Incident Controller should ensure crew
mental welfare is managed to reduce the exposures to
psychological events.
3. During almost all types of operational response the potential for
major or catastrophic adverse outcomes is present.

The

potential consequence is consistently greater than the actual
consequence realised in the data analysed.

This may be

explained by the mitigating effects of post event barriers (PPE,
physical conditioning of personnel, etc.) or simply the personnel
involved escaped more serious injury due to a combination of
events that led to them being close to the impact, as opposed to
being in the direct line of impact.

In light of this finding it is

important that incident controllers and operational personnel
remain vigilant to the potentially ‘normalising’ effect of recurrent
exposure to potentially catastrophic, albeit low frequency,
situations.

9.3

Implications for fire behaviour specialists and urban
planners
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1. To partially address the issues identified in AS3959 and increase the
accuracy of modelled wildfire outputs the following is recommended:
i.

Classification

of

vegetation

based

solely

on

qualitative

descriptors should not over-ride the wildfire behaviour model
applied to the scenario without due consideration of the wildfire
behaviour expected to occur through the vegetation.

Using

the case study previously provided as an example, whilst the
vegetation could reasonably be classified as Class A Forest or
Class B Woodlands, applying the Noble et al wildfire behaviour
model to either of these options without modifying the deemed
fuel loads would significantly result in over-estimation of wildfire
outputs.

In urban areas where vegetation geometry restricts

wildfire growth, a more appropriate and accurate approach is
to assess the fuel load utilizing Vesta Fuel Hazard Scores and
apply the correct vegetation availability factor.

Further

guidance on this can be found in Sections 2 and 3; and
ii.

Practitioners (both from fire services and land use planning
perspectives) involved in modelling wildfire and calculating
potential impacts require a sound understanding of the
respective models and their limitations.

Caution should be

applied when attempting to ‘simplify’ complex equations,
models or engineering concepts in standards, guidance
material or documents for use by lay persons or in land use
planning decisions. The profession of wildfire engineering is in its
infancy and job titles do not necessarily equate to the
knowledge and skills required to complete the required
technical analysis or make informed and accurate decisions.
This can be in part be remedied by professionalization /
accreditation of the sector and greater recognition of the role
of fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds in it.
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1. Perhaps the greatest implications of Section 2 for urban planners
applies to assessments of potential wildfire behaviour in urban
areas where the landscape scale wildfire behaviour assumed in
AS3959 and many of the planning guidelines is not possible.
Where vegetation fuel bed geometry (refer back to Section 1)
prevents the development of a quasi-steady RoS (refer to section
2.3 of this section), as reported in recent studies (Penney &
Stevenson, 2019), failure to adequately adjust inputs may result in
the significant over-calculation of potential wildfire behaviour.
This can be in part be remedied by deference in such instances to
suitably qualified fire safety engineers with wildfire backgrounds
that can provide quantified analysis and an appropriate level of
fire safety engineering rigor to design solutions.

1. Inappropriate modelling of wildfire through landscaped gardens,
public open space, road reserves, and residential areas within
urban areas. In turn, land that is actually suitable for development
may be identified as being subject to overestimated wildfire
impact which restricts or prohibits development altogether.
Typically, this may occur in urban settings where a small
unmanaged vacant residential lot is modelled as supporting a
landscape

scale

wildfire,

in

turn

restricting

or

prohibiting

development on adjacent and near-by lots.
2. Unnecessary requirements for over engineering and wildfire
resistant construction standards of affected dwellings and
structures

that

hinders

development

through

either

misidentification of land as being subject to unacceptable levels
of wildfire impact, or through making development cost-prohibitive
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as a result of the level of wildfire resistant engineering and
construction required.
3. In addition to the inherent safety factor incorporated within the
vegetation

availability

factor

previously

discussed,

the

methodologies proposed also retain the assumption of a flame
emissivity ε = 0.95, being representative of a landscape scale
wildfire with an active uniform flame front depth greater than 2 m,
and even potentially greater than 10 m (Poon, 2003; Sullivan, 2009).
In cases where the active flame front will not reach this depth, it
may also be suitable to reduce the emissivity. It is important to note
that whilst the vegetation factor and modified view factor model
are applicable to all fuel types (forest, woodland, shrub, scrub,
grassland, etc.), the point source acceleration model presented in
Section 3 is suitable for treed forest and woodland structures only,
as fire growth in other fuel structures may be significantly faster.
4. The models presented in Section 3 are not intended to address the
potential radiant heat flux arising from surrounding buildings being
involved in fire. In part, this is inherently considered within AS3959
through the requirement that associated structures on the same
parcel of land and within 6m of the dwelling subject to enhanced
construction standards, must also be constructed to that same
standard. In new estates, all dwellings within the land development
should be constructed to the required standard of wildfire
resistance, in theory significantly reducing the potential for mass
conflagration spreading between multiple houses. Due to the
differences in wildfire and structural fire behaviour and radiation
models as well as the difference in building and structure
performance once impacted by wildfire, it is suggested that a high
level of technical expertise is required to complete this process.
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1. By understanding wildfire behaviour and wildfire suppression
strategies,

urban

planners

can

significantly

influence

the

defendability and resilience of communities to wildfire impacts
through appropriate design of development at the RUI.

The

research and increased analysis presented in this section enables
wildfire impacts and potential suppression to be considered at the
design stage of RUI development. Evidence based design that
incorporates minimum measures for evacuations and eliminates
the unrealistic expectation that firefighters will be able to defend
every property will lead to more appropriate passive 6 wildfire
resilient design
2. The use of design wildfires, Wildfire Engineering Briefs and Wildfire
Engineering Reports, similar to the standard fire engineering
processes within the urban fire engineering profession will only
further increase the standard of safety in bushfire prone areas.
These are detailed and complex technical documents however
that required a high degree of technical knowledge and
proficiency from both the engineer and the agencies involved.

1. Current wildfire planning guidelines and policy in Australia
typically set deemed to satisfy set the ‘acceptable’7 threshold for
development at 10kW-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for

6

Passive systems do not require action or maintenance.

For instance,

ensuring road design allows sufficient evacuation opportunity without
additional control measures is a passive measure that can be supported by
appropriate and timely community evacuation messages.

Firefighters

being required to suppress a wildfire is an active intervention.
7

Planning approval will typically be provided.
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vulnerable, critical or hazardous land use8 and between 19kWm-2
to 29kWm-2 (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017) for standard
development such as subdivision.

As detailed in this section,

10kWm-2 is considered critical conditions for firefighters in structural
PPC and breathing apparatus, with retreat required in less than 60
seconds.

At the same level, for a healthy person without

protective equipment, incapacitating burns are predicted in
approximately 60 seconds, with severe pain and first degree burns
expected to occur after substantially less exposure. By adopting
these thresholds, communities are effectively being designed to be
undefendable by firefighters. At 29kWm-2, firefighters in structural
PPC and breathing apparatus are likely to face incapacitating
burns in less than 30 seconds. This realisation is also significant for
firefighters and IMT’s who are considering firefighting defense of
threatened communities who must consider whether they are
expected to, or are indeed themselves expecting to do the
impossible and un-survivable.
2. The solution from an urban planning perspective may rest in several
approaches that require consideration on a case by case basis:
i.

If development is required to be actively defendable by
firefighters during the passage of a wildfire front, the
maximum radiant heat impact at any point within the
development needs to be within the window of safe and
effective wildfire suppression.

In turn, this arguably either

requires extensive and permanent vegetation modification
and fuel reduction around the development, or appropriate
landscaping that forms part of a passive wildfire engineered
design;
ii.

If development does not require active firefighter defense
then the actual level of wildfire radiant heat impact can, in

8

Vulnerable land use includes schools, nursing homes, tourism etc.
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theory, be addressed by the application of enhanced
wildfire resilient engineering construction such as that
detailed in AS3959. In turn, this may also allow the fire truck
related road access standards to such as those described in
existing guidelines (NSWRFS, 2019; WAPC, 2015, 2017; GSA,
2012; ) to be revisited;
iii.

Development of an evidence based performance based
wildfire urban planning code, similar to that of the Building
Code of Australia and that adopted by Tasmania (2017).
This would need to go beyond the existing and largely
subjective planning guidelines and carry throughout the
planning and building legislation and process, as is the case
in Victoria (VSG, 2019);

iv.

Professionalisation and regulation of the wildfire engineering
industry.

Whilst the existing Bushfire Planning and Design

(BPAD) accreditation scheme is the first step in this process,
the technical knowledge and expertise required of wildfire
engineers arguably requires greater accreditation and
regulation.

1. The data and results presented in this section reinforce the
implications for Urban Planners discussed in Section 5.

1. Firefighters will put themselves in harms way to protect vulnerable
communities. Through careful and appropriate urban design that
considers

potential

wildfire

behaviour,

defendability

of

communities, evacuation requirements and firefighter tenability
using evidence based fire engineering analysis, urban planners can
enhance the safety of communities in areas prone to wildfire and
the firefighters that protect them.
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Chapter 3 – Firefighter tenability and its influence on wildfire
suppression
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M. (2019a).
Firefighter tenability and its influence on siege wildfire suppression. Fire Safety
Journal, 106, pp38-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.firesaf.2019.03.012

3.1 Abstract
This paper provides analysis of international fire service siege wildfire
suppression thresholds and reports on the effect of forest fuel structure, fire
weather condition and terrain on the suitability of suppression strategies.
Further, this study applies a fire engineering approach whereby siege wildfire
behaviour is deterministically assessed against firefighter tenability thresholds.
This research is significant as it is the first study to consider human tenability as
a factor in determining appropriateness of wildfire suppression strategies and
tactics. The results clearly demonstrate offensive siege wildfire suppression
involving direct head fire attacks by personnel and appliances exposes
firefighters to untenable conditions well in advance of the head fire edge.
Accordingly fire services may need to consider earlier instigation of defensive
strategies and increased reliance on aerial wildfire suppression.

3.2 Introduction
Each year firefighters from career and volunteer agencies throughout the
world respond to siege wildfires of significant scale in forest and woodland
vegetation structures that require vast resources and extended suppression
efforts over days or weeks.

In doing so they expose themselves to a large

number of hazards including heat illness, smoke inhalation, significant burns
and even death [1-3]. Perhaps the most frightening prospect a firefighter
can face is a ‘burnover’ whereby personnel and/or equipment are caught
in the direct path and overrun by the fire [4]. When such an event occurs
during a period of intense fire behaviour the environmental conditions are
often unsurvivable for people caught in the open or seeking refuge in a
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vehicle [5].

This places firefighters in precarious situations and in addition to

firefighters being fit, appropriately trained and equipped, requires the careful
and informed selection of appropriate suppression strategies in order to
minimise the potential for such an event. The international literature from
Australia, America, Canada, Europe and New Zealand [6-12] considers head
fire rate of spread (RoS), fire line intensity (IFL) and flame length (LF) when
determining the suitability of suppression strategies and tactics, however
there is a dearth of literature that considers the fire ground environmental
limitations for firefighters as a factor influencing the selection of suppression
strategies. This shortcoming may not only contribute to inappropriate and
inefficient deployment of resources during wildfire suppression, but more
importantly, may be unintentionally contributing to firefighter injuries and
deaths. The aim of this research is to develop a fire engineering approach to
the analysis of forest and woodland wildfire suppression strategies that not
only compares international suppression thresholds, but considers firefighter
tenability as a key factor for determining the suitability of suppression
strategies.

3.3 Wildfire suppression strategies and tactics

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services [6, p75-76] identifies both
offensive and defensive strategies as being suitable for fighting wildfires
depending on fire behaviour and resourcing, however “wherever possible,
the Incident Controller should use offensive strategies / methods of attack to
attack and control the fire to minimise the adverse impact from both the fire
and the fire suppression activities.”

Offensive strategies include direct

head fire or flank fire attack (Figure 1) and typically require firefighters to be
within 10 m of the flame zone in order to apply suppressants from hand held
attack lines or machine monitors. An alternate offensive strategy is the
parallel attack is where firefighters fall back some safe distance, construct
containment lines parallel to the fire line then burn out the intervening piece.
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Defensive strategies are employed when the fire behaviour is too intense to
be safely attacked and utilise tactics that do not involve active fire
suppression including building containment lines, backburning, defending
properties and focusing on evacuation of people and livestock.

The

international literature [6-12] reveals considerable variation between
suppression strategy RoS, IFL and LF thresholds, further, all jurisdictions were
consistent in that they failed to considered firefighter tenability as part of the
decision making process.

76Figure 1: Direct attack on the head fire (left) vs direct attack on the flank (right) (Source:
[11] p10-11)

3.4 Modelling wildfire behaviour
Understanding how wildfire fuels are represented in fire behavior models is
critical to calculating potential fire behaviour and subsequently determining
whether suppression thresholds will be breached. The term wildfire fuel is
broadly applied to the vegetation potentially consumed by a fire burning in
vegetation, regardless of the active fire area itself [13-18]. Wildfire fuel is
defined by its physical structure and properties which are represented by
numerical inputs relevant to the appropriate model being applied. For the
purposes of this paper, wildfire fuel is considered to be the fine fuels, typically
less than 6mm in diameter, that will be consumed by the approaching flame.
Four main fuel strata layers and one contributing element are considered
when describing wildfire fuel structures [19]. These are: canopy; bark (the
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contributing element); elevated; near-surface; and surface fuels. A
description of the main fuel layers is provided in the list below [17-19]:
•

Canopy fuel is contained in the forest crown. The crown
encompasses the leaves and fine twigs of the tallest layer of trees
in a forest or woodland. Crown involvement may lead to erratic
and extreme fire behaviour and contributes to spotting distances.

•

Bark fuel is the flammable bark on tree trunks and upper branches
that contributes to transference of surface fires into the canopy,
embers and firebrands, and subsequent spot fires.

•

Elevated fuel includes shrubs, scrub, and juvenile understory plants
up to 2–3m in height, however, canopy of heights less than 4m can
be included when there is no identifiable separation between the
canopy and lower shrubs. The individual fuel components
generally have an upright orientation and may be highly variable
in ground coverage. Elevated fuels influence the flame height and
rate of spread of a fire whilst also contributing to crown
involvement by providing vertical fuel structure.

•

Near-surface fuels include grasses, low shrubs, and heath,
sometimes containing suspended components of leaves, bark,
and twigs. This layer can vary from a few centimeters to up to 0.6m
in height. Near-surface fuel components include a mixture of
orientations from horizontal to vertical. This layer may be continuous
or have large gaps in ground coverage and influences both the
rate of spread of a fire and flame height.

•

Surface fuel includes leaves, twigs, and bark on the forest floor.
Surface fuel (or litter) components are generally horizontally
layered. Surface fuel usually contributes the greatest to fuel
quantity and includes the partly decomposed fuel (duff) on the soil
surface. This fuel layer influences the rate of spread of a fire and
flame depth as well as contributing to the establishment of a fire
post initial ignition.
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Pyrolysis of vegetation and combustion of turbulent diffusion flames of a
bushfire front is extremely complex. In Australia, this is highly simplified by
existing models and relies heavily on the assumption that radiation is
overwhelmingly responsible for heat transfer between the flame and the
receiving body [20-23]. It is considered that the fire front is geometrically
represented by a uniform parallelepiped the width of the head fire, with
sufficient flame depth for the flame emissivity to reach 0.95 (identified as
being greater than 5m and potentially deeper than 10m) [24,25], and flame
length dependent on associated fire modelling that assumes the fire has
attained a quasi-steady rate of spread ( RoS ) [20,26,27]. The RoS (kmh-1) flame
length

Lf

(m) and fire line intensity I (kWm-1) for forest, woodland, and

rainforest are given by:

RoS = 0.0012 × FDI × w × exp(0.069θ eff )
L f = (13RoS + 0.24W ) / 2
I = HWRoS
where FDI is the fire danger index, w is the surface fuel load (t/ha), θeff is the
effective slope (slope of land under the vegetation or fuel bed, W is the
overall fuel load (tha-1), and H is the heat of combustion (kJkg-1). The
assumed flame geometry is commonly known as the “radiant heat panel”,
with the horizontal position of the panel considered to be located below the
midpoint between the base and tip of the flame front [20,26]. Both the flame
temperature and emissivity are assumed to be consistent across the panel,
whilst the receiving body is assumed to be aligned perpendicular to the
approaching fire front [28].
Landscape scale wildfire shapes have numerous components as illustrated in
Figure 2.
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77Figure 2. Wildfire components (source: Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report).

The forward RoS and intensity of an active front of a fire, known as the head
fire, is dependent on the fuel available for consumption in the active flaming
front [29,30]. This is incorporated into existing empirical wildfire models
[14,15,17,28-34] through the consideration of available fuels expressed as
tons per hectare within the active fire area directly behind the head fire [19].
Typically driven by wind direction, the head fire is the main component of a
wildfire contributing to the RoS and fire behaviour intensity.
In landscape scale wildfire scenarios, the 1ha area of assessment used for
empirical models falls within the greater active fire area, whilst in sublandscape scale wildfire scenarios the active fire area instead falls within the
1ha assessment area [19]. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Where wildfire occurs
at a sub-landscape scale, application of a Vegetation Availability Factor [19]
is required to correct fire behaviour outputs

and subsequently determine

whether suppression thresholds are likely to be exceeded.
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(a)

(b)
78Figure 3. (a) Landscape scale wildfire scenario; and (b) sub-landscape scale wildfire
scenario. [19]

Of the literature reviewed [6-12], only Western Australia [6,7] reported utilising
RoS as a marker for wildfire suppression strategies in forest or woodland fuel
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structures.

The reported thresholds were readily suppressed (<0.06kph);

hand tool attack possible (<0.14kph); direct machine attack possible
(<0.4kph); direct attack not possible / unlikely to succeed (>0.4kph); and
indirect attack likely to fail (>0.8kph).

No explanation was provided from

other jurisdictions for the absence of reported RoS thresholds.

Whilst there is general agreement across jurisdictions regarding IFL Direct
Attack tactical thresholds in forest or woodland fuel structures, discrepancy
occurs between Direct Machine Attack thresholds as well as when the head
fire is considered uncontrollable. Western Australian [6,7,11], New Zealand
[10] and Canadian [8] thresholds are the most aggressive, identifying Direct
Machine Attack on the headfire suitable to 2000 kWm-1 and Indirect Attack
suitable to 3000-4000 kWm-1 compared to the United States which considers
the Headfire Control Limit to be 1730 kWm-1, dangerous conditions present
within 30 feet (9.14m) of the head fire at 2422 kWm-1 and the head fire to be
undefendable at 3460 kWm-1. Only Canada identified a limit for suppression
efforts to cease, being 10,000 kWm-1 almost three times higher than the
undefendable threshold set by the United States [8].

None of the literature

reviewed considered any correlation between the identified IFL thresholds
and other fire behaviour parameters including RoS, LF or tenability as a
function of separation distance from the fire edge.

Western Australia again adopts the most aggressive LF tactical thresholds in
forest or woodland fuel structures. Whilst there is again general agreement
at lower flame length (United States adopts 1.2 m for Direct Attack [8],
Canada utilises 1.4 m [8], Western Australia alongside Europe use between
1.5 m [6,9] to 2 m [12], there is increased variance as LF increases. Western
Australia’s Parallel Attack LF threshold of 3 m is greater than both the 2.5 m
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European limit for Parallel Attack and the 2.8 m LF the United States recognises
as creating dangerous conditions within 30 ft of the head fire, whilst the
Western Australian [6,12] Indirect Attack limit of 10 m is almost three times
greater than the head fire undefendable threshold of 3.4m set by the United
States. Again, none of the literature considered any correlation between
the identified LF thresholds and other fire behaviour parameters including rate
of spread, intensity or tenability as a function of separation distance from the
fire edge.

3.5 Firefighter tenability in the Wildland Context

The International Fire Engineering Guidelines [35] define untenable conditions
as “environmental conditions associated with fire in which human life is not
sustainable.” This should not be confused with the conditions required to
facilitate effective firefighting suppression which are significantly milder than
those able to be withstood for short periods of time. Therefore, improving
firefighter safety during wildfire suppression by clearly defining fire ground
environmental conditions that are considered tenable, or safe for firefighters
is paramount. Both the Society of Fire Safety [36] and Poh [37] identify four
primary hazards associated with fires within the built environment that affect
tenability being convected heat, radiant heat, toxic gases and smoke
obscuration. However, as Poh [37] reports, there is no single set of related
values for tenability criteria which is universally accepted. The current study
excludes smoke obscuration as a factor affecting tenability in the bushfire
context due to the lack of injuries and incidents associated with visual
obscurity during bushfire events [2,3].

Each of the remaining hazards and

their relevant thresholds as accepted by various jurisdictions is subsequently
discussed in the following sections.
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Knight, Brown and Leonard [38] identify the toxic gases produced during the
thermal degradation of vehicle componentry, particularly the interior vehicle
componentry, will be subsequent to the loss of tenability due to radiant heat
and other factors.

The same authors do note that hydrogen chloride (HCl),

a severe irritant released when vinyl interiors thermally degrade even without
combustion, formaldehyde (HCHO), hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and carbon
monoxide (CO) may cause significant irritation to occupants in the vehicle
cabin, however not to the extent of affecting tenability. The concentration
for each of these gases that are immediately dangerous to life or health
(IDLH) are detailed in Table 1. Brown et al. [39] reports fire truck cabins will
generally remain tenable in regards to toxic gases unless there is catastrophic
window failure with glass falling from the frame.

Tenability within fire

appliance cabins subject to high intensity wildfire impact and the effects of
Vehicle Protection Systems identified as a potential subject of future
research.
68Table 1: IDLH concentrations
Material

IDLH (ppm)

Source & Comments

CO

1000-8000

[39,40]

HCHO

20-100

[39,41,42]
@20ppm – severe respiratory irritation
@50ppm – pulmonary oedema
@100ppm – immediate death

HCl

50-1000

[39,43,44]
@50ppm – barely tolerable
@1000ppm pulmonary oedema

HCN

50-280

[39,45]
@ 100 death after 1 hour
@181 fatal after 10 minutes
@280 immediately fatal

278

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

Radiant heat transfer is primarily responsible for the propagation of
landscape scale bushfire and subsequent impacts on firefighters [19,28,4648] therefore it is proposed any impacts of convective heat transfer, or
noxious gases on firefighters would first occur from radiant heat transfer.
Direct flame contact from the passing fire front or adjacent involved fuels
(including burning fuels underneath the vehicle) have the potential to result
in rapid vehicle fire involvement and untenable conditions in as little as 90
seconds [49-51]. Post burnover investigations support the conclusion radiant
heat remains the greatest threat to firefighters and conditions within the
vehicle cabin may become untenable in a much shorter timeframe than this
[4,52-54]. Calculated potential peak radiant heat flux from large wildfires
can exceed 76 kWm-2, even at greater than 10 m separation from the head
fire under mild fuel loads and weather conditions [55].

By comparison

experiential forest fire field data reported by Frankman [21] identified peak
heat fluxes of 179 kWm-2 and 263 kWm-2, whilst an analysis of 216 homes post
the Springwood wildfire in New South Wales, Australia in 2013 by Newnham
[22] estimated peak radiant heat fluxes experienced by houses to be as
much as 52.5kWm-2.

Purser [56] cites three methods of incapacitation from exposure to fire are
possible, being heat stroke, body surface burns and respiratory tract burns.
The sensation of pain occurs prior to burns, incapacitation and ultimately
death, however in the case of significant bushfire such events may be almost
simultaneous as opposed to the more prolonged onset of hyperthermia.
In considering pain and burns two assumptions detailed in both Poh [37] and
Purser [56] are retained:
1. Thermal burns to the respiratory tract will not occur unless the air
temperature / or humidity are sufficient to cause (unprotected) facial
skin burns; and
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2. Heat flux and temperature tenability limits designed to protect victims
from incapacitation by skin burns should be adequate to protect them
from burns to the respiratory tract.
Whilst the protective effects of Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) and
Equipment (PPE) are acknowledged, this report includes a third assumption
that unprotected skin thresholds are suitable for modelling purposes (and as
a result incorporate an inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPC
and PPE are worn). Limited experimental data involving human test subjects
is available to support tenability thresholds and variance between the
literature exists. Although Raj [57] suggests exposure to as much as 5 kWm-2
may occur without pain or injury in clothed subjects, Poh [37] identifies 2.5
kWm-2 is sufficient to result in both skin and respiratory burns. The Australasian
Fire Authorities Council [58] provides further guidance for firefighters in
structural firefighting PPC (including Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) as
detailed in Table 2, however the Society of Fire Safety [36] suggest the
‘Routine’ exposure threshold may be inappropriate considering radiant heat
flux received whilst sunbaking may be as high as 1.1 kWm-2. For firefighters
sheltering inside a fire appliance cabin Knight, Brown and Leonard [38] utilise
a 60 second radiation limit of 2 kWm-2 and air blast temperature limit of 200°C
however the lower temperature of 150°C for exposed personnel is adopted
in Europe [59]. Further guidance regarding human tolerance to thermal
radiation is provided by Purser [56, Table 2-6.19] as summarised in Table 3.
69Table 2: Firefighter exposure limits (sourced from [36,58]
Routine

Hazardous

Extreme

Critical

Condition

Condition

Condition

Condition

Maximum Time

25 minutes

10 minutes

1 minute

< 1 minute

Maximum Air Temperature

100°C

120°C

160°C

>235°C

Maximum Radiation

1kWm-2

3kWm-2

4-4.5kWm-2

>10kWm-2
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70Table 3: Summarised radiant heat flux effects
Heat Flux kWm-2

Time to Effect (seconds)
Pain

Burn

Full Burn

2.5

40

-

-

4.2

-

30 (blisters)

-

10.5

5

-

-

23.5

1.6

-

-

30

6

10

>15

35

5

9.5

>15

40

4.5

9

>15

50

4

7

>15

100

2

4

6

150

1

2.5

4

Alternatively it can be calculated using the following equation [36][56]:
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =

4

𝑟𝑟 �3
𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟 4/3

Where trad is time to reach end effect for identified thermal radiation
(minutes); qr is the given radiant heat flux; r is the radiant heat exposure dose
[(kWm-2).min] required for the identified endpoint:
1.33 (kWm-2).min (tolerance limit / pain / first-degree burns);
10 (kWm-2).min (severe incapacitation and second-degree burns); and
16.7 (kWm-2).min (fatal exposure with third-degree burns).
Applying Purser’s [56] equation, Figure 4 provides comparison of the various
times to reach the identified endpoint as a function of radiant heat flux and
illustrates that incapacitating burns can occur within relatively small
timeframes at the lower end of possible wildfire induced radiant heat flux.
The results demonstrate fatal exposure occurs within 1 minute once radiant
heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2, whilst incapacitating injuries occur within 1
minute once radiant heat flux exceeds 20 kWm-2.
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6

Time (minutes)

5
4
3
2
1
0

1st
5kW/m2
45kW/m2

Degree

10kW/m2 B 15kW/m2
50kW/m2
55kW/m2

20kW/m2
60kW/m2

2nd

3rd

Degree

25kW/m2
65kW/m2

30kW/m2
70kW/m2

35kW/m2
75kW/m2

Degree
40kW/m2
80kW/m2

79Figure 4: Time to effect

This study assumes the worst case credible scenario being firefighters in
personal protective clothing suitable for wildland fire suppression are
exposed to radiant heat effects of a rapidly advancing flame edge that is
part of a continuous landscape scale wildfire flank or head.

This is a

deliberate measure to account for burnover situations in appliances that are
disabled and firefighters attempt to flee by foot.

In these situations

sheltering behind appliances and other small structures will provide little if any
shielding from radiant heat flux [19]. Whilst the literature identifies several
potential tenable limits as previously discussed, this study adopts the AFAC
[58] “Hazardous Condition” limit of 3 kWm-2 as the threshold for suppression
operations involving personnel (the “Suppression Threshold”). This is less than
both the

“Extreme” limit of 4 kWm-2 [58] and the acceptable 5 kWm-2

exposure in normal clothing reported by Raj [57] which were considered to
provide an insufficient margin for error to firefighters to retreat to a safe area
as incapacitating injury may occur within 30 seconds depending on the
individual, but greater than the limit adopted by [38]. As illustrated in Figure
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4, the “Critical” limit of 10 kWm-2 [58] can result in incapacitating burns in less
than one minute and is subsequently identified as the “Tenability Threshold”
for the study.

The “Suppression Threshold”, being the radiant heat flux the

firefighters in Personal Protective Clothing (PPC) can withstand whilst being
able to undertake suppression activities is inherently lower than the
“Tenability Threshold”, being the radiant heat flux those same firefighters
could physically survive.

As previously identified, different PPE affords

firefighters various levels of protection however exposed skin and respiratory
tracts (in the absence of closed circuit breathing apparatus) remain
vulnerable. As a result the thresholds adopted in this study incorporate an
inherent safety factor where structural firefighting PPE is worn.

3.6 Study Phase One – Wildfire behaviour threshold analysis

International literature and fire service doctrine was reviewed to establish
wildfire suppression thresholds (see above). Subsequently, analysis of RoS, IFL
and LF using both McArthur [14,28] and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model
(DEFFM) [17,32] empirical models was deterministically compared to
documented thresholds. Acknowledging the limitations of empirical models
discussed by Cruz et al. [60], the models selected are those currently used by
fire services across Australia [32] as well as the Australian Building Codes
Board [61,62] by adopting Australian Standard 3959 [28], and are therefore
considered suitable for the study.
McArthur model analysis utilised forest understory fuel loads (w) between 525t/ha and Forest Fire Danger Indices (FDI) between 10-100, representing a
broad spectrum of forest fuel loads [55] and up to the 99.9th percentile of fire
weather conditions [63] across Australia. Terrain was assumed to be flat for
all scenarios with sensitivity to slope assessed in Phase Two of the current
study.
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Analysis using DEFFM was completed using the Fire Behaviour Calculator [64]
incorporating fuel loads and weather datasets from the south west of
Western Australia, ambient temperature of 20°C, relative humidity of 20% and
open wind speed at 10 m of 20 kph. The results from the DEFFM analysis were
compared to the McArthur model for the same fuel load (w) datasets at FDI’s
between 10-100. Finally, results from the DEFFM modelling were compared
against the fuel load variations identified by [16] for the mid-range
associated fuel hazard scores (ignoring bark) within each geographical area.

Results for the McArthur model analysis are illustrated in Figure 5. The
operational RoS thresholds identified by Smith [7] are exceeded in all but the
sparsest of understorey (w) fuel loads and mildest fire weather conditions
associated with an FDI less than 20.

Hand tool attack is not considered

possible once available understory fuel loads exceed 5 t/ha, regardless of
FDI, whilst the direct machine attack threshold is also rapidly exceeded once
the FDI exceeds 20 for understory fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha.

Indirect

attack thresholds are exceeded once an FDI of 45 is reached in understory
fuel loads of 15 t/ha. At an understory of 25 t/ha, identified as the standard
fuel load in AS3959 [28], direct machine attack is only suitable at FDIs ≤10 and
the indirect attack threshold is exceeded once the FDI exceeds
approximately 23.

The results demonstrate that offensive strategies (direct

attack) are not suitable and unlikely to succeed against an established
landscape scale wildfire front in 62% of simulated wildfire conditions.
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80Figure 5: Tactic suitability according to RoS

Whilst there is general consistency between Western Australian, New Zealand
and Canadian thresholds, reduced thresholds adopted by the USA further
restrict the suitability of direct wildfire suppression tactics to all but the mildest
conditions. As illustrated in Figure 6, once understory fuel loads exceed 20
t/ha headfire behaviour is recognised as undefendable across all jurisdictions
regardless of the FDI.

Utilising American thresholds, IFL is recognised as

resulting in dangerous conditions within 30 ft of the head fire at all FDIs once
a surface fuel load of 15 t/ha is exceeded. The lower Canadian intensity
threshold of 10,000 kWm-1 to cease all wildfire suppression activities can be
exceeded under the right fire weather conditions once surface fuel loads
reach 10 t/ha, and can be breached at an FDI as low as 30 when surface
fuels exceed 20 t/ha. The higher Canadian IFL threshold of 30,000 kWm-1 is
breached once surface fuels exceed 20 t/ha and the FDI exceeds 80. In
higher fuel loads, this limit can be exceeded when the FDI reaches as low as
40.

Analysis of the data illustrated in Figure 4 identified that offensive

suppression strategies are suitable in only 22% of simulated wildfire scenarios
utilising thresholds from Western Australia, New Zealand and Canadian
jurisdictions.

This figure falls to 12% when thresholds from the USA are

applied.
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81Figure 6: Tactic suitability according to Fire Line Intensity

As detailed in Figure 7, when LF thresholds are used, offensive suppression
strategies are considered unsuitable or dangerous for all landscape scale
wildfires burning in understory fuel loads exceeding 15 t/ha regardless of fire
weather conditions.

Further, fire behaviour is recognised as dangerous

within 30 ft of the head fire in all understory fuel loads once an FDI of 30 is
attained.

There is strong agreement between direct personnel attack

thresholds between jurisdictions with direct personnel attack / manual attack
on the head fire identified as inappropriate due to LF across all scenarios
regardless of understory fuel loads and at all FDIs.

Only two jurisdictions

suggest a direct machine attack on the head fire is suitable, and only in the
mildest head fire behaviour arising from understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and
at an FDI of 5 (USA) and 10 (Canada).

Thresholds are the most

conservative in American and Canadian jurisdictions, with offensive
strategies considered suitable in only 2-8% of the wildfire scenarios modelled.
By comparison, offensive strategies were considered suitable in 55% of the
wildfire scenarios using Western Australian thresholds and 42% according to
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European thresholds.

No LF threshold was identified for New Zealand fire

services.
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82Figure 7: Tactic suitability according to Flame Length

The second phase of the study revealed little agreement between the results
of the DEFFM and McArthur model analysis.

In comparison to McArthur,

DEFFM analysis under predicted RoS, IFL and LF across all geographic regions
once fuels reached three to four years in age and a FDI of 30 to 40 was
attained.

Applying DEFFM alone, Direct Machine Attack RoS thresholds

were reached across all geographical jurisdictions when fuels reached four
to five years of age, Direct Machine Attack IFL thresholds were reached at
five to nine years of age whilst Direct Machine Attack LF thresholds were
reached across all geographical jurisdictions at fuel ages between three to
nine years.
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Comparative McArthur modelling across all fire weather conditions and
utilising the identified fuel loads (a sample of these results is illustrated for RoS
in Jarrah Mosaic -Figure 8; IFL in Jarrah South - Figure 9; and LF in Jarrah East Figure 10) revealed DEFFM analysis typically over estimated wildfire
behaviour below an FDI of 30 to 50, above this range DEFFM analysis typically
significantly underestimated wildfire behaviour across all fuel ages and
jurisdictions.

.

Fire line intensity suppression thresholds were typically

exceeded across all jurisdictions once fuel ages reached 3 to 4 years and an
FDI of 30 was reached, with the United States ‘dangerous within 30ft’
threshold rapidly exceeded under the same conditions. LF suppression
thresholds were typically exceeded with most jurisdictions considering the
head fire to be undefendable due to fire behaviour once fuels reached 3 to
5 years of age and an FDI of 30 attained. Only Western Australia and Europe
considered head fires to be defendable above these limits, albeit using
indirect suppression tactics.

3.7 Phase Two – Suppression and tenability threshold analysis

Empirical wildfire behaviour and radiant heat modelling was completed in
accordance with the methodology detailed in AS3959 Annexure B [28].
Radiant heat flux as a function of separation distance at 5 m increments from
0-100 m from the head fire front was calculated for each scenario with the
results deterministically assessed against the defined tenability criteria.
total of 600 iterations were completed across the wildfire scenarios.

A
The

calculated radiant heat flux for each iteration was subsequently used as an
input for Purser’s [56] equation to calculate the time for pain and burns to
occur to a person 10 m from the head fire.
Analysis again utilised forest understory fuel loads (w) between 5-25 t/ha and
Fire Danger Indices (FDI) between 10-100. A flame temperature of 1090 K
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was selected, being within the wildfire flame temperature ranges reported
[25,28,65,66]. Heat of combustion of 18,600 kJ/kg was applied, being within
ranges reported in AS3959 [28] and the SFPE Handbook [67, Table 1-5.3].
Emissivity (ԑ) of 0.8 was applied with sensitivity analysis between 0.6 to 0.95
undertaken at Forest and Woodland fuel loads as defined in AS3959 [28]
across the FDI range. These values were within emissivity ranges reported
[25,28,66,68] and reflects the optically thick flame of a significant wildfire
head fire. Head fire width of 100 m was applied, being consistent with that
required for radiant heat flux modelling of siege wildfire reported in AS3959
[28] and Penney & Stevenson [19]. Positive slope (aligned with wind direction)
was assumed to be 0° with sensitivity analysis between 0° to 20° undertaken
at Forest fuel loads as defined in AS3959 [28] across the FDI range. Radiant
heat flux as a function of separation distance from 0 m to 100 m from the
head fire front for each scenario were completed with the results
deterministically assessed against the defined tenability criteria.

The results (Table 4) identify that even in the mildest of fuel loads and fire
weather conditions, when attempting to suppress a fully developed forest
head fire in continuous fuel structures, firefighters will need to remain at least
20 m from the head fire. At understory fuel loads of 5 t/ha and assuming no
shielding, the Suppression Threshold is exceeded even at an FDI of 10 until 20
m separation from the head fire is achieved, whilst tenability limits are
exceeded for the first 6 m from the head fire. The required separation for
the Suppression Threshold increases with FDI, with 28 m separation necessary
to reach suitable conditions once an FDI of 40 is reached.

Conditions

supportive of suppression efforts are not experienced within 30 m of the head
fire at or above an FDI of 50.

As illustrated in Figures 11 and 12,

representative of typical Woodland and Forest fuel loads [28], conditions
worsen as fuel load increases. For typical Woodlands fuel loads, depending
on FDI, radiant heat flux falls below the Tenability Threshold at 15 m-35 m whilst
35 m-80 m separation is required for conditions to be conducive to safe
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suppression efforts. These distances increase to 20 m to 50 m and 45 m to
>100 m respectively for typical Forest fuel loads.

None of the scenarios

analysed resulted in conditions that would facilitate suppression efforts on the
head fire within 10 m of the flame edge, whilst only 8.3% of the scenarios
assessed provided tenable conditions for firefighters within the same
separation.
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83Figure 8: Tactic suitability – the relationship between rate of spread, fuel age and various
suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah Mosaic)
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84Figure 9: Tactic suitability – the relationship between fire line intensity, fuel age and various
suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah South)
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85Figure 10: Tactic suitability – the relationship between flame length, fuel age and various
suppression tactic thresholds for fire in jarrah forest fuels (Jarrah East)
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71Table 4: Separation (distance between firefighters and flaming zone) required for
suppression and tenability thresholds
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (based on 5 m increment data)
Surface
Fuel

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

FDI

(t/ha)

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

w5
w10
w15
w20
w25
w30

FDI
FDI 80

FDI 90

100

Tenability

10

10

10

10

15

15

15

15

15

20

Suppression

20

25

25

30

35

35

35

40

40

45

Tenability

10

15

15

15

20

20

25

25

25

30

Suppression

30

35

40

45

45

50

55

60

60

65

Tenability

15

15

20

20

25

30

30

30

35

35

Suppression

35

40

50

55

60

65

70

70

75

80

Tenability

15

20

25

25

30

35

35

40

40

45

Suppression

40

50

55

65

70

75

80

85

90

90

Tenability

20

25

30

30

35

40

45

45

50

50

Suppression

45

55

65

70

75

85

90

95

100

>100

Tenability

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

50

55

60

Suppression

50

60

70

80

85

90

95

>100

>100

>100
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86Figure 11: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between
radiant heat flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Woodlands fuel structures

293

Greg Penney PhD Thesis
70

Radiant heat flux (kW/m2)

60
50

Window of safe &
effective wildfire
suppression

40
30
20
10
0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95 100

Separation from head fire (m)
FDI 10

FDI 20

FDI 30

FDI 40

FDI 50

FDI 60

FDI 70

FDI 80

FDI 90

FDI 100

Suppression Threshold

Tenability Limit

87Figure 12: Firefighter tenability and suppression thresholds – the relationship between
radiant heat flux, separation distance from the head fire and FDI in Forest fuel structures

Applying Purser’ equation [56] and assuming 10 m separation from the head
fire, the reality of the environmental conditions faced by firefighters becomes
evident across understory fuel loads and FDI (Table 5).

In the mildest of

conditions, the time taken for pain tolerance thresholds to be reached and
for first degree burns to occur is 8 seconds. In foreseeable circumstances,
such as an FDI of 60 and understory fuel loads of 25 t/ha, this time is reduced
to less than a second.

In comparison, the time taken for severe

incapacitation to occur in the mildest conditions at 10 m separation from the
head fire is approximately 120 seconds, whilst at an FDI of 60 and understory
fuel load of 25 t/ha this drops to approximately 10 seconds.

At 10 m

separation and at the lowest FDI and fuel load, fatal exposure limits are also
rapidly reached, occurring in under 233 seconds. At understory fuel loads
of 25t/ha and an FDI 60 fatal exposure will occur in less than 17 seconds (Table
5).
294

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

The time frame for incapacitating burns to occur is a critical factor when
identifying safe zones for firefighter retreat and for assessing the appropriate
wildfire suppression strategies and tactics. When interpreting the results of
this study, it is suggested that once incapacitation occurs a firefighter will
likely be imminently exposed to fatal levels of radiant heat and the shorter
time frame should be applied.

It is also important to consider the shielding

effects of intervening unburnt vegetation may provide firefighters a false
sense of fire intensity until the flames engulf the vegetation in front of them.
Firefighters surprised by the rapid emergence of landscape scale wildfire
from behind thick vegetation could be rapidly incapacitated and may have
insufficient time to retreat to vehicles and activate protective systems such
as sprinklers and radiation shields fitted to the vehicles.

Even if protective

systems are activated, the flow rates required to extinguish or substantially
lessen fire impact is likely to exceed the capacity of the protective systems
[69] which suggests fatal burnovers may still occur.
72Table 5: Time to pain, incapacitation and fatal exposure from radiation at 10m separation
from the head fire

Time (seconds) taken to tolerance limit / pain / first degree burn at 10m separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

w5

8.0

6.4

5.3

4.5

3.9

3.4

3.0

2.7

2.4

2.2

w10

4.8

3.6

2.8

2.3

1.9

1.7

1.4

1.3

1.1

1.0

w15

3.4

2.4

1.9

1.5

1.2

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

w20

2.5

1.8

1.3

1.1

0.9

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

w25

2.0

1.4

1.0

0.8

0.7

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

w30

1.6

1.1

0.8

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

Time (seconds) taken to severe incapacitation and second degree burns at 10m
separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

w5

117.5

94.4

78.2

66.3

57.3

50.2

44.5

39.8

35.9

32.7

w10

71.4

53.2

41.8

34.1

28.5

24.4

21.2

18.6

16.6

14.9

w15

49.7

35.7

27.3

21.9

18.0

15.2

13.1

11.4

10.1

9.0

w20

37.3

26.2

19.7

15.6

12.8

10.7

9.1

7.9

6.9

6.1

w25

29.5

20.3

15.2

11.9

9.6

8.0

6.8

5.9

5.0

5.0

w30

24.1

16.4

12.1

9.4

7.6

6.3

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

Time (seconds) taken to fatal exposure with third degree burns at 10m separation
w/FDI

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
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w5

232.8

187.0

155.0

131.4

113.4

99.4

88.1

78.9

71.2

64.7

w10

141.4

105.5

82.9

67.6

56.6

48.3

42.0

36.9

32.8

29.4

w15

98.4

70.6

54.1

43.3

35.7

30.2

25.9

22.6

19.9

17.8

w20

74.0

51.8

39.1

30.9

25.3

21.2

18.1

15.6

13.7

12.1

w25

58.4

40.3

30.0

23.5

19.1

15.9

13.5

11.6

10.0

10.0

w30

47.8

32.5

24.0

18.7

15.1

12.5

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

As emissivity affects the receiver’s total radiant heat flux it was expected
lower emissivity values resulting in reduced radiant heat exposure.

The

results of the sensitivity analysis (Table 6) reveal that for Woodlands fuels, the
Tenability Threshold is not achieved until a minimum 25 m separation from the
head fire flames is reached whilst the Suppression Threshold is not achieved
until a minimum 60 m separation is reached. For Forest structures, these
distances increase to 40 m and 80 m respectively.

These results suggest

suppression efforts will be ineffective against siege head fires where the flame
emissivity exceeds 0.6, representative of optically thick flames in head fires
with an active flame depth of more than 1 m to 1.5 m [25, 66,68].
73Table 6: Separation required from head fire line for suppression and tenability thresholds –
sensitivity to emissivity
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data)
Surface
Fuel
(t/ha)
w15
w25

Ԑ 0.6
25

Ԑ 0.65
30

Ԑ 0.7
30

Ԑ 0.75

30

Ԑ 0.8

35

Ԑ 0.85

35

Ԑ 0.9

35

Ԑ 0.95

Suppression

60

65

65

70

70

75

75

80

Tenability

40

40

40

45

45

50

50

50

Suppression

80

85

85

90

95

95

100

>100

Tenability

35

As illustrated in Table 7, as the FDI and understory fuel loads increase, slope
has a greater effect on the separation distance required to achieve tenable
and operational conditions. This result was expected due to the relationship
in empirical modelling between rate of spread of which understory fuel load,
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FDI and slope are direct inputs, and the subsequent empirical radiation
model used to calculate radiant heat flux as described by Penney and
Stevenson [19].

In all scenarios presented, increased positive slope and

associated increase in fire behaviour decreases tenability and suppression
potential compared to equivalent siege wildfire burning over flat terrain.
74Table 7: Separation required for suppression and tenability thresholds – sensitivity to slope
Separation (m) required for suppression and tenability thresholds (5m increment data)
FDI
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90

0° Slope

10° Slope

15° Slope

20° Slope

Tenability

20

20

25

25

30

Suppression

45

50

55

60

65

Tenability

25

25

30

35

45

Suppression

55

60

70

80

85

Tenability

30

30

40

45

55

Suppression

65

70

80

95

>100

Tenability

35

40

50

60

70

Suppression

75

80

90

>100

>100

Tenability

35

40

50

60

70

Suppression

75

90

100

>100

>100

Tenability

40

45

55

65

80

Suppression

85

95

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

45

50

60

70

85

Suppression

90

100

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

45

55

65

75

90

Suppression

95

>100

>100

>100

>100

Tenability

50

60

70

80

100

100

>100

>100

>100

>100

50

60

75

85

>100

>100

>100

>100

>100

>100

Suppression

100

5° Slope

Tenability
Suppression

3.8 Discussion
By comparing the calculated fire behaviour outputs (RoS, IFL and LF) with the
associated base inputs of FDI, w and fuel age and comparing the results to
international wildfire suppression thresholds a single strategic guidance table
can be produced (Table 8). The result is that safe offensive strategies on the
head fire are identified as appropriate in only the mildest of conditions or
where fuel structure does not facilitate significant head fire propagation [19].
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It is important to note this guidance is intended for established siege wildfires
of significant proportion such as those reviewed by Keelty [70,71], Ferguson
[72] and the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission [73]. Smaller wildfires such
as those experienced within closed urban environments do not achieve the
same Heat Release Rates or produce the same behaviour outputs as
established wildfires [19] which may subsequently allow more aggressive
offensive suppression strategies and tactics. In these instances, as opposed
to utilising Table 8, it is necessary to apply the Vegetation Availability Factor
[19] when predicting potential wildfire behaviour and manually determining
whether suppression and tenability thresholds are exceeded.
Of concern is that existing operational wildfire suppression thresholds do not
systematically or quantifiably take account of wildfire behaviour (RoS, IFL and
LF) combined with the associated potential radiant heat flux received by
firefighters attempting suppression activities in a landscape scale wildfire
scenario.

Current fire behaviour-linked suppression guidelines do not

specifically address the tenability of environmental conditions in the proximity
of the flaming zone where firefighters are often working to suppress the fire.
Once tenability thresholds are considered it is evident that offensive, direct
attack on the head of large wildfires is extremely hazardous to firefighters
under all but the mildest of conditions.
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75Table 8: Wildfire head fire strategic and tactical suppression guide
Siege Wildfire Head Fire Suppression
FDI/w (t/ha)
10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

5

10

15

Legend

20

25

30

DM – Direct

DM

IA

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

machine

Fuel Age <

Fuel Age <

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

attack

5yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

IA

IA

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

IA – Indirect

Fuel Age <

Fuel Age <

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

attack

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Defensive

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

strategy

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

adopted

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

head

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

Consider flank

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

and

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

attacks where

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

suitable.

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Note:

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

DEFFM

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

Modelling

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

refer

to fuel

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

age.

For

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

McArthur use

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

FDI/w

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

DEF

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

Fuel Age ≥

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

10yrs

–

for
fire.
tail

For

3.9 Limitations
Validation of predictive modelling of large scale, chaotic and turbulent
wildfire is inherently problematic [19]. The scale of wildfires such as those
described in [49-51,79,80] combined with the ethical implications of human
experimentation [57] facilitates little if any available, reliable and relevant
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data. As a result, many of the wildfire models currently used by fire services
[14,17,31-34] have only been validated during low to mid intensity wildfire
experiments with their application extrapolated to wildfires of significantly
greater intensity. It must also be acknowledged that as this research relies
on the McArthur and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire models, it inherits their
associated potential weaknesses. Whilst this research attempts to address
this by comparing the results of the two models, future research using a
greater number of models may be of some benefit.

This research excludes the tenability within fire appliance cabins during a
wildfire burnover.

Whilst Knight, Brown and Leonard [39] provide some

insight into this area, the tenability of fire appliance cabins and the efficacy
of vehicle protective systems is identified as an area for future research. Whilst
advanced computer simulation may provide advanced analysis of the
potential performance of vehicle protective systems, the identified issue of
field validation would not be solved through such an approach.

It is

suggested the solution may lie in the installation of telemetry specifically
designed to capture radiant heat flux and GPS onto wildfire suppression
appliances coupled with real time accurate aerial fire line mapping. This
would not only allow existing models to be validated in the field, but would
also allow greater accuracy of investigations when burnovers occur.

Whilst there have been some advancements in the analysis of wildfire
suppression [25,49, ,69,74,75] and modelling at the urban interface [19,7678], further research is required. It is suggested this should occur through
greater investment by fire services completing research during active wildfire
suppression and enhanced analysis of wildfire models against actual wildfire
events. The potential difficulty and expense in completing the identified
research is acknowledged, however it should be considered an essential
component of enhancing wildfire suppression strategies and improving the
safety of frontline firefighters.
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3.10

Conclusion

This research in part addresses the several of the critical shortfalls of existing
research identified by Butler [49] in that it will assist improve firefighter
understanding of tenability in the wildland context, and that it provides
additional guidance regarding required firefighter safety zones. Through
analysis of international thresholds and analysis of forest fire behaviour using
both McArthur and DEFFM empirical models, this study identifies that even in
moderate forest understory fuel loads of 15 t/ha, an established siege wildfire
will result in untenable conditions at all FDIs within 10 m separation of the head
fire.

Within this 10 m separation from the headfire, conditions potentially

resulting in incapacitating burns within 60 seconds of exposure have been
shown to occur in 95% of wildfire scenarios assessed. This will inherently place
firefighters attempting to suppress the head of a siege wildfire in grave
danger in almost all circumstances and represents a significantly greater
“dead man zone” than is considered in current literature.

It is important to

note that while these findings apply to all fires, small urban wildfires do not
usually achieve the same Heat Release Rates, active flame depths or
produce the same behaviour outputs as large established wildfires [19] which
may facilitate more aggressive offensive suppression strategies and tactics
within the urban environment. When calculating wildfire behaviour in small
urban settings, the Vegetation Availability Factor detailed in [19] must be
applied before utilising the guidance provided by this research.
When attempting to suppress landscape scale wildfire, it may be more
appropriate for fire services to consider early instigation of indirect attack or
defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and clear
communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at
the head fire are not defendable.

It is suggested offensive strategies

involving personnel and appliances should be employed with caution after
detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, secondary to the increased
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use of aerial firefighting suppression.

Early adoption of this approach will

assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous
‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little
if any impact on the fire. Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the
approaching head fire and will assist to prevent unrealistic community
expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic wildfire events.
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Chapter 4 - Calculation of Critical Water Flow Rates for Wildfire
Suppression
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M., Carter, M.
(2019b).

Calculation of Critical Water Flow Rates for Wildfire Suppression.

Fire, 2 (3), 1-12, DOI: doi:10.3390/fire2010003

4.1. Abstract
Predicting water suppression requirements and its impacts on firefighting
strategies and logistics within the urban environment has been the subject of
many previous studies, however the same level of research has yet to be
applied in the realm of wildfire suppression. To work towards addressing this
knowledge gap, this paper provides guidance for Incident Controllers in
relation to critical water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across
a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths.
This is achieved through mathematical empirical analysis of water flow rates
required for head fire suppression during 540 simulated wildfires in forest
vegetation. This research applies a fire engineering approach to wildfire
suppression logistics and deterministically assess the suitability of appliance
and aircraft based head fire suppression. The results highlight the limitations
of offensive wildfire suppression involving direct head fire attacks by
appliances once wildfires attain a quasi-steady state in forest fuels.

4.2. Introduction
Globally various retardants are applied during wildfire suppression efforts, yet
water remains the primary extinguishing agent [1]. Whilst prediction of water
suppression requirements and its impacts on firefighting strategies and
logistics within the urban environment has been the subject of many previous
publications [2,3], the same level of research has yet to be applied in the field
of wildfire suppression [1]. With fire services around the globe advocating
offensive wildfire fighting strategies [4–9,10] heavily reliant the application of
both water and other suppressants, it is suggested this knowledge gap and
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a lack of suitable data may be impeding firefighting efforts of significant
wildfires, known as siege or campaign wildfires amongst fire services
internationally.
One of the major differences affecting data collection from major urban
structure fires and siege wildfires is that structure fires are inherently contained
and last a matter of hours whereas siege wildfires routinely consume
thousands of hectares of vegetation, multiple structures and last days if not
weeks. Using recent fires of note for comparison, even the devastating
Grenfell Tower fire of 14 June 2017 [11] did not result in the same scale of
destruction or require the extent of fire suppression resourcing of recent and
more frequent siege wildfires such as those experienced in California [12,13],
Greece [14] or Victoria [15] which required the mobilization of military or
international firefighting assistance.
For Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) and Incident Controllers (IC’s) to
develop and execute successful and safe suppression strategies it is critical
they are able to appropriately analyse and manage risk [16]. This not only
requires a comprehensive knowledge of wildfire behaviour, but also the
abilities and limitations of both firefighting personnel, appliances and aircraft.
Hindering the ability of the IMT’s and IC’s is a lack of formal evidence to
support operational decisions [10,17,18,19], with decision makers having to
rely on personal experience [16,20] and empirical wildfire behaviour or
suppression models which also have inherent limitations [1,21–23].
Existing water extinguishment models [1] have been validated against field
data from low intensity experimental burns with fire line intensities of less than
1 MWm−1 and flame lengths of less than 2.5 m. These experimental conditions
are far from the conditions faced during siege wildfire events which can
include fire line intensities of 88 MWm−1 and flame heights extending 10–20
m above the crowns of trees [24]. Further limiting the application of existing
research to dynamic emergency conditions is the lack of consideration for
the capabilities of firefighting vehicles and aircraft that have limited water
capacities and may be away from the active fire front for considerable
durations whilst they refill.
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To work towards addressing the identified knowledge gap, this paper builds
upon previous research [1] by applying a fire engineering deterministic
analysis of water flow rates required for head fire suppression during wildfires.
The aim of this study is to provide guidance for Incident Controllers in relation
to critical water flow rates required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide
range of forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths. The
impacts of the results on current suppression strategies and logistics are
discussed in order to facilitate enhanced effectiveness and safety of
operational response to siege wildfire incidents. In doing so, this paper
provides the critical connection between firefighting theory and practice
that is essential within the firefighting profession [19].

4.3. Materials and Methods
The prevention or extinguishment of fire through the application of water
occurs by three methods [1,2]:
1. Water is applied to fuel surfaces not yet involved in fire, preventing
pyrolysis and the production of combustion gases;
2. Water is applied directly into the flames, cooling the flame below
the critical temperature; or
3. Water is applied directly to the burning fuel surface, cooling the
fuel and resulting in a reduced pyrolysis rate and quenching of the
flames.
When considering active suppression efforts during high intensity bushfires
only surface cooling should be considered as evaporating water vapour is
rapidly dispersed and will not noticeably affect the flame temperature [1]. As
a result, by applying Fire Point Theory and accounting for external radiant
and convective heat flux, the critical flow rate (CF) in Lm−2s−1 (i.e. Litres per
square meter per second) can be calculated for the wildfire scenarios using
Equation (1) [1]. CF is the flow rate of water required to extinguish a burning
surface, with an infinite period of time available [19]. As the wildfire length
and depth of the active flame front changes over time and is influenced by
many factors including but not limited to terrain, wind, fuel structure and fuel
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geometry [21], the CF can only be calculated at a specific point in time. The
limitations of fire ground suppression, including appliance or aircraft capacity
and available must be considered and are addressed later in the report.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 +

𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 × 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

(1)

where 𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 is the critical water application rate assuming no external
heat flux, identified as ≈0.0129 Lm−2s−1 [1]; 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is the efficiency of water

application, representing the portion of water leaving the firefighting branch
which actually contributes to fire extinguishment, conservatively assumed to
be 0.7 [1]; 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is the enthalpy change of water, identified as 2640 kJkg−1;
𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸 is external heat flux, calculated using Equation (2),

0.27 × 𝐼𝐼
𝑞𝑞̇ ” 𝐸𝐸 = �
× 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏� + �ℎ × �𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 − 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ��
�2 × 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 + 𝐷𝐷�

(2)

Where 𝐼𝐼 is fire line intensity in kWm−1 calculated using Byram’s fire line

intensity equation [25], calculated using Equation (3); 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is flame length in m,
calculated using Equation (4); 𝐷𝐷 is depth of the active flame in m; 𝜏𝜏 is

atmospheric transmissivity, assumed to be 1 due to the proximity of the
unburned fuel in respect to the flames; 𝜙𝜙 is view factor, assumed to be 1 due

to the proximity of the unburned fuel in respect to the flames; h is the
convective heat transfer coefficient set at 0.077 kW/m2K assuming a forced
convection and air velocity at 10 ms−1 [1]; Tg is gas temperature of the flame,
assumed to be 1090 K, representative of siege wildfire conditions [22,26–29];
Tfuel is the fuel temperature of the fuel, assumed to be 588 K, being the ignition
surface temperature for pine-needle fuel beds [1].
The fire line intensity (I) is given by:
𝐼𝐼 =

𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
36

(3)

Where H is effective heat of combustion, assumed to be 18,600 kJkg−1 [22,26]
(noting this will vary with vegetation type); W is total fuel load in tha−1,
considering fine fuels typically less than 6 mm in diameter [22]; RoS is the
forward Rate of Spread corrected for slope in kmh−1, calculated using
Equation (5). Noting that terrain influences RoS, slope is assumed to be flat for
the purposes of the study.
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Flame length (Lf) is given by:
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 =

13𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.24𝑊𝑊
2

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0.0012(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑤𝑤

(4)
(5)

Where FDI is Forest Fire Danger Index, a dimensionless factor incorporating
the chance of a fire starting, its Rate of Spread, its intensity and the difficulty
of its suppression, according to various combinations of air temperature,
relative humidity, wind speed and both the long- and short-term drought
effects [26]; w is understorey fuel load and W is total fuel load in tha−1,
considering fine fuels typically less than 6mm in diameter [22].
Analysis included spreadsheet calculation of CF using Equation (1) across
variations of fuel load, FDI and active flame depth to simulate a large range
of wildfire conditions and scenarios. Six variations of forest understory fuel
loads at 5 tha−1 increments between 5–30 tha−1 with corresponding total fuel
loads between 15–40 tha−1 (Note: the assumption that the canopy
contributes 10 tha−1 [26] is retained) were simulated, representing a broad
spectrum of forest fuel loads [22]. Ten variations of FDI at increments of 10
between 10–100, identified as the 99.9th percentile of fire weather conditions
across Australia [22,30] were incorporated into the simulations. Nine variants
of active flame depth (D) were also modelled at 1m increments between 2–
10 m, representative of the optically thick head fire flame experienced during
severe wildfire events [22,26–28]. In total, 540 wildfire scenarios were
analysed. Calculations were confirmed using separate spreadsheets by the
research team. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities were
derived from technical literature [31–35] and discussions with technical
experts [36]. These capabilities are summarized in Table 1, with maximum
potential flow rates, representing best case scenario, selected for the study.
Deterministic analysis of calculated required CF to available flow rates was
completed. For the purposes of deterministic analysis, it is assumed that
appliances and aircraft can apply a uniform pattern of water to a 10 m
length of active head fire front [4–6,31–36]. These values can be easily
converted should different active head fire lengths be required.
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Incident Controllers utilise a number of wildfire behaviour thresholds including
Rate of Spread (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) to assess the suitability
and potential success of suppression strategies. However there is some
discrepancy between these thresholds and identification of suitable
suppression strategies [23]. In order to provide further guidance for Incident
Controllers and provide connection between firefighting theory and
practice, the findings were subsequently analysed to determine CF as
functions of these parameters.
76Table 1. Appliance and aircraft water suppression capabilities.
Type

Name

Aircraft-Rotary 1 [36]

Dauphin Type 2
Erikson S64E
Aircrane
AirTractor AT802F
Light Tanker

Aircraft-Rotary 2 [36]
Aircraft-Fixed wing 3 [36]
Appliance 4WD 4 [32–34]
Appliance 4WD 4,5 [31,33–
35]

1

Heavy Tanker

Water Capacity
(L)
1000–1200

Flow Rate (Ls−1)
~333–400

7560

~1512

3150
~500

~1050
2.5

~3000

3.8–7.9

Drop width ~6 m, drop length ~15 m, full deployment in 3 s; 2 Drop width >8

m, drop length ~30 m, full deployment in 5 s; 3 Drop width ~6 m, drop length
~30 m, full deployment in 3 s;

4

Branch jet spray width ~1 m;

5

700 L water

required for appliance sprinkler protection which activates at 3 Ls−1 from
each head.

4.4. Results
Illustrated in Figure 1a–f, critical flow (CF) rates per 10 m section of active
head fire range from 0.94 Ls−1 in a 2 m deep active flame front through
understorey fuels of 5 tha−1 at a FDI of 10 through to 21.10 Ls−1 in a 10 m deep
active flame front through understorey fuels of 30 tha−1 at an FDI of 100. Note:
As described above, this study assumes appliances and aircraft can apply a
uniform pattern of water to a 10 m length of active head fire front and the
results are presented on this basis.
Deterministic analysis of required CF to available CF identifies that a single
Light Tanker cannot apply the required flow rate to 10 m section of wildfire
front once an active flame depth of 6 m is attained, irrespective of fuel loads
and FDI. Prior to the active head fire attaining a 6 m depth, in limited Light
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Tankers can engage in head fire suppression for a duration of 200 s in limited
circumstances. Larger appliances such as the Heavy Tanker have a
maximum flow rate of 7.9 Ls−1 and can supply enough water to extinguish at
10 m section of active wildfire front at all FDI’s in understorey fuel loads of 5
tha−1. As conditions worsen, the capacity of a single Heavy Tanker to
extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire rapidly diminishes. With
significantly higher capabilities, all aircraft assessed are found to provide
enough flow rates to extinguish a 10 m section of active head fire, regardless
of flame depth, FDI or understorey fuel load. Whilst Figure 1a–f may assist
Incident Controllers to determine the suitability of wildfire suppression
strategies, the full application of these findings, including the impacts on the
logistics of siege wildfire suppression is explored in the Discussion section of
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88Figure 1. Critical flow, (CF) per 10 m length of head fire across the selected range of FDI’s
for Forest with surface fuel loads (w) of: (a) 5 tha−1; (b) 10 tha−1; (c) 15 tha−1; (d) 20 tha−1; (e)
25 tha−1; (f) 30 tha−1.

CF as functions of (RoS), intensity (I) and flame length (Lf) are illustrated in
Figures 2–4. This also enabled CF as a function of active flame depth (CFD) to
be expressed as equations of the corresponding the fire behaviour,
summarized in Table 2. The advantages of this approach are:
1. The analysis incorporates the full spectrum of fire weather
conditions and understorey fuel loads. Therefore the CF can be
rapidly estimated by Incident Controllers without requiring current
or predicted fire weather conditions (an essential component for
calculating FDI) or understorey fuel loads (w) which may vary
across the landscape. Both these inputs are required for
calculating CF refer to Equations (1)–(5); and
2. It provides Incident Controllers both visual and mathematical tools
to assess the potential suitability of suppression strategies.
The limitation of this approach is that as wildfire behaviour intensifies the
power functions appeared to under-predict CF at active flame depths
greater than 6m compared to using Fire Point Theory and Equation (1)
directly. This may be explained however as the equations are trend lines of
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the data, which are influenced by the somewhat clustered data at lower
levels of wildfire behaviour.
77Table 2. CFd as functions of Rate of Spread, intensity and flame length.

Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1)
Active Flame Depth (m)
Function
2
CF2 = 2.72 RoS0.42
3
CF3 = 3.97 RoS0.43
4
CF4 = 5.12 RoS0.44
5
CF5 = 6.24 RoS0.44
6
CF6 = 7.23 RoS0.45
7
CF7 = 8.30 RoS0.45
8
CF8 = 9.23 RoS0.45
9
CF9 = 10.20 RoS0.45
10
CF10 = 11.11 RoS0.46
Intensity, I (kWm−1)
Active Flame Depth (m)
Function
2
CF2 = 0.11(I)0.33
3
CF3 = 0.15(I)0.34
4
CF4 = 0.12(I)0.35
5
CF5 = 0.22(I)0.35
6
CF6 = 0.24(I)0.36
7
CF7 = 0.27(I)0.36
8
CF8 = 0.30(I)0.36
9
CF9 = 0.32(I)0.36
10
CF10 = 0.35(I)0.36
Flame Length, Lf (m)
Active Flame Depth (m)
Function
2
CF2 = 0.64 Lf0.62
3
CF3 = 0.90 Lf0.63
4
CF4 = 1.14 Lf0.65
5
CF5 = 1.35 Lf0.65
6
CF6 = 1.56 Lf0.66
7
CF7 = 1.74 Lf0.67
8
CF8 = 1.93 Lf0.67
9
CF9 = 2.11 Lf0.68
10
CF10 = 2.28 Lf0.68
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89Figure 2. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of head
fire Rate of Spread, RoS (kmh−1).
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90Figure 3. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of
intensity, I (kWm−1).
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91Figure 4. Critical flow rates at various active flame depths, CFD (Ls−1), as a function of flame
length, Lf (m)

4.5. Sensitivity
Sensitivity to variations in the base inputs was conducted to evaluate how
they influence CF. To complete the sensitivity analysis the following inputs
were assumed: FDI = 80, w = 25 tha−1, W = 35 tha−1, D = 4 m, Lf = 19.8 m, I =
43,000 kWm−1, h = 0.077 kW/m2K, Tg = 1090 K, Tfuel = 588 K, 𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 = 0.7, 𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤

= 2640 kJkg−1, 𝑚𝑚̇” 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0 ≈ 0.0129 Lgm−2s−1, 𝜏𝜏 = 0.8, 𝜙𝜙 = 0.8. As the effects of

FDI, fuel load (and thereby Lf and I due to the mathematical relationships

identified in Equations (3)–(5)) and flame depth are investigated throughout
the study, sensitivity to the remaining inputs was assessed by decreasing and
increasing the subject base input by 20%, all other inputs as assumed. The
results are summarized in Table 3. With the exception of 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜙𝜙, there was

little if any change to CF as a result of a 20% to the base input. It is worth
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noting that in the context of wildfire where the fuel and the flame are in close
proximity, both 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜙𝜙 should be set at 1 [1].
78Table 3. Sensitivity analysis.

Input
% Change to Base Input % Change to Critical Flow (CF)
h
±20%
±1%
Tg
±20%
±2%
Tfuel
±20%
±1%
𝜂𝜂𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
±20%
±1%
𝐿𝐿𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
±20%
±1%
”
𝑚𝑚̇ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,0
±20%
±0%
𝜏𝜏
±20%
±24%
𝜙𝜙
±20%
±24%

4.6. Validation
Validation of predictive suppression modelling against large scale, chaotic
and turbulent wildfire is inherently problematic. The scale of wildfires such as
those described in [12–15] combined with the limited suitability of suppression
strategies [23] and lack of technology available to capture both the
efficiency and total application of water [31,32,35,36] during wildfire
suppression facilitates little if any available, reliable and relevant data. As a
result, like many of the wildfire studies and models currently used by fire
services [21,37–42], validation of the methodology applied in this study has
been only completed for low-intensity wildfire experiments [1].
Hansen [1] reported that whilst experimental values matched ‘very well’ the
calculated CF for red pine needles, however in balsam fir slash and black
spruce slash the calculated and experimental values did not align well. One
of the reasons identified for this occurrence was the variance in flame length
and active flame depth through slash compared to that experienced in the
fine fuels of pine needles. It should be noted that Equations (3)–(5) applied in
this study assume fine fuel involvement only. Another reason for the potential
disagreement between experimental slash values and calculated values
was identified as the inability of Byram’s active flame depth equation [1]. The
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methods applied in this report require visual identification of active flame
depth which may assist eliminate this issue.
In order to further validate this study during large wildfires the following is
recommended:
1. real time fire appliance and aircraft telemetry that records active
fire suppression time, water application rates and location;
2. enhanced quantitative measurement of wildfire behaviour such as
that available through aerial intelligence and analysis [36];
3. further experimental study in scaled controlled wildfires through
natural vegetation structures with a specific focus on CF
requirements.
The potential difficulty and expense in completing the identified research is
acknowledged, however it should be considered an essential component of
enhancing wildfire suppression strategies and thereby reducing the impacts
of wildfire on the greater community.

4.7. Discussion
The results demonstrate small firefighting appliances such as light tankers
cannot deliver sufficient water flow rates to extinguish wildfire, regardless of
FDI, once the active flame depth reaches 2.5 m in typical Woodland fuels of
w = 15 tha−1 or 3 m in typical Forest fuels of w = 25 tha−1 [22,26]. In larger
appliances with higher delivery capacities, the required CF cannot be
achieved once the active flame depth reaches approximately 5 m with an
FDI of 40. All aircraft reviewed are capable of achieving the required CF.
However, they remain restricted by the inherent limitations of availability, turn
around, restricted ability to operate at night where they may be most
effective due to reduced fire behaviour, and the increasing presence of
privately operated drones over fire grounds which requires the cessation of
aerial suppression on safety grounds [36].
In translating the theory to practical application during a wildfire emergency,
Figure 1a–f may assist Incident Controllers quickly determine the suitability of
appliance-based suppression strategies where fuel load, FDI and active
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flame depth are known. In jurisdictions that do not rely on FDI or surface fuel
loads, it is suggested Table 2 (with an appropriate safety factor) may be
suitable to provide a deterministic assessment required CF to available CF,
and therefore determine whether ground suppression efforts are potentially
suitable. Used in conjunction with existing suppression thresholds and newer
thresholds that consider radiant heat flux and firefighter tenability [23], these
results will assist provide greater justification for the selection of appropriate
wildfire suppression strategies.
The results also demonstrate the importance of active flame depth when
analyzing wildfire severity and the suitability of suppression strategies. In
addition to having a significant impact on CF as shown in this study, the depth
of the active flame front has significant effects on emissivity and
subsequently, radiant heat flux [22,23]. It is therefore proposed that active
flame depth may be a better measure of wildfire intensity than the traditional
measures of RoS, intensity or Lf utilized internationally. Where active flame
depths remain less than 3 m, traditional suppression strategies may remain
suitable as long as firefighter tenability is considered and due care is
exercised.
In order to meet the required CF to extinguish a wildfire in accordance with
the assumptions applied in this research, firefighters must be able to have
appliances consistently attacking each 10m section of wildfire. Whilst it is not
in any way suggested incident logistics is as simplistic as providing a single
suitable ground appliance for every 10 m section of fire front, it may be
applied for determining initial resourcing turnout to developing wildfires that
have the potential to grow into siege wildfire dimensions.

4.8. Conclusions
This study provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to CF required
to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of forest fuel loads, fire
weather and active fire front depths. Perhaps the greatest ramification of the
results is the need to reexamine the use of aerial and appliance suppression
in high fire intensity conditions. The use of ground based appliances remains
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vital in suppression of wildfires. However, in both forest and woodland fuel
structures, and when faced with siege wildfire behavior with active flame
depths across the head fire greater than 3 m, increased reliance on aerial
suppression may be required to deliver the CF necessary to impact the head
fire and have any effect on the forward Rate of Spread. In reality of this will
require greater investment to ensure that fuel loads adjacent or near
congregations of high value assets are prevented from reaching the
thresholds that support this level of fire intensity. Fire services investment in
improved technologies that supports night time aerial suppression operations
during periods of reduced fire behaviour is also suggested. Where aerial
resourcing is limited, strategies such as guiding head fire direction and preemptive line building adjacent to existing fuel breaks such as major roads,
supported by appliance based suppression may provide enhanced
outcomes compared to reliance on head fire suppression alone.
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Chapter 5 - Improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and
burnover: an analysis of vehicle protection systems.
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M. (under review).
Improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and burnover: an analysis
of vehicle protection systems. Fire Safety Journal

5.1. Abstract
When attempting to suppress severe wildfire the possibility for firefighting
crews to be overrun by wildfire, known as entrapment and burnover,
remains

a catastrophic

and

all

too

common occurrence.

While

improvements have been made to vehicle protection systems to increase
the safety of firefighters caught in burnover, the potential effectiveness of
these systems remains limited. This study involved systematic analysis of 62
historical entrapment and burnover reports from the USA, Australian and
New Zealand from 1978 to 2020 (Phase 1), and 135 simulated wildfires
encompassing the 99th percentile of Australian fire weather conditions, fuel
structures and terrain (Phase 2).

Analysis of historical entrapments

identified existing vehicle protection systems have failure points well below
the reported Fire Danger Index associated with the majority of house loss
during wildfire events in Australia. Increasing the performance threshold of
vehicle protection systems to the historical mean fire line intensity identified
at the point of entrapment increased efficacy, and, prevented vehicle
protection systems being overwhelmed in simulations regardless of Fire
Danger Index and up to windspeeds of 55 kmh-1.

In order to further

improve firefighter protection during entrapment and burnover it is
recommended the radiant heat flux performance threshold of vehicle
protection systems are increased..

5.2. Introduction
Firefighters are regularly required to protect life, property and areas of
natural significance from destructive wildfires. A combination of offensive
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and defensive strategies are usually necessary, selected depending on the
fire behaviour, availability of resources, access to the fire, and fuel structure
itself [1-13]. Offensive strategies include direct head fire or flank fire attack
(Figure 1) and typically require firefighters to apply suppressants from hand
held attack lines or machine monitors. An alternate offensive strategy, the
parallel attack, is where firefighters fall back some safe distance, construct
containment lines parallel to the fire line and then burn out the intervening
vegetation. Defensive strategies are employed when the fire behaviour is too
intense to be safely attacked with active fire suppression.

Defensive

strategies include building containment lines, backburning, defending
properties and focusing on evacuation of people and livestock [6,12,13].

92Figure 1. Direct attack on the head fire (left) vs direct attack on the flank (right) (Source:
DFES, 2014, p10-11).

During wildfire operations the use of inappropriate suppression tactics [10]
or sudden changes in wind direction [14,15] can result in firefighters being
directly caught by wildfire smoke and fire, a situation known as entrapment.
The occurrence of wildfire flame directly impacting firefighters is known as
burnover.

The threat posed from entrapment and burnover is significant

and has resulted in 411 firefighter deaths in the USA from 1910 to 2006 [16], 92
Australian firefighter deaths from 1901 to 2011 [17] and 165 Canadian
firefighter deaths between 1941 and 2010 [18]. In many cases multiple
fatalities resulted from a single entrapment and burnover.

The causes

entrapment and burnover are well known [19], although more recent studies
have increased this understanding by defining human factors and fire
behaviour leading up to these events [14,15,20-24].
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In an effort to improve firefighter safety and aiming to protect the integrity
of firefighting vehicles, enabling escape and improving the tenability for
entrapped occupants, Australian fire services have invested in vehicle
protection systems (VPS).
Vehicle protection systems include [25,26] (figure 2):
1. Installation of deluge sprinklers, drop down thermal shielding blankets
and personal fire blankets;
2. Protect components essential to vehicle mobility against thermal
damage, through shielding, relocation and lagging;
3. Protect components critical to firefighting against thermal damage,
through shielding, relocation and lagging;
4. Ensuring the cabin is a suitable refuge and provides a continuous
enclosure of non-combustible materials through:
i.
removal of wheel arches, mudguards, step shrouds, cabin
body aesthetic panels, side mirror mounts, door handles,
backing plates and underbody panels; or
ii.
Where this is not possible, making these products fire resistant;
5. Protection of windows that are not essential for vision including the
replacement of rear and side rear windows with solid panels;
6. Adding infill panels between the cabin and the vehicle tray; and
7. Modifying the air-conditioning system to prevent smoke and heated
gases entering the cabin.

(a)

(b)

(c)

93Figure 2. Burnover protection systems (a) Drop down shielding blanket deployed
(DFES, 2013c); (b) Firefighter under a personal fire blanket (DFES, 2013f); (c) Typical
wildfire fighting appliance showing position of side deluge sprays (DFES, 2013a).
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The vehicle protection system deluge sprays are designed to [25]:
1. Prevent glass failure, i.e. to ensure integrity of the cabin;
2. Cool the cabin to reduce occupant heat exposure; and
3. Cool the tyres to reduce risk of ignition.
The deluge system is required to be activated from the cabin, operate for
a minimum of 5 minutes from the time the ‘crew protection water alert’
sounds which occurs once water tank reserves reach 600 L, and to have a
nominal flow rate of 120 Lmin-1 with a flow pressure of 3 bar [25]. An audible
and visual warning device alerts crews once they have reached the deluge
system reserve capacity, however the crew can continue to utilise this
reserve without restriction. Not all appliances can be fitted with deluge
systems. For instance Light Tankers, a small four wheel drive appliance with
a 500 L water tank, cannot be fitted with deluge systems due to insufficient
water capacity to generate the required protection duration and existing
vehicle weight restrictions [26,27].
Limited field experimentation has been completed [28,29] and the
inherent danger of wildfire suppression during elevated fire weather
conditions has prevented the potential effectiveness of vehicle protection
systems being suitably quantified in full scale field experimentation.
Addressing this gap is vital and forms a critical component of thorough fire
engineering safety analysis [30-33].

Current external vehicle protection

systems utilised in Australian fire service vehicles incorporate drop down
thermal shielding blankets and sprinkler deluge systems have been tested
against fire line intensities of between 2,500-10,000 kWm-1 and designed to
withstand 7,500 kWm-1 [33]. In similar tests, Nichols et al. [34] reported that
cabin tenability was maintained when simulated fire line intensities of up to
12,000 kWm-1 were maintained for up to 14 seconds when water spray
protection systems were used in conjunction with window radiation shields,
whilst Sargeant et al. [35, p7] reported that
“In general vehicle orientated front on remained tenable at radiation
levels up to 30 kWm-2. while side on and rear facing vehicles lost integrity
at around 10 to 15 kWm-2”
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By comparison forensic wildfire analysis [36] and field experimentation
[37,38,39] identified fire line intensities of up to 88,000 kWm-1 and radiant heat
fluxes in excess of 100 kWm-2 can be experienced for longer durations during
landscape scale wildfires, far exceeding the limits of crew protection systems
[34].
The potential effectiveness of vehicle protection systems in providing an
adequate

level

unquantified.

of

fireifghter

protection

during

burnover

remains

Without validation firefighters may overestimate their

personal safety during wildfire suppression based on the belief they will be
adequately protected.

The objective of this study is to address this

knowledge gap and provide further guidance the potential effectiveness of
vehicle protection systems in improving firefighter tenability
entrapment and burnover.

during

This is achieved by systematic analysis of

historical entrapments and burnover (Phase 1) and simulated wildfires
encompassing the 99th percentile of weather conditions and forest fuel loads
(Phase 2).
In order to verify the effectiveness of fire safety systems clear objectives
and performance criteria must be defined [30,31,40].

Effectiveness is

defined as the product of fire safety system efficacy and reliability [41].
Efficacy is the degree to which a system achieves its objective, a factor of
1.00 signifies the system achieves all objectives. Reliability is the probability
that the system operates as required, a factor of 1.00 signifies 100% reliability.
The objective of vehicle protection systems (VPS) is to increase the tenability
of firefighters during vehicle entrapment and burnover. For the purposes of
the study the performance criteria (PC) required to meet this objective were
subsequently defined as:
PC1.
PC2.
PC3.

VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than 7,500 kWm-1 (the current rating of VPS);
VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than 10,000 kWm-1 (the maximum intensity VPS
have been tested to);
VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than 12,000 kWm-1 (maximum short duration
intensity VPS can withstand);
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PC4.

PC5.

PC6.

VPS is determined to have worked effectively where fire line
intensity (I) is less than the mean historical upper reported /
calculated intensity for all entrapments resulting in fatality or
injury;
VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant
heat flux (RHF) is less than 15 kWm-2, assuming vehicles are
orientated side on or with the rear to the advancing headfire;
and
VPS is determined to have worked effectively where radiant
heat flux (RHF) is less than 30 kWm-2, assuming vehicles orientated
front on to the advancing headfire.

5.3. Phase 1 – Historical burnover analysis

International safety reports and coronial inquiries were reviewed to identify
occurrences of firefighter injury or fatality during wildfire suppression and
extract wildfire behaviour at the time of impact. Wildfire behaviour at the
time of impact was subsequently deterministically evaluated against defined
VPS fire line intensity and radiant heat flux performance thresholds.
To increase the number of burnover events for analysis, inclusion criteria for
initial investigation were broad, with the search terms of entrapment; fire;
firefighter; burnover; wildfire; or bushfire (being the Australian term for wildfire)
applied.
permitted.

Databases were searched as far back as electronic records
The full text of the studies identified by the searchers were

retrieved, references were screened for additional papers and a further
selection process undertaken (Table 1). During the second review of the
selected reports, the search terms fatality; injury; intensity; spread; rate; flame;
and length were applied to refine results.

As the research specifically

related to entrapment and burnover during wildfire suppression incidents
arising from prescribed burns were excluded.
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79Table 1. Data collection and analysis summary.

Source

Available Reports
reports

Coroner Court of New South Wales 19792020 [42]
Coroner Court of Queensland 2004-2020

Reports

identified included
during

after

first

second

review

review

560

14

0

802

17

0

1760

50

0

7

0

1

0

5

1 (F)

415

25 (F)

[43]
Coroners Court of Victoria 2008-2020 [44]

Coroners Court of Tasmania 2015-2018 307
[45]
Coroners Court of South Australia 2016- 678
2020 [46]
Coroners Court of Western Australia 2014- 323
2019 [47]
Fire Sciences Lab Merged Entrapment 415
Database [48]
Fire services literature, ResearchGate and 11

186 (Inj)
11

2 (F)

referenced papers
Note: (F) indicates incident with fatality; (INJ) indicates incident with injury
only
Data pertaining to fire line intensity (I), headfire rate of spread (RoS) and
flame length (Lf) was extrapolated from each report. Where intensity was not
directly reported at the point of entrapment and burnover, but either rate of
spread or flame length was reported, intensity was calculated using
equations (1) to (8) as appropriate and fuel load values detailed in Australian
Standard AS3959 Construction of buildings in bushfire prone areas [49],
subsequently referred to as AS3959. Heat of combustion of 18,600 kJkg-1 was
selected for the analysis, being within the values detailed in table 2. Reports
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were excluded if insufficient detail regarding fire line intensity, head fire rate
of spread or flame length to extract or calculate wildfire intensity was
available.

All reports included in the study are detailed in Appendix 1.

Performance Criteria 1 to 4 were deterministically assessed against fire line
intensity at the point of entrapment and burnover.
The assumptions associated with the modelling are:
1. The term wildfire fuel is broadly applied to the vegetation
potentially consumed by a fire burning in vegetation, regardless of
the active fire area itself [50-57]. Wildfire fuel is defined by its
physical structure and properties which are represented by
numerical inputs relevant to the appropriate model being applied
and classified into set vegtation categories [50,51]. For the
purposes of this research, wildfire fuel is considered to be the fine
fuels, typically less than 6mm in diameter, that will be consumed by
the approaching headfire. Vegetation categories are defined in
accordance with AS3959 [49] as Forest, Woodland, Scrub, Shrub
and Grass;
2. Pyrolysis of vegetation and combustion of turbulent diffusion flames
of a bushfire front is extremely complex. Existing empirical models
rely heavily on the assumption that radiation is overwhelmingly
responsible for heat transfer between the flame and the receiving
body [38,39,50,57,58]. It is assumed the fire front is geometrically
represented by a uniform parallelepiped the width of the head fire
(figure 3), with sufficient flame depth for the flame emissivity to
reach at least 0.8 (identified as being greater than 5 m and
potentially deeper than 10 m) [13,59,60], and flame length
dependent on associated fire modelling that assumes the fire has
attained a quasi-steady rate of spread (RoS) [1,57,61]. The assumed
flame geometry is commonly known as the “radiant heat panel”,
with the horizontal position of the panel considered to be located
below the midpoint between the base and tip of the flame front
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(fig 3) [13,57,61]. Both the flame temperature and emissivity are
assumed to be consistent across the panel, whilst the receiving
body is assumed to be aligned perpendicular to the approaching
fire front [49,50].

Radiant heat flux is the radiation in kWm-2

received by a body at a specified distance from the radiant heat
panel, considering any shielding and the spectral properties of
both the fire and the firefighter, vehicle, house etc. [13,50,62]
3. Dold, Zinoviev and Leslie [63] describe wildfires as eruptive and
unstable combustion involving a process of dynamic interaction
between rate of spread, flame length and fire line intensity. The
mathematical relationship between wildfire behaviour, flame
geometry and radiant heat flux described in AS3959 [49] is
explained and expanded in equations (1) to (9); and
4. A critical component of the fireline intensity is the heat of
combustion (H), defined as the amount of heat released when a
unit quantity of fuel is oxidized completely to yield stable end
products [32]. Values for H for common types of vegetation are
identified in Table 2.

Australian Standard 3959 [49] details that

intensity (I), in kWm-1 and corrected for slope, is calculated using
Byram’s fireline intensity equation.

𝐼𝐼 = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)/36

(1)

Where H is the heat of combustion (kJkg-1), shown in table 1, W is total fuel
load (tha-1) and RoS is the head fire rate of spread in kmh-1.
80Table 2. Heat of Combustion.
Fuel
Wood (European Beech)
Wood (Ponderosa Pine)
Australian vegetation

Heat of Combustion (kJ/kg)
19500
19400
18600

Source
(SFPE,2008, Table 1-5.3)
(SFPE,2008, Table 1-5.3)
(AS3959)
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In forest and woodland vegetation Lf is calculated by:
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 =

13𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.24𝑊𝑊
2

(2)

We rearrange equation 1 and substituting it for RoS provides:
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 =

13 �36𝐼𝐼�𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻� + 0.24𝑊𝑊
2

Therefore:
𝐼𝐼 =

𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻�2𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 − 0.24𝑊𝑊�
468

(3)

(4)

For scrub and shrub vegetation structures, Lf is calculated by:
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 = 0.0775𝐼𝐼0.46

(5)

We rearrange this equation, enabling I to be calculated by:
2.2
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓
�
𝐼𝐼 = �
0.0775

(6)

In grassland vegetation, Lf is calculated by:
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 = 1.192 �

𝐼𝐼
�
1000

0.5

(7)

We rearrange this equation, enabling I to be calculated by:
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 2
�
𝐼𝐼 = 1000 �
1.192

(8)

Radiant heat flux is calculated for all vegetation structures using the
equation:
𝑞𝑞 = 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏

(9)

where 𝑞𝑞 is the radiant heat flux in kW/m2, 𝜏𝜏 is the atmospheric transmissivity,
𝐸𝐸 is the flame emissive power in kW/m2 and 𝜙𝜙 is the view factor.
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94Figure 3. Geometrical representation of the wildfire headfire. The radiant heat
panel (left) and flame geometry (right)

Of the 4,856 reports initially reviewed, 4,336 were excluded as they did not
meet the initial inclusion criteria. Of the remaining 520 reports, 56 reports
were excluded because they did not involve a fatality or injury; two reports
were excluded because they detailed accidents unrelated to entrapment
(one structure fire propane tank explosion and one ATV rollover); eight reports
were excluded as they related to controlled burns; and 392 reports were
excluded because they contained insufficient information to extract or
calculate fire line intensity. A total of 62 reports were included in the final
study, 42% (n=26) containing firefighter fatalities and 58% (n=36) reports
containing firefighter injuries only.
By vegetation, forest fuel structures accounted for approximately 62%
(n=16) of fatal entrapments, scrub 23% (n=6), shrub 7.5% (n=2) and grassland
7.5% (n=2).

For entrapments involving injury only, forest accounted for

approximately 25% (n=9) of incidents, woodlands 14%

(n=5), scrub 11%

(n=4), shrub 17% (n=6) and grassland 33% (n=12).
For all entrapments resulting in either fatality or injury, forest accounted for
approximately 40% (n=25) of incidents, woodlands 9% (n=5), scrub 16%
(n=10), shrub 13% (n=8) and grassland 22% (n=14). Wildfire behaviour (lower
and upper reported / calculated values) during entrapments and burnover
at the time of fatality, injury and all incidents is detailed in Table 3, with
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distribution across all incidents illustrated in Figure 4.

The highest RoS by

vegetation type was Forest 8.3ms-1, Woodland 4.53 ms-1, Scrub 7.23 ms-1,
Shrub 6.73 ms-1, and Grass 5.63 ms-1. The highest intensity and flame length
occurred in planation Forest fires during fatal entrapments, with the highest
reported intensity being 249,226 kWm-1, the highest calculated intensity being
318,990 kWm-1 and the largest flame length being reported as between 45.7
to 61 m. The mean (μ) upper reported / calculated intensity across all
entrapments was 64,453 kWm-1 and was subsequently adopted as the
intensity threshold for Performance Criteria 4. Acknowledging the limitations
and assumptions of the wildfire models used in the study, these figures are
consistent with explosive wildfire behaviour over short runs [1,64].
81Table 3. Wildfire behaviour at point of impact during entrapments resulting in injury or
fatality, showing minimum and maximum reported or calculated values, mean (μ) and
standard deviation (σ).
Fatality only incidents
Wildfire behaviour
min
max
-1
RoS lower reported value (ms )
0.1
7.2
RoS upper reported value (ms-1)
0.1
8.3
-1
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm )
1012
318990
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm-1) 3113
318990
LF lower reported value (m)
1.8
45.7
LF upper reported value (m)
3.0
61
Injury only incidents
Wildfire behaviour
min
max
-1
RoS lower reported value (ms )
0.2
4.5
RoS upper reported value (ms-1)
0.2
6.7
-1
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm )
253
209250
-1
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm ) 850
227850
LF lower reported value (m)
0.6
45.7
LF upper reported value (m)
1.2
76.2
All incidents considered
Wildfire behaviour
min
max
-1
RoS lower reported value (ms )
0.1
7.2
-1
RoS upper reported value (ms )
0.1
8.3
I lower reported / calculated value (kWm-1)
253
318990
-1
I upper reported / calculated value (kWm ) 850
318990
LF lower reported value (m)
0.6
45.7
LF upper reported value (m)
1.2
76.2

μ
2.0
2.3
68523
83545
13.7
19.8

σ
2.1
2.4
87142
85912
13.0
18.5

μ
1.5
2.2
32937
50664
8.5
11.8

σ
1.4
1.8
7481
60349
10.9
15.5

μ
1.8
2.2
47860
64453
10.6
15.0

σ
1.8
2.1
67687
73373
11.9
17.1
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(a) RoS all incidents by vegetation

(b) Intensity all incidents by vegetation
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(c) LF all incidents by vegetation
95Figure 4. Wildfire behaviour all incidents by vegetation type (a) RoS; (b) Intensity;
(c) LF

Efficacy is the ability of a fire safety system to successfully achieve its
required objective, assuming it functions as intended [32,40,41].

Table 4

details the efficacy of vehicle protection systems against Performance
Criteria 1 to 4 using the results from the historical entrapments analysed.
Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity 7,500 kWm1

(i.e. Performance Criteria 1) have an efficacy between 0.12 to a maximum

of 0.36. An increase in efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 is observed when vehicle
protection systems performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10,000 kWm-1,
are considered. Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an
intensity of 12,000 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an
efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.

Applying Performance Criteria 4 (i.e.

performance threshold equal to the mean historical upper recorded /
calculated intensity of 64453 kWm-1), efficacy of vehicle protection systems
increases to between 0.62 to 0.81. By comparison, Yung (2008) reports the
efficacy of sprinklers in suppressing a ‘large’ fire in buildings as between 0.89
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to 1.00, with an overall effectiveness (efficacy multiplied by reliability) of 0.77
to 0.96.

In conjunction with the analysis of historical entrapments, this

suggests that existing vehicle protection systems may be unreliable in
protecting

vehicle

occupants

from

entrapment

and

burnover.

Improvements in vehicle protection system efficacy could be achieved by
increasing the performance standard they are required to meet, whilst further
research into the reliability of vehicle protection systems will facilitate greater
understanding of overall effectiveness.
82Table 4. Vehicle protection system efficacy based on historical entrapments considering
lower and upper recorded / calculated intensity.
Fatality only incidents (n=26)
Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)
Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)
Performance Criteria
PC 1 (intensity <7500kWm-1)
PC 2 (intensity <10000kWm-1)
PC 3 (intensity <12000kWm-1)
PC 4 (intensity <64453kWm-1)

lower intensity
0.19 (n=5)
0.31 (n=8)
0.31 (n=8)
0.69 (n=18)
Injury only incidents (n=36)
lower intensity
0.36 (n=13)
0.42 (n=15)
0.47 (n=17)
0.81 (n=29)
All incidents (n=62)
lower intensity
0.29 (n=18)
0.37 (n=23)
0.42 (n=26)
0.76 (n=47)

upper intensity
0.12 (n=3)
0.12 (n=3)
0.12 (n=3)
0.62 (n=16)
upper intensity
0.22 (n=8)
0.28 (n=10)
0.33 (n=12)
0.67 (n=24)
upper intensity
0.18 (n=11)
0.21 (n=13)
0.24 (n=15)
0.66 (n=41)

5.4. Phase 2 – Design wildfire analysis

Where full scale fire safety systems testing is prohibitive (e.g. testing vehicle
protection systems against an out of control wildfire in elevated fire weather
conditions), fire safety systems analysis using design fire simulation is required
[30-32].

Design fires are prescribed fires that can be used by fire protection
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engineers for performance-based fire safety designs [40]. Parameters and
justification for the design wildfire simulated in the study are detailed in Table
6. Modelling was completed using the methodology described in AS3959
Construction of buildings in bushfire prone areas Annexure B [49] which
details the calculation of wildfire Rate of Spread (RoS), intensity (I) and
radiant heat flux (RHF) for multiple vegetation structures. This approach
enabled vehicle protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 1 to 6
(i.e. intensities of 7,500 kWm-1, 10,000 kWm-1, 12,000 kWm-1, 64,453 kWm-1; and
radiant heat flux of 15 kWm-2 and 30 kWm-2) to be assessed across Forest,
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland fuel structures, fuel loads, forest and
grassland fire danger indices, windspeeds, slope and fuel age.
83Table 6. Design wildfire specifications AS3959 Annexure B simulations
Component

Model / Value

Wildfire
models

AS3959 Annexure B

Vegetation

Forest, Woodland,
Scrub, Shrub &
Grassland

Fire Danger
Index (FDI)

10-100

Grassland Fire
Danger Index
(GFDI)

50-130

Justification
Acknowledging the limitations of empirical models [65] the
models selected are those currently used by fire services
across Australia [10,65] as well as the Australian Building
Codes Board [67,68] by adopting Australian Standard 3959
[49]. They have also been successfully utilised in recent
related research [10,50], and are therefore considered
suitable for the study.
Captures all fuel structures associated with historical
entrapment and burnover. Understory fuel loads (w), total
fuel loads (W), vegetation heights (VH) and wind speed (V)
sourced AS3959 [49] Table B3:
Forest: w = 25tha-1; W = 35tha-1;
Woodland: w = 15tha-1; W = 25tha-1;
Scrub: w = 25tha-1; W = 25tha-1; VH = 3m; V = 45kmh-1;
Shrub: w = 15tha-1; W = 15tha-1; VH = 1.5m; V = 45kmh-1;
Grassland: w = 4.5tha-1; W = 4.5tha-1
Sensitivity analysis completed for W at 10% increments for
Forest and Woodland, assuming flat slope and FDI = 80.
Additional radiant heat flux sensitivity analysis was
completed for Forest and Woodland for w at 5tha-1
increments across all Fire Danger Indices.
Assessed at increments of 10.
Represents the 99th
percentile of fire weather conditions [69] across Australia.
Note: only applicable to Forest and Woodland.
Represents the 99th percentile of fire weather conditions
[69] across Australia. Note: only applicable to Grassland.
GFDI distribution in accordance with AS3959 [49] default
values.
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Heat of
Combustion
(HC)
Flame
temperature
(TF)

18600kJkg-1

Within ranges reported in AS3959[49] and the SFPE
Handbook [32]

1090K

Within the wildfire flame temperature ranges reported
[49,59,60]

Emissivity (ε)

0.95

Head fire
width

100m

Wind speed
(V)

45kmh-1

Slope

0°

Separation
distance

0-100m

Within emissivity ranges reported [49,59,60,70] (and reflects
the optically thick flame of a significant wildfire head fire.
Consistent with that required for radiant heat flux
modelling of wildfire reported in AS3959 [49] and Penney
& Stevenson [50].
Average wind speed at 10m above ground (kmh-1) in the
open AS3959 [49]. Sensitivity analysis at 10kmh-1
increments. Note: only applicable to Scrub and Shrub fire
models.
Positive slope (aligned with wind direction) assumed to be
0° with sensitivity analysis at 5° increments across Forest
and Woodland vegetation at FDI = 80; Grassland at GFDI
=110 (equivalent to FDI of 80); at 45kph-1 windspeed for
Scrub and Shrub.
Radiant heat flux (RHF) diminishes with separation of the
receiver from the radiant heat panel. RHF is calculated at
5m increments from 0 to 100m separation.

Applying the parameters detailed in Table 6, a total of 90 simulations were
completed. As expected wildfire intensity increased with slope, windspeed
(V) and Forest / Grassland Fire Danger Indices (Figure 5a-j), which is consistent
with the principles of established wildfire behaviour.
Forest simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding
Performance Criteria 1 (7,500 kWm-1) and Performance Criteria 2 (10,000
kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 10 to 20, and Performance Criteria 3
(12,000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire Danger Index of 20 to 30.
Performance Criteria 4 (i.e. performance threshold equal to the mean
historical upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64,453 kWm-1) was not
exceeded regardless of the Fire Danger Index. By comparison Woodland
simulations on flat ground resulted in intensity exceeding Performance
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Criteria 1 (7,500 kWm-1) between a Fire Danger Index of 30 to 40, intensity
exceeding Performance Criteria 2 (10,000 kWm-1) between a FDI of 40 to 50,
and Performance Criteria 3 (12,000 kWm-1) being exceeded between a Fire
Danger Index of 50 to 60.

Echoing the results of Forest simulations,

Performance Criteria 4 (64,453 kWm-1) was not exceeded in Woodland
regardless of the Fire Danger Index.

In Grassland under equivalent

conditions, intensity exceeded Performance Criteria 1-3 prior to a Grassland
Fire Danger Index of 50 while Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded at
any Fire Danger Index.
To put these figures into context, Blanchi et al. [71] report virtually all house
loss from wildfire in Australia occurs on days when the FDI exceeds the 99.5th
percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions
considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger
Index greater than 100. Further, they report there is little house loss on days
where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50. This indicates that vehicle
protection systems designed to current performance criteria are unlikely to
be effective on days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in
the protection of houses during significant wildfire events.
The influence of windspeed on fire line intensity in Scrub and Shrub
wildfires is illustrated in Figures 5g and 5i. Scrub simulations on flat ground
resulted in intensity exceeding Performance Criteria 1 to 3 between
windspeeds (V) of 5 to 15 kmh-1.

Unlike all other simulations, intensity

exceeded Performance Criteria 4 in simulated Scrub wildfire, but only once
windspeed exceeded approximately 55 kmh-1. By comparison, Shrub
simulations in equivalent conditions resulted in intensity exceeding
Performance Criteria 1 and 2 between windspeeds of 5 to 15 kmh-1, and
Performance Criteria 3 being exceeded between windspeeds of 25 to 35
kmh-1.

Intensity did not exceed Performance Criteria 4 regardless of

windspeed in Shrub simulations.
Sensitivity analysis was completed to determine the effect of changing
slope across all vegetation structures.

Simulations in each fuel structure

were completed at 0° to 20°. When simulating the effect of increase in slope
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(Figures 5b,d,f,h,j), a positive relationship was confirmed between slope and
wildfire intensity (Table 8). This subsequently resulted in Performance Criteria
1-3 thresholds being exceeded more rapidly as slope increased. Increased
slope may also result in Performance Criteria 4 being exceeded where it
previously provided adequate protection.

These outcomes were

expected given the mathematical relationship between slope, rate of
spread and intensity detailed in equations 1-8.
Sensitivity analysis of intensity to fuel load in Forest and Woodland also
confirmed consistent increase of intensity as understory (w) and total fuel (W)
load increased (Figure 6). At a Fire Danger Index of 80 and assuming flat
ground, fire line intensities exceeded Performance Criteria 1 and 2 when
Forest fuels reached 40-50% of their default design wildfire values (w= 10-12.5
tha-1 and W= 14-17.5 tha-1) and Performance Criteria 3 was exceeded once
Forest fuels reached 50-60% (w= 15-17.5 tha-1 and W= 21-24.5 tha-1) of default
design wildfire values. Under the same conditions, Performance Criteria 1
was exceeded when Woodland fuels reached 60-70% (w= 7.4-9 tha-1 and W=
12.5-15 tha-1) of default design wildfire values and both Performance Criteria
2 and 3 were exceeded once Woodland fuels reached 70-80% (w= 10.5-12
tha-1 and W= 17.5-20 tha-1) of their default design wildfire values (the fuel
loads assigned in AS3959).

Performance Criteria 4 was not exceeded in

Forest or Woodland simulations at any fuel load. These results indicate that
whilst sparser fuels result in reduced intensity, vehicle protection systems
designed to existing performance criteria may still be exceeded, however
vehicle protection systems designed to Performance Criteria 4 would provide
a significantly higher level of firefighter protection.
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96Figure 5. Wildfire intensity by vegetation type

84Table 7. Relationship between slope and intensity, all vegetation types

Slope
Flat
5°
10°
15°
20°

Intensity factor
compared to flat ground
1
1.4
2.0
2.8
4
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97Figure 6. Sensitivity to fuel load - Forest & Woodland

Wildfire simulations (n=45) enabled radiant heat flux (RHF) to be calculated
at 5 m increments for 0 to 100 m of separation from the headfire for Forest,
Woodland, Scrub, Shrub and Grassland vegetation structures (Figure 7). As
expected, due to the mathematical relationships established in Equations (1)
to (9), radiant heat flux at each unit of separation increases with slope, Fire
Danger Index (FDI), Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) and windspeed (V).
In all simulations, regardless of FDI, GFDI, V, slope or fuel load, Performance
Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) and Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) were exceeded
for 0 to 5m separation from the wildfire front.

Historical analysis (Table 3)

identifies the mean flame length during entrapments and burnover resulting
in either injury or fatality is 10.6 to 15 m, with a maximum flame length of 45.7
to 76.2 m. This indicates vehicle protection systems would likely fail in the
event of protracted flame immersion associated with engulfment and
burnover during the passage of the headfire.
In Forest simulations (Figure 7a), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance
Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 14 m separation from the headfire at
a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 44 m at a Fire Danger
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Index of 100. Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm2)

for approximately 8 m separation from the headfire at a Fire Danger Index

of 10, increasing to approximately 25 m at a Fire Danger Index of 100.
As expected, the efficacy of vehicle suppression systems in Woodlands
fuels was slightly higher by comparison, Woodlands having less understory
fuel (15 tha-1) compared to Forest (25 tha-1). Radiant heat flux exceeded
Performance Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 10m separation from the
headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 30m at a
Fire Danger Index of 100 (Figure 7b).

Radiant heat flux exceeded

Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) for approximately 5 m separation from
the headfire at a Fire Danger Index of 10, increasing to approximately 17 m
at a Fire Danger Index of 100.
In Scrub simulations (Figure 7c), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance
Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 8 m from the headfire at a windspeed
of 5kmh-1, increasing to approximately 35 m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1.
Radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) for
approximately 5 m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5 kmh-1, increasing
to approximately 20 m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1. By comparison, in Shrub
simulations (Figure 7d), radiant heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 5
(15 kWm-2) for approximately 5 m from the headfire at a windspeed of 5 kmh1,

increasing to approximately 25 m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1. Radiant

heat flux exceeded Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2)for approximately 4m
from the headfire at a windspeed of 5 kmh-1, increasing to approximately 13
m at a windspeed of 95 kmh-1.
In Grassland simulations (Figure 7e) radiant heat flux exceeded
Performance Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) for approximately 10 m from the headfire
at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 17 m at
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.

Radiant heat flux exceeded

Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) for approximately 5m from the headfire at
a Grassland Fire Danger Index of 50, increasing to approximately 10m at a
Grassland Fire Danger Index of 130.
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These results again demonstrate that the operating parameters of existing
vehicle protection systems are likely to be exceeded well below the
conditions Blanchi et al [71] report are most likely to be involved in the
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98Figure 7. RHF as a function of separation from headfire: (a) Forest; (b) Woodland;
(c) Scrub; (d) Shrub; (e) Grassland

Sensitivity analysis (table 9) demonstrates the separation required from the
headfire (all vegetation structures) in order for radiant heat flux to fall below
Performance Criteria 5 and 6 increases with slope.

Similarly, sensitivity

analysis of understory fuel loads (w) in Forest/Woodland design wildfires
(Figure 8a-f) demonstrates a positive relationship between the separation
required from the headfire in order for radiant heat flux to fall below
Performance Criteria 5 and 6, and understory fuel loads (w). At surface fuel
loads (w) of 30 tha-1, and a Fire Danger Index of 100, radiant heat flux
exceeds Performance Criteria 5 (15 kWm-2) until approximately 45 m
separation from the forest head fire is achieved. Under the same conditions
radiant heat flux exceeds Performance Criteria 6 (30 kWm-2) until separation
of approximately 25m is achieved. The required separation from the head
fire for RHF decreases with FDI and w, with only approximately 6 m separation
required for RHF to fall below 30 kWm-2 at a FDI of 100 when w is 5 tha-1; and
10 m separation required for RHF to fall below 15 kWm-2 under the same
conditions.
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85Table 8. Effect of slope on reparation from headfire required before Performance Criteria
5 & 6 are achieved.
Slope
Vegetation
0°
5°
10°
Performance Criteria 5 (Radiant heat flux of 15kWm-2) exceeded

15°

20°

Forest (FDI=80)
35-40m
45m
55m
Woodland (FDI=80)
25m
30m
35-40m
-1
Scrub (V=45kmh )
20-25m
25-30m
30m
Shrub (V=45kmh-1)
15-20m
15-20m
20-25m
Grassland (GFDI=110)
15m
15-20m
20m
Performance Criteria 6 (Radiant heat flux of 30kWm-2) exceeded

65m
45-50m
30-35m
20-25m
15-20m

75-80m

Forest (FDI=80)
Woodland (FDI=80)
Scrub (V=45kmh-1)
Shrub (V=45kmh-1)
Grassland (GFDI=110)

40-45m
25-30m
15-20m
10-15m
10-15m

50-55m

20-25m
10-15m
10-15m
5-10m
5-10m

25-30m
15-20m
10-15m
5-10m
5-10m
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50
40
30
20
10
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99Figure 8. Effect of understory fuel load on RHF as a function of separation from the
headfire: (a) w = 5tha-1; (b) w = 10tha-1; (c) w = 15tha-1; (d) w = 20tha-1; (e) w = 25tha1; (f) w = 30tha-1

5.5. Discussion
The results of Phase 1 of the study identify that vehicle protection systems
designed to operate in fire line intensities of 7,500 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance
Criteria 1) could reasonably be expected to be effective in 0.12 to 0.36 of
historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate without fault
100% of the time (i.e. a reliability factor of 1.00). An increase in efficacy from
0.12 to 0.42 was observed when vehicle protection systems performing to
Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10,000 kWm-1, were considered.

Vehicle

protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity of 12,000 kWm-1
(i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to 0.47.
This is well below the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety systems
[32,40].

Increasing the operational performance standard of vehicle

protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded / calculated
intensity of 64,453 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result in an
increase in the efficacy of vehicle protection systems to between 0.62 to 0.81.
To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is
recommended that significantly higher fire line intensity performance criteria
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are adopted across fire services for vehicle protection systems.

Further

research

is

into

the

reliability

of

vehicle

protection

systems

also

recommended to determine the effectiveness of each system as part of a
detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering analysis. This will
help a better assessment of the required safety systems for firefighters during
entrapment and burnover and will reduce injuries or fatalities during wildfire
suppression.
The results of Phase 2 of the study further highlight the performance
limitations of existing vehicle protection systems.

Whilst the 95th and 99th

percentiles of Fire Danger Indices across Australia from 2000 to 2007 as
reported by Dowdy et al. [69] are illustrated in figure 9, fire weather in
Australia is increasingly worsening as a result of climate change Lucas et al.
[72].

As Blanchi et al. [71] report, virtually all house loss from wildfire in

Australia occurs on days when the Fire Danger Index exceeds the 99.5th
percentile in the distribution of daily Fire Danger Index for each of the regions
considered, with the majority of house loss occurring on days of Fire Danger
Index greater than 100. Further, they report there is little house loss on days
where the Fire Danger Index did not exceed 50. The simulations completed
in the study demonstrated Performance Criteria 1-3 (i.e. intensity of 7,500
kWm-1, 10,000 kWm-1 and 12,000 kWm-1 respectively) were exceeded on flat
terrain in Forest below a Fire Danger Index of 30; in Woodlands at Fire Danger
Indices between 30 to 60; in Grassland at a Grassland Fire Danger Index of
less than 50 (equivalent to a Fire Danger Index of 40); and in Scrub and Scrub
at windspeeds of less than 15 kmh-1.

By comparison, the mean historical

upper recorded / calculated intensity of 64,453 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance
Criteria 4) was not exceeded in any simulation, regardless of Fire Danger
Index or windspeed except for Scrub fuels once windspeed reached
approximately 55 kmh-1.
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100Figure 9. The 99th (upper panel) and 95th (lower panel) percentiles of the Fire
Danger Index. (image from Dowdy et al. [69], used with permission from the Bureau
of Meteorology)

Radiant heat flux modelling completed in Phase 2 demonstrated that
vehicle protection system Performance Criteria 5 and 6 (i.e. 15 kWm-2 and
30kWm-2) are likely to be exceeded in all cases of entrapment where flame
immersion occurs, and, remains a distinct possibility for significant distances
of separation from the headfire.

To increase firefighter safety further

research and development is recommended into vehicle protection systems
satisfying Australian Standard 1530.8.2 Methods for fire tests on building
materials, components and structures – Part 8.2 Tests on elements of
construction for buildings exposed to simulated bushfire attack – large
flaming sources [73],

which specifically identifies performance criteria for

prolonged radiant heat flux exceeding 40 kWm-2.
This study investigates the efficacy of vehicle protection systems as
currently fitted to Australian wildfire appliances. Whilst it does not investigate
impacts of specific designs or the effects of various water sprays and droplet
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size on attenuation, the study does identify suitable performance criteria for
future vehicle protection systems to be assessed against.

Building on

findings and recommendations by Roberts [74], Turco et al., [75] and SAI
Global [73,77] future research into specific components of vehicle protection
system design may further improve the effectiveness of various systems and
ultimately improve firefighter safety. Whilst data was collected across three
countries and over 40 years, it is also acknowledged that incidents in some
jurisdictions and fuel types are limited, particularly from Australia and New
Zealand and in shrub and grassland fuel structures. For this reason, care
should be taken when interpreting the findings in these specific areas until
further data becomes available for analysis.
The results of this study should not be considered in isolation, but rather
alongside the findings of other recent research [10-13] into wildfire
suppression strategies and the limitations of firefighters and the equipment
they rely on. A recurring theme within the conclusions of this research is that
when attempting to suppress landscape scale wildfire, it may be more
appropriate for fire services to consider early instigation of indirect attack or
defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and clear
communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at
the head fire are not defendable.

It is suggested offensive strategies

involving personnel and appliances should be employed with caution after
detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, secondary to the increased
use of aerial firefighting suppression.

Early adoption of this approach will

assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous
‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little
if any impact on the fire. Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the
approaching head fire and will assist to prevent unrealistic community
expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic wildfire events.
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5.10. Table A1 – Entrapments and Burnover Fatalities
Report

Vegetation

Country

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/oaklandberkeley-hills-1991

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/south-canyon-fire-fa

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/dude-1990

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/thirtymile-fire-fata

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/rainbow-springs-1984

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/california-1990

Forest

USA
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https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/station-fire-fatalities-2009

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/blue-ribbon-fire-fatalities-2011

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/mound-house-fire-1983

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/golden-gates-estates-fire-1985

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/cedar-mountain-1994

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/daddy-ridge-fatality

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/panther-fire-fatality-2008

Forest

USA

http://royalcommission.vic.gov.au/getdoc/1ef74588-457f-47ce-baa2-1c98f9fe10f2/TEN.132.001.0001.pdf

Forest

Australia

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/cramer-fire-entrapment-2003

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/yarnell-hill-entrapm

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/point-fire-1995

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/kates-basin-2000

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/esperanza-fire-fatal

Scrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/glen-allen-entrapment-1993

Scrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/cedar-2003

Scrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/tuolumne-fire-entrap

Scrub

USA

Scrub

Australia

https://www.dfes.wa.gov.au/publications/MajorIncidentReports/Major%

20Incident%20Review%20-

%20Black%20Cat%20Creek%20Fire%20 (October%202012).pdf
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298346129_Fire_behaviour

New

_and_firefighter_

safety_implications_associated_with_the_Bucklands_Crossing_fire_burnover _of_24_March_1998

Scrub

Zealand

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/county-road-u-fire-f

Shrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/shaw-fire-entrapment-fatality-2018

Shrub

USA

5.11. Table A2 – Entrapments and Burnover Injuries
Report

Vegetation

Country

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/blue-cut-2002

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/hochderffer-hills-1996

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/dano-1996

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/calabasas-1996

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/pechanga-2000

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/mendocino-fire-complex-injuries-and

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/shrimp-fire-burn-inj

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/seven-oak-fire-2007

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/lauder-1987

Forest

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/hyatt-1998

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/deadman-flat-no-1298-1979

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/jackson-burnover-2008

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/grizzly-canyon-1981

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/wagon-box-1999

Grass

USA
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https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/clubhouse-2006

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/nicolaus-fire-2008

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/dutch-flat-1996

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/klamathon-entrapment-2018

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/davin-road-fire-2010

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/bull-fire-entrapment

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/new-york-peak-2006

Grass

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/pine-fire-dozer-entrapment-2007

scrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/holloway-fire-entrap

Scrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/tanner-railroad-1999

Scrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/indians-fire-2008

Scrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/ridgetop-fire-entrapment-2012

Shrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/sadler-1999

Shrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/mackenzie-1994

Shrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/canyon-fire-entrapment-2016

Shrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/grassy-ridge-fire-shelter-deploymen

Shrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/old-topanga-1993

Shrub

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/maple-road-1987

Woodland

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/smokey-hill-wind-far

Woodland

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/jesusita-fire-2009

Woodland

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/hyde-1988

Woodland

USA

https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/flat-fire-entrapment

Woodland

USA
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Chapter 6 – RUIM: a fire safety engineering model for Rural Urban
Interface firefighter taskforce deployment
Associated publication: Penney, G., Habibi, D., Cattani, M. RUIM – a fire safety
engineering

model

for

Rural

Urban

Interface

firefighter

taskforce

deployment. Fire Safety Journal. 113, DOI: 10.1016/j.firesaf.2020.102986

6.1. Abstract:
Firefighting at the rural urban interface remains one of the most
dangerous activities undertaken by fire services internationally. Whilst there
is a significant volume of literature and describing methods for fire
engineering safety analysis in the urban environment, a significant gap
remains in the context of the rural urban interface.

To address this, this

article presents the Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM). An adaptation of
the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM), the RUIM enables systematic
analysis of firefighter safety during catastrophic and dynamic wildfire events.
When applied correctly, the RUIM assists the Incident Controller and Incident
Management Team determine whether there is sufficient time to establish
defenses at the Rural Urban Interface, and, provides additional guidance
regarding the suitability and safety of defensive firefighting strategies.
Ultimately, the inclusion of the RUIM as part of operational fire ground
analysis may reduce the potential for fatalities or injuries arising from
firefighting taskforces being caught in wildfire burnover.

6.2. Introduction
The suppression of devastating wildfires at the rural urban interface (RUI) is
an all too common problem encountered by fire services internationally.
During these disasters, significant intervention is required by fire and
emergency services to suppress wildfires and minimise their impacts at the
RUI [1,2,3]. When planning to suppress severe wildfire, a combination of
strategies may be necessary depending on the fire behaviour, availability of
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resources, accessibility and fuel structure [1,4-6].

The application of

incorrect strategies or sudden changes in fireground conditions can result in
firefighting crews being overrun by wildfire, known as a burnover [1,7-9]. In
such instances, unless the wildfire behaviour is mild, the risk of firefighter injury
or fatality is unacceptably high [7,9-13]. Whilst offensive strategies involve
actively combatting the fire, defensive strategies are employed when the fire
behaviour is too intense for an offensive strategy [1] or people cannot be
safely evacuated.
The protect-in-place/shelter-in-place defensive Rural Urban Interface (RUI)
firefighting tactic is typically utilised where communities and infrastructure are
located within or immediately adjacent to vegetation that will support
landscape scale wildfire behaviour [4,14]. It can be a high risk approach as
not all structures are defensible [4,15] or constructed to withstand wildfire
impacts.

‘Backstop’ RUI defense, whereby firefighters have their backs

‘against the walls’ of the structures they are attempting to protect, essentially
requires firefighting crews to position themselves between an asset and the
approaching bushfire front as illustrated in figure 1.

However, as we

reported previously [1,2] this type of suppression tactic may expose
firefighters to untenable conditions well in advance of the wildfire front itself,
and may be ineffective due to insufficient water flow rates.

As an

alternative RUI defense to this high risk tactic, particularly where structures are
constructed to be more resilient to the impacts of wildfire [16,17], protection
of the sheltering population may be achieved by firefighters sheltering inside
the structure until after the passage of the head fire and they can safely
extingish spot fires and reminant flames. Where evacuations of vulnerable
people or communities are not possible, for example the inhabitants of
hospitals, schools, aged care facilities and other trapped communities, the
shelter-in-place defense is a necessary approach.
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101Figure 1. RUI defense

A fundamental component of a fire engineering safety analysis is
understanding fire service intervention [18]. For Incident Management Teams
(IMT) and Incident Controllers (IC) to develop and execute successful and
safe suppression strategies it is critical they are able to appropriately analyse
and manage risk.

Hindering both fire engineering analysis and IC in the

wildfire context is a lack of formal evidence and processes to support
operational decisions within the operational wildfire fighting context [19-22].
Decision makers often have to rely on personal experience [1,23]. This is in
part due to the relatively new discipline of wildfire engineering at the RUI in
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comparison to traditional fire safety engineering in the urban environment.
In Australia for instance, following the catastrophic 2009 Black Saturday fires
in Victoria, the Building Code of Australia first adopted enhanced wildfire
engineering assessments and wildfire resilient construction codes and in 2010.
By comparison, fire safety engineering was incorporated into the original
Building Code of Australia released in 1996.
Within the context of RUI firefighting Incident Controllers must decide
whether RUI taskforces have sufficient time to respond and travel to, as well
as prepare for the impact of the wildfire head fire. Their decisions are based
on experience and assumptions supported by limited local information and
intelligence. In effect, there is an inadequate engineering and systematic
approach to the decision making, thus increasing the opportunity for error.
To work towards addressing the existing shortfalls, this paper builds upon
the Fire Brigade Intervention Model [18], and proposes the Rural Urban
Interface Model (RUIM) to assist the IC analyse critical information and
calculate required versus available safe RUI preparation time. Case studies
representative of historical wildfire events are presented to demonstrate how
the RUIM can be utilised by IMT to reduce the potential risk of firefighter injuries
and fatalities. In doing so, this paper provides the critical connection
between firefighting theory and practice that is essential within the
firefighting profession [21].

6.3. Model
The Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) is a quantitative model of urban
structural fire service operations for use in fire engineering analysis and is an
accepted verification method for performance based fire safety systems in
the Building Code of Australia [18,24].

Developed following extensive

review of existing international models, research into fire service operations
and consultation with Australian and New Zealand fire service experts, the
FBIM is reported to be “flexible enough to expanded to deal with all aspects
of fire brigade operations” [18, p4] with a primary focus on firefighter safety.
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The context of the FBIM is fire brigade operations within the urban context,
such as high rise and complex building fires and does not consider firefighting
tactical response work flow in the wildfire context. Based on Australian and
international RUI wildfire fighting strategies and tactics [4,6,7,25], the Rural
Urban Interface Model (RUIM) addresses this gap and represents the
expansion of the FBIM to the specific context of firefighting defense at the
RUI. The RUIM is detailed in figures 2-6 and tables 1-5. When completed,
the RUIM assists IC and IMT determine whether there is sufficient time for
taskforce’s assigned to protect life, property and critical infrastructure at the
RUI, subsequently known as RUI taskforce’s, to safely mobilise, prepare for,
and find shelter prior to the arrival of the wildfire and the untenable conditions
which can occur well in advance of the headfire front [1].
When considering whether there is sufficient time to set up RUI defense
prior to the impact of the head fire, deterministic analysis of Available Safe
RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) versus Required Safe RUI Preparation Time
(RSRPT) can be applied:

ASRPT is calculated by:

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

(1)

(2)

Where the distance between the headfire and RUI is the lineal separation
between the headfire and the structures under threat; and the headfire rate
of spread is calculated using appropriate equations for the vegetation type
and fuel structure involved, such as those described in [17,26,27]
Illustrated in figure 2, RSRPT is calculated by:
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

(3)

Where TR is the time taken for the RUI taskforce to respond; TT is travel time
(to a base, staging area and/or the RUI itself); THL is time to complete and
assessment of the immediate area and set up hose lines; TS is the time taken
for crews to seek shelter within a structure prior to the arrival of untenable
conditions associated with the wildfire front. Safety factors (FS) are included
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at each stage of the process. Each of these components are discussed
separately in this manuscript.
The main differences between the RUIM and FBIM are:
1. FBIM requires the firefighting strategy and associated tactics to be
determined. In RUI firefighting, the strategies are limited to either
‘backstop defense’ or sheltering within the structures. The RUIM
reflects this accordingly;
2. Wildfire suppression during large campaign wildfires such as those
in California [28.29], Greece [30] or Victoria [31] required the
mobilization of military, interstate and even international firefighting
assistance. Suppression efforts are protracted, lasting weeks and
firefighting crews will be drawn from many regions and are likely to
be unfamiliar with the operational area, particularly during the
escalation phases of the incident.

This results in greater

uncertainty compared to metropolitan structural fire response,
therefore some of the decision points and pathways of the FBIM are
not appropriate to the wildfire context;
3. RUI firefighting does not involve crews committing to internal
structural firefighting as structures actively on fire are identified as
undefendable [6,14]. Therefore external suppression of structures
only is considered in the RUIM; and
4. The RUIM also allows for Available Safe Time to Critical Points
(ASTCP) to be calculated, enabling critical components of the
response including wildfire impacts on access routes, evacuations
and other aspects to be deterministically assessed.

This further

enhances firefighter safety when responding to areas involving
active wildfire.
Similarities between the RUIM and FBIM are:
1. Both models rely on the systematic completion to determine the
total time to complete the required activities;
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2. Both models require the identification of the critical path, being the
sequence of activities determining the minimum time required for
the firefighting intervention;
3. Whilst neither model provides a definitive answer for the duration
of mobilization and suppression efforts, both the RUIM and FBIM
provide useful guidance for Incident Controllers when making
operational decisions; and
4. Both models can be improved with enhanced data.
One limitation of the RUIM is the presence of spot fires that grow into new
head fires well in advance of the original fire front are not automatically
considered due to the difficulty in accurately forecasting spot fire formation.
Where spotting results in new wildfires in advance of the original head fire
result from spotting, the ASRPT must be revised appropriately.

This is not

unique to the RUIM however as new fires within an urban structure require a
new timeframe to be established. As with any model, they are only one tool
firefighters and Incident Controllers can utilise to assist the decision making
process.

Field validation and current and reliable intelligence will further

assist to increase the accuracy of predictions.
For each of the RUIM stages in the boxes of Figure 2, separate flow charts
and associated tables are required to be referred to in order to calculate the
total RSRPT. Whilst firefighters will complete property protection tasks prior to
seeking shelter inside the building of refuge, the time available to complete
the property protection (shaded in Figure 2) is calculated after the other
stages as it is not in the critical path of completing RUI defense. To calculate
RSRPT, the Incident Controller or relevant officer should commence at Box 1
in Figure 3 and work their way through the RUIM until all time components
have been calculated.

The incorporation of safety factors and/or

percentiles into the RUIM is also essential [18,24] due to:
1. Fire safety engineering, especially wildfire engineering, being a
discipline based on complex science which is neither exact or
complete [18];
375

Greg Penney PhD Thesis

2. The potential for mass fatalities associated with firefighters’ convoys
being caught in a burnover [32-35];
3. The potential for untenable conditions occurring well in advance
of the wildfire front [1]; and the complexity of significant wildfire
events, the incorporation of a safety factors and/or percentiles is
also required.
As [18,p26] reports
“Fire safety engineering is a discipline based upon a complex science
which is neither exact nor complete. For a realistic result to be achieved,
informed approximations and expert judgement must be employed. In
order to ensure safety, appropriate margins are required in the analysis.”
To account for firefighter fatigue, varying levels of firefighter proficiency
and other uncertainties that can affect fire service response, utilizing a
percentile approach can also be incorporated into the RUIM. The mean
values provided in this manuscript are sourced from [18] and are
representative of the particular activity being completed within the stated
duration, 50% of the time.

Due to the severity of the consequences of

burnover, it is suitable to incorporate a greater percentile. For reference,
[18] suggests a 90th percentile is suitable, meaning a particular activity will be
completed within the stated duration 90% of the time.

Adopting a

conservative approach, the relationship between X percentile and k
standard deviations can be expressed as:

𝑘𝑘 = �

100
100 − 𝑋𝑋

(4)

When the distribution is unknown, for X = 90, k = 3.17 [18], however where
the average time is at least several standard deviations greater than zero, it
is reasonable to assume the distribution to be normal and for X = 90, k = 1.28
[18]. Using the example of an “officer size up” where the mean (μ) is 135
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seconds and the standard deviation (σ) is 20 seconds, the 90th percentile can
then be expressed as:
90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇 + 1.28𝜎𝜎

(5)

90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 135 + (1.28 × 20) = 160.6 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

Where the calculation involves speed as opposed to time, the equation
becomes:
90𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇 − 1.28𝜎𝜎

(6)

The use of safety multipliers or factors is also recommended. As [18]
describes, where the scientific basis for a well-established discipline is sound,
a relatively small safety factor (FS) as low as 1.2 may be suitable. In keeping
with the recommendations of the FBIM, a safety factor of 2 should be
considered for the RUIM. As opposed to applying a single safety factor at
the completion of the model, the correct approach to incorporating safety
factors is to apply them after each individual stage. This is demonstrated in
the case study presented later in this manuscript.
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102Figure 2: Rural Urban Interface Model (RUIM) methodology

This represents the time taken for firefighters to respond to the dispatch /
turnout message and respond to either the staging area, or the RUI to be
defended. It considers whether the taskforce is pre-assembled or must first
mobilise to the staging area from various locations.
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103Figure 3: RUI taskforce dispatch time flow chart.

Adapted from [18, Chart 3, p56]
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86Table 1: RUI taskforce dispatch flow chart explanation.
Box /
diamond
1

2
3

4

5
6

7
8

Adapted from [18, Table E, p106]

Description

Time (s)

This flowchart determines the time taken for firefighters to respond
to the dispatch / turnout message. It is the time taken from
activation of the turnout signal to the time when the taskforce
proceeds to the RUI to be defended.
The RUI taskforce assembles at the staging point prior to mobilizing
to the RUI to be defended.
When assembled at the staging area and wearing PPC, firefighters
receive their briefing and crew their machines immediately prior to
mobilizing to the RUI to be defended.
If the RUI taskforce hasn’t been assembled then firefighters must
first mobilize to the RUI taskforce staging area from their home fire
stations.
If firefighters are on station then they must respond to the message
to proceed to the RUI staging area, don PPC and depart.
If firefighters are not on station then (as may be the case with
volunteer stations) they must first drive to the fire station prior to
responding to the dispatch/turnout message. Once on station the
firefighters must respond to the message to proceed to the RUI
staging area, don PPC and depart.
Figure 4.17 details the flowchart used for calculation of fire
appliance travel times.
Time for RUI taskforce to respond = sum of times in shaded boxes
along chosen paths.

n/a

n/a
60* to
1,200**
n/a

90*
480*
to 1,200**

Fig. 4.17
n/a

*Sourced from [18, Table E, p106]
**Suggested realistic worst case scenario

This process can be used for determining both the time it takes for individual
appliances to reach the taskforce staging area (the area all crews assemble
prior to being briefed and dispatched as one taskforce), and the time it takes
for the assembled taskforce to reached the RUI to be defended.
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104Figure 4: RUI taskforce travel time flow chart.

Adapted from [18, Chart 4, p60]
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87Table 2: Fire appliance and RUI taskforce travel flow chart explanation.
Box /
diamond
9

10

11

Description

Value

Time taken for individual appliances to reach RUI taskforce staging
area (use greatest time). Also the process used to determine the
time taken for the assembled taskforce to reach the designated RUI.
If the response is along a defined route then the actual road distance
can be used (Box 11). If the route or the exact distance of a route is
unknown then the radial distance multiplier (Box 12) applies.
Use the actual road distance.

n/a

12

[18, p61] reports the radial distance multiplied by 1.5 provides a
reasonable approximation of actual road distance to be travelled.

13

[18, Tables F1-F5] provide typical fire service travel times for
different Australian jurisdictions. The average of these times is
provided in Table 4.18 and may be used where other data sets are
not available [18, p61].
Total travel time = distance travelled (Box 11 or 12) divided by
average expected speed (Box 13)

14

88Table 3: Mean fire appliance travel speeds, in kph.

Context

Melbourne

n/a

Actual
route (km)
Radial
distance X
1.5 (km)
Table 3

n/a

Adapted from [18, Tables F1-F5].

Tasmania

South

Average

Australia
μ

σ

μ

σ

μ

σ

μ

σ

38.8

12.8

45.1

24.1

36.6

8.7

40.2

15.2

city

inner 44.3

12.0

51.0

20.3

41.4

7.3

45.6

13.2

city

outer 60.5

16.2

43.9

18.2

42.6

8.8

49.0

14.4

Major city CBD
Major
suburb
Major
suburb
Rural town centre

-

-

54.9

25.6

-

-

54.9

25.6

Rural country

-

-

55.7

23.6

-

-

55.7

23.6

Travel through site

8

-

8

-

-

-

8

-

Note: other datasets from [18] included firefighter response times which are
considered separately in RUIM Figure 4
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to set up
hose lines for the RUI defense. It provides flexibility around the individual RUI
tactics that individual fire services utilise.

105Figure 5: Time to set up RUI defense hose lines flow chart.

Adapted from [18, Charts

7&10]
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89Table 4: Time to set up RUI defense hose lines flow chart explanation.
Box /
diamond
15

Description

Value

Time taken for individual crews to set up hose lines in
n/a
preparation for RUI defense.
16
The Office in Charge must first complete a size up of the RUI
135
and determine which properties the taskforce will focus on.
seconds
This is considered to be equivalent to complex wayfinding in a
structure fire context [18, Table K] and the time taken to
Table
gather information in an area >10,000m2 [18, Table L]. Total
4.20
135 seconds.
17
If lay flat hoses are used proceed to Box 18. If high pressure
n/a
hose reels are to be used proceed to Box 19.
18
Lay flat hose must be removed, connected and charged
Table
from the appliance. Guidance is provided in Table 5,
4.20
amended from [18, Table V, p110].
19
Appliance hose reel must be removed from appliance and
Table
carried to position. Guidance is provided in Table 5,
4.20
amended from [18,Table Q, p109] and is considered
equivalent to firefighter horizontal speed in PPC with
equipment.
20
Total time taken to set up RUI = sum of shaded boxes (16 + 18
n/a
or 19) along chosen path.
90Table 5: RUI defense activities and times. Adapted from [18, Tables K, L, Q, V]
Activity

Time (s)
μ

σ

Officer in Charge size up

135

-

Remove and position high pressure hose reel*

15.8

23.1

Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 65mm

39.4**

17.4**

33.3**

15.4**

20.3**

13.2**

18.4**

10.2**

diameter hose
Remove and connect hose from appliance to branch – 38mm
diameter hose
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 65mm diameter
hose
Charge delivery hose from appliance to branch – 38mm diameter
hose

*Movement speed of firefighter in turnout uniform carrying equipment [18,
Table Q, p109]
**Per 30m length of hose
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This process is used to calculate the time required for firefighters to seek
shelter in an appropriate refuge prior to the arrival of the wildfire front.

106Figure 6: Time for firefighters to seek shelter flow chart.

Assuming firefighters are only required to travel horizontally (i.e. no stairs are
involved) and firefighters move at μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3 [18, Table Q ‘dressed in
turnout uniform with equipment’] the time taken for firefighters to reach the
building of refuge can be estimated by:
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𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 (𝑚𝑚)
𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −1 )

(7)

Where Rd is the distance of the firefighters from the building of refuge; SF is
the speed of the firefighters. In the absence of available data it is suggested
that as a worse case credible scenario it is appropriate to consider this
distance to be 90m, being three lengths of 30m hose consistent with the
tactics of RUI defense reported in [6,14].
The time taken for a group of people (including firefighters) to pass a point
in a path of travel (corridor, aisle, ramp, doorway) is expressed as [36, Eqn
11]:

𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃⁄[(1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 ]

(8)

Where tp is the time for passage in seconds, P is the population size in
persons, D is the population density in persons per m2, k is 1.40, a is 0.266ms-1,
and We is the effective width in metres of the component being transferred
(door, corridor, ramp etc.). In the absence of alternate data, We of a door
can be assumed to be 0.6m and D assumed to be 1.9 persons per m2 [36].
Whilst the time available to complete property protection tasks (TF) is not
on the critical path for RUI defense, removal of proximal fuel from houses can
increase their resilience to wildfire impacts (Leonard, 2009; Blanchi et al.,
2006). TF is calculated by:
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

(9)

If ASRPT<RSRPT then Incident Controllers need to consider the high potential
for the responding taskforce to be caught by the approaching headfire in
the open, either on route or during RUI preparation.
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6.4. Case Study
In order to provide the pathway between firefighting theory and practice,
and demonstrate the practical application of the RUIM to a realistic wildfire
scenario, the following case study based on recent and potential wildfire
events in Western Australia (illustrated in figures 7-9) is presented:
A wildfire ignition is reported in the Blackwood State Forest in the south west
of Western Australia. Aurora wildfire simulation completed by the IMT predicts
the wildfire will impact Nannup, a town approximately 47km to the east in 3034 hours post ignition.

The fire will also impact the road between the

taskforce staging point and Nannup in 26-30 hours post ignition. For the first
11 hours suppression is unsuccessfully attempted through aerial firefighting
and the construction of containment lines. Community warnings are issued
and residents are advised to evacuate north towards the regional city of
Bunbury, however a large aged care facility of 80 high dependency residents
cannot be evacuated and a critical radio communications tower is also
located in Nannup townsite.

At the 12 hour mark the IMT determine a

defend-in-place strategy is required to protect the aged care facility.

A

request for a taskforce is issued however it is not known whether the taskforce
will arrive too late to protect the town.

The taskforce of 30 personnel

(including the Officer in Charge) will be coming from the regional city of
Bunbury and the state capital city of Perth. Bunbury is approximately 70km
to the north, whilst Perth is approximately 220km to the north (both distances
measured lineally). Whilst the Bunbury Taskforce is already assembled and
ready to depart to the RUI staging area, the Perth Taskforce is to be made up
of fire appliances from various metropolitan and regional volunteer fire
stations, including Lancelin (114km northwest of Perth) and Northam (90km
northeast of Perth). The crew of Northam have advised there will be a four
hour delay due to appliance technical issues before they can depart to the
Perth staging area where the convoy will depart. The IMT are situated in the
town of Busselton, 50km northwest of Nannup. This is also the location of the
RUI Taskforce Staging point.

To provide the IMT guidance, the RUIM is

applied. An overview map is provided in figure 7.
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From the Aurora modelling, the town of Nannup wll be impacted by the
headfire in 30-34 hours post ignition. It is critical however to acknowledge
the request for the taskforce is issued 12 hours post ignition, reducing the
Available Safe RUI Preparation Time (ASRPT) to 18-22 hours. The Incident
Controller takes a precautionary approach and requires the lower 22 hour
period to be used.
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 22 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

However, another critical point is also identified for the scenario, being the
available time before access road is impacted by fire, being 28-30 hours post
ignition. It is equally as critical to acknowledge this event is forecast to occur
16-18 hours after the request for the taskforce is issued. This is termed the
Available Safe Time to Critical Point 1 or ASTCP1 = 16 hours = 960 minutes.
The Incident Controller also requires 90th percentile margins and safety
factors to be applied where possible, except for the initial travel to the
taskforce staging area located well away from the fireground or any smoke
impacts etc, and requires a Safety Factor (FS) of 2 to be applied in all
instances.

Separate TR must be calculated for each section of the taskforce,
subsequently denoted Bunbury TF and Perth TF. With reference to figures 34, the process for determining TR for each section is detailed in tables 6-7 from
initial dispatch to arrival at the Busselton staging point to receive their briefing
and then table 8 from Busselton to the RUI staging point. The process results
in TR for the Bunbury TF calculated as 58.5 minutes and the TR for the Perth TF
as 637 minutes. When considering the two separate taskforces are to join
into a single taskforce to respond to the RUI, the greater value of 637 minutes
is applied.
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107Figure 7: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com
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108Figure 8: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com

109Figure 9: Wildfire scenario. Image source: Google AU earth.google.com
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91Table 6: TR Bunbury TF
Step

Comment

Time

1

Start of RUIM. Proceed to step 2.

n/a

2

Task force is ready to depart Bunbury but is not at the RUI staging area.

n/a

Proceed to step 4.
4

Firefighters are at their station. Proceed to step 5.

n/a

5

Firefighters dress, assemble, assimilate information and leave station.

1.5 min

Duration 90 seconds. Proceed to Step 7.
7

Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step

n/a

9.
9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a

10

Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.

n/a

11

Actual distance of 52km is used, 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’

n/a

and 42km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.

n/a

14

Travel time to taskforce staging area = (10/49.0) + (42/55.7) = (0.2 + 0.75) =

57 min

0.95 hours
End

Total Bunbury TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals

58.5

time to respond plus travel time, being 1.5 + 57 min. Equal to 58.5 minutes.

minutes

92Table 7: TR Perth TF
Step

Comment

Time

1

Start of RUIM. Proceed to step 2.

n/a

2

Task force is not assembled. Proceed to step 4.

n/a

4

Firefighters are not at their station. Proceed to step 6.

n/a

6

For all stations except for Northam, time to travel to fire station, dress,
assemble, assimilate information and leave station is 1,200 seconds = 20

240 min

minutes.
For Northam station, the stated delay is 4 hours = 240 minutes.
The highest value is used for the purposes of calculation.
Proceed to step 7.
7

Calculation of travel time to Perth base for Perth TF to form starting at step

n/a

9.
9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a

10

Exact distance by road is not known, travel times calculated for the two

n/a

stations required to travel the greatest distance, being Lancelin (114km)
and Northam (90km).

Assumption made that as all other metropolitan
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appliances are within 20km of the Perth base they will arrive prior to either
Lancelin or Northam.
Proceed to step 12.
12

Maximum radial distance from staging area calculated as:

n/a

Lancelin = 1.5 x 114 = 171km; and
Northam = 1.5 x 90 = 135km
Both distances assumed to include 10km through ‘major city outer suburb’
and the remaining distance through ‘rural country’.
Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.

n/a

14

Travel time to taskforce staging area is calculated as:

156 min

Lanceline = (10/49.0) + (161/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.9) = 3.1 hours = 186 minutes
Northam = (10/49.0) + (135/55.7) = (0.2 + 2.4) = 2.6 hours = 156 minutes.
As the Lancelin crew will arrive at the Perth base prior to the Northam crew
leaving their station, the Northam value of 156 minutes is the critical value
used for the purposes of calculation.
Proceed to step 1 to determine time required for Perth TF to respond to TF
staging area in Busselton.
1

No action required. Proceed to step 2.

2

Perth TF is assembled at the Perth base and ready to depart to the staging

n/a

area in Busselton. Proceed to step 4.
4

Crews are at the Perth base. Proceed to step 5.

5

Crews receive their briefing and depart. Duration 60 seconds. Proceed to

1 min

step 7.
7

Calculation of travel time to RUI Staging Point in Busselton starting at step

n/a

9.
9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a

10

Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.

n/a

11

Actual distance of 222km is used, 20km through ‘major city outer suburb’

n/a

and 202km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used. Proceed to step 14.

n/a

14

Travel time to taskforce staging area = (20/49.0) + (202/55.7) = (0.4 + 3.6) =

240 min

4 hours
End

Total Perth TF travel time to taskforce staging area in Busselton equals time

637 min

to respond plus travel time, being 240 + 156 + 1 + 240 min. Equal to 637
minutes.

This is greater than the Bunbury TF travel time and is used for

subsequent calculations.
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Now the taskforce is united, subsequently referred to as the Joint TF, at the
Busselton staging area, a single travel time (TT) to the RUI staging area can be
calculated.

With reference to figure 3, the process for determining TT is

detailed in table 8.

Noting that the Joint TF is now proceeding to the

fireground, the IC requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of
2 to be applied will be in effect. Importantly, the calculations demonstrate
ASTCP1 of 960 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925 minutes and the taskforce can be safely
deployed to the RUI with reasonable confidence that they will not be
impacted by the headfire during the journey. The total TT is calculated as
288 minutes.
93Table 8: TT Joint TF
Step

Comment

Time

9

No action required. Proceed to step 10.

n/a

10

Exact distance by road is known. Proceed to step 11.

n/a

11

Actual distance of 60km is used, 5km through ‘major city outer suburb’

n/a

and 55km through ‘rural country’. Proceed to step 13.
13

Table 3 ‘Average’ values used and 90th percentile applied.

n/a

90th percentile= μ-1.28σ, therefore major city outer suburb speed =
(49.0 – (1.28x14.4) = 30.7kph and ‘rural country’ speed = (55.7 – (1.28 x
23.6) = 25.5kph. Proceed to step 14.
14

Travel time to RUI staging area = (5/30.7) + (55/25.5) = (0.2 + 2.2) = 2.4

144 min

hours.
FS

Safety factor of 2 applied.

ASTCP1

For the taskforce to travel to the RUI without being impacted by the fire

288 min

front, ASTCP1 > (TR+TT). Using the forecast time of impact of the access
road and the calculated TR and TT:
ASTCP1 = 960 minutes
TR = 288 minutes and TT = 637 minutes, therefore TR+TT = 925 minutes
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Once the taskforce arrives at the Nannup RUI the time taken to set up hose
lines and establish the urban defense must be calculated. With reference
to figure 5, the process for determining THL is detailed in table 9.

The IC

requirement for 90th percentile values and safety factor of 2 to be applied is
incorporated into the calculation. The total THL is calculated as 10 minutes.
94Table 9: THL Joint TF
Step

Comment

Time

15

No action required. Proceed to step 16.

n/a

16

Time taken for Officer in Charge (OIC) to complete size up is 135

2.3 min

seconds = 2.3 minutes. Proceed to step 17.
17

The OIC determines that hose lines will consist of 1 length of 65mm hose

n/a

and 2 lengths of 38mm hose. Proceed to step 18.
18

Table 5 values used and 90th percentile applied.

1.7 min

90th percentile= μ+1.28σ, therefore time to remove and connect
65mm hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (39.4 +
(1.28 x17.4)) = 61.7 seconds and time to remove and connect 38mm
hose from appliance to branch / other length of hose is = (33.3 + (1.28 x
15.4) = 53.0 seconds.
Time to charge hose is the time to charge the 65mm length and both
38mm lengths of hose.

This is calculated by (20.3+(1.28 x 13.2)) +

2(18.4+(1.28 x 10.2) = (37.2+62.9) = 100.1 seconds = 1.7 minutes
Proceed to step 14.
20

THL = 2.3 + 1.7 min = 5 minutes

5 min

With reference to figure 6, the process for determining TS is detailed in table
10. The required time for firefighters to seek shelter prior to the arrival of
untenable conditions associated with the head fire are calculated in
accordance with equations 7 and 8, where Rd is the distance of the
firefighters from the building of refuge = 90m; SF is the speed of the firefighters
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μ = 2.3ms-1, σ = 1.3, therefore SF = 2.3 – (1.28 x 1.3) = 0.6 ms-1; P is 30, We is 0.6m;
and D is 1.9 persons per m2. The total TS is calculated as 6.3 minutes.
95Table 10: TS Joint TF
Step

Comment

Time

21

No action required. Proceed to step 22.

n/a

16

Time taken for firefighters to reach shelter, applying equation 6.

2.5 min

∴ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

90 (𝑚𝑚)
= 150 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 2.5𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
0.6 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −1 )

Apply Safety factor.
FS

Safety factor of 2 applied.

5 min

Proceed to step 23.
18

Time taken for firefighters to enter shelter, applying equation 7.
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 = 30�[(1

− 0.266 × 1.9)1.4 × 1.9 × 0.6]

Apply Safety factor
FS

0.65 min

= 38 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.

Safety factor of 2 applied.

1.3 min

Proceed to step 24.
24

TS = 5 + 1.3 min = 6.3 minutes

6.3 min

Equation 3 is now applied to determine whether there is sufficient RSRPT for
the taskforce to be deployed. ASRPT was previously determined to be 22
hours.
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 )

∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (637 + 288 + 10 + 6.3)

∴ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 941.3 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 15.7 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
∴ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

In this scenario, the deterministic analysis provides guidance to the IMT that
there is sufficient time for the taskforce to safely reach the Nannup RUI and
ready the defense of the nursing home. The calculation of RSRPT also enables
evidence based trigger points to be set by the IMT.

For instance, should
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spotting result in a new headfire that will impact the access road into Nannup
20 hours post ignition (8 hours after the taskforce request is submitted) and
impacting the Nannup RUI 26 hours post ignition (15 hours after the taskforce
request is submitted), then the revised ASTCP1 of 480 minutes > (TR+TT) of 925
minutes and the revised ASRPT of 900 minutes > RSRPT of 941.3 minutes.
Having completed the RUIM process, the IMT are aware that without waiting
for the Perth TF, the Bunbury TF RSRPT is 369.1 minutes (6.2 hours); and only 310
minutes (5.2 hours) if they are already assembled at the Busselton staging
area.

This analysis supports the IMT to enact the contingency plan of

deploying a smaller taskforce to the Nannup RUI as opposed to no taskforce
at all. It also supports the establishment of operational ‘go/no-go’ trigger
points to reduce the potential for responding firefighters to be caught in
burnover.

6.5. Limitations
Like the FBIM, the RUIM also has its limitations:
1. As a manual process it can be time consuming and complex,
especially when attempting to incorporate multiple taskforces and
rural urban interfaces such as those routinely experienced across
the globe. This may be addressed through the development of
spreadsheets or applications. Enhancements in technology that
facilitate real time incident data including Automatic Vehicle
Location systems, digital logistics systems and integrated fire
ground intelligence systems that can provide updated data for the
RUIM will also improve the reliability and accuracy of the model.
Future research including post incident analysis of specific
sequencing of events during significant wildfires across jurisdictions
internationally will serve to further enhance the RUIM;
2. Whilst the datasets supporting the RUIM have been previously
published [18], they are somewhat dated and are limited to the fire
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services of the eastern states of Australia. This stated, it is a model
that can be easily adapted to international jurisdictions utilizing
local data sets, an area identified for further research.

The

inclusion of larger datasets will also strengthen the model; and
3. The RUIM process / work flow was developed from existing fire
services literature. As new research continues to develop in the
field of wildfire engineering firefighting tactics will invariably
change. Periodic reviews of both the RUIM and FBIM are required
to ensure the models are current.

6.6. Conclusion
The RUIM builds upon the FBIM to provide additional guidance for Incident
Controllers and Incident Management Teams to assess the safety of
firefighters during taskforce deployment into areas containing active wildfire.
Incorporation of critical fire safety engineering concepts including
percentiles and safety factors assists account for uncertainties in wildfire
response, enabling fire safety engineering guidance to be applied in
dynamic environments of potentially catastrophic consequence.

By

enabling the deterministic analysis of Available Safe Times to Critical Points,
the RUIM also supports the development of operational trigger points and
contingency plans. In doing so, the RUIM provides the critical connection
between firefighting theory and practice that is needed in the wildfire
context. Further, the model provides a detailed, yet flexible workflow that
will assist in logistical resource planning for wildfire events.
The RUIM is not intended to replace the need for accurate and current
fireground intelligence and field validations.

However, as demonstrated

through the Nannup case study, when used by experienced and suitably
qualified wildfire engineers within the IMT it has the potential to assist
determine the suitability of firefighting strategies at the RUI and reduce the
potential for catastrophic injury and the loss of life associated with burnover.
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion
The studies completed in part addresses several of the critical shortfalls of
existing research and explore the critical link between wildfire suppression,
firefighter safety and urban design. In doing so they not only enhance the
guidance regarding wildfire suppression available to Incident Management
Teams and firefighters alike, but also provide new operational models and
analysis

of

protective

systems

that

will

enhance

firefighter

safety

internationally.
The Handbook of Wildfire Engineering (the Handbook) not only
encompasses the literature review component of the dissertation, but also
expands upon previous related research in the field. Whilst the conclusions
detailed in the Handbook address urban planning for wildfire resilience in
addition to active suppression of wildfire, it is ultimately important that the
relationship between firefighting theory and practice is recognized and the
necessary supporting connections made.

Wildfire engineering is in its

infancy. It is a field of complex equations, significant assumptions simplifying
the chaotic behaviour of wildfires and their interactions with vegetation
structure and geometry.

These complex relationships need to be

contextualized and communicated effectively to frontline firefighters who
have to put them into practice in highly dynamic and dangerous situations.
At the same time Wildfire Engineering is a highly political field which can
impact large numbers of the population who chose to live in areas prone to
wildfire impacts.

It is not a field that should be overly simplified nor

attempted by those without the necessary wildfire and engineering
qualifications.
The first study “Firefighter tenability and its influence on wildfire suppression”
improves understanding of firefighter tenability in the wildland context, and
that it provides additional guidance regarding required firefighter safety
zones. Through analysis of international thresholds and analysis of forest fire
behaviour using both McArthur and Dry Eucalypt Forest Fire Model empirical
models, this study identifies that even in moderate forest understory fuel loads
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of 15t/ha, an established siege wildfire will result in untenable conditions at all
Fire Danger Indexes within 10m separation of the head fire.
separation

from

the

headfire,

conditions

potentially

Within this 10m
resulting

in

incapacitating burns within 60 seconds of exposure have been shown to
occur in 95% of wildfire scenarios assessed. This will inherently place firefighters
attempting to suppress the head of a siege wildfire in grave danger in almost
all circumstances and represents a significantly greater “dead man zone”
than is considered in current literature.

It is important to note that while

these findings apply to all fires, small urban wildfires do not usually achieve
the same Heat Release Rates, active flame depths or produce the same
behaviour outputs as large established wildfires which may facilitate more
aggressive offensive suppression strategies and tactics within the urban
environment. When calculating wildfire behaviour in small urban settings,
the Vegetation Availability Factor detailed must be applied before utilising
the guidance provided by this research.
When attempting to suppress landscape scale wildfire, it may be more
appropriate for fire services to consider early instigation of indirect attack or
defensive strategies including safeguarding, evacuations and clear
communication to the community and other stakeholders that conditions at
the head fire are not defendable.

It is suggested offensive strategies

involving personnel and appliances should be employed with caution after
detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity, secondary to the increased
use of aerial firefighting suppression.

Early adoption of this approach will

assist prevent crews being inappropriately tasked to potential dangerous
‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be at great risk, but will have little
if any impact on the fire. Further, it will clearly articulate the severity of the
approaching head fire and will assist to prevent unrealistic community
expectations of fire services intervention during catastrophic wildfire events.
The second study “Calculation of critical water flow rates for wildfire
suppression” provides guidance for Incident Controllers in relation to the
critical flow rate required to extinguish large wildfire across a wide range of
forest fuel loads, fire weather and active fire front depths.

Perhaps the
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greatest ramification of the results is the need to reexamine the use of aerial
and appliance suppression in high fire intensity conditions. The use of ground
based appliances remains vital in suppression of wildfires. However, in both
forest and woodland fuel structures, and when faced with siege wildfire
behavior with active flame depths across the head fire greater than 3m,
increased reliance on aerial suppression may be required to deliver the
critical flow rate necessary to impact the head fire and have any effect on
the forward Rate of Spread. In reality of this will require greater investment to
ensure that fuel loads adjacent or near congregations of high value assets
are prevented from reaching the thresholds that support this level of fire
intensity. Fire services investment in improved technologies that supports
night time aerial suppression operations during periods of reduced fire
behaviour is also suggested.

Where aerial resourcing is limited, strategies

such as guiding head fire direction and pre-emptive line building adjacent
to existing fuel breaks such as major roads, supported by appliance based
suppression may provide enhanced outcomes compared to reliance on
head fire suppression alone.
The third study “Improving firefighter tenability during entrapment and
burnover: an analysis of vehicle protection systems.” provides new guidance
regarding the suitability of vehicles protection systems during wildfire
entrapment and burnover.

The study concluded that Vehicle Protection

Systems (VPS) designed to the existing intensity standard 7,500 kWm-1 (i.e.
Performance Criteria 1) could reasonably be expected to be effective in 0.12
to 0.36 of historical entrapments and burnovers, assuming they operate
without fault 100% of the time (i.e. a reliability factor of 1.00). An increase in
efficacy from 0.12 to 0.42 was observed when vehicle protection systems
performing to Performance Criteria 2, i.e. 10,000 kWm-1, were considered.
Vehicle protection systems designed to operate up to an intensity of 12,000
kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 3) demonstrate an efficacy between 0.12 to
0.47.

This is well below the expected efficacy of commercial fire safety

systems [32,40].

Increasing the operational performance standard of

vehicle protection systems to the mean historical upper recorded /
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calculated intensity of 64,453 kWm-1 (i.e. Performance Criteria 4) would result
in an increase in the efficacy of vehicle protection systems to between 0.62
to 0.81. To improve firefighter safety during entrapment and burnover it is
recommended that significantly higher fire line intensity performance criteria
are adopted across fire services for vehicle protection systems.

Further

research

is

into

the

reliability

of

vehicle

protection

systems

also

recommended to determine the effectiveness of each system as part of a
detailed fire safety system validation and fire engineering analysis. This will
help a better assessment of the required safety systems for firefighters during
entrapment and burnover and will reduce injuries or fatalities during wildfire
suppression. In conjunction with research into wildfire weather in Australia,
the results of Phase 2 of the study indicate VPS are unlikely to be effective on
days that firefighters are most likely to be actively involved in the protection
of houses during significant wildfire events. In order to maximise firefighter
safety during wildfire suppression, and to avoid providing firefighters
unrealistic expectations regarding VPS and other fire safety systems which
may contribute to firefighters taking unacceptable risks, it is recommended
fire services should include training on the limitations of VPS. This study also
suggests there may be steps firefighters can take in order to position their
vehicles in optimal positions to survive entrapment and burnover, regardless
of the presence of vehicle protection systems. This includes maximizing
separation from the potential head fire as well as attempting to position their
vehicles with the rear to the approaching head fire. In order to bridge the
gap between theory and firefighting practice, further research should be
completed in this area with results implemented into firefighter training and
wildfire entrapment and burnover procedures.
The Rural Urban Interface Model developed as part of this study provides
a fire safety engineering model for Rural Urban Interface firefighter taskforce
deployment.

In doing so it provides additional guidance for Incident

Controllers and Incident Management Teams to assess the safety of
firefighters during taskforce deployment into areas containing active wildfire.
Incorporation of critical fire safety engineering concepts including
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percentiles and safety factors assists account for uncertainties in wildfire
response, enabling fire safety engineering guidance to be applied in
dynamic environments of potentially catastrophic consequence.

By

enabling the deterministic analysis of Available Safe Times to Critical Points,
the Rural Urban Interface Model also supports the development of
operational trigger points and contingency plans. In doing so, the Rural
Urban Interface Model provides the critical connection between firefighting
theory and practice that is needed in the wildfire context.

Further, the

model provides a detailed, yet flexible workflow that will assist in logistical
resource planning for wildfire events. The Rural Urban Interface Model is not
intended to replace the need for accurate and current fireground
intelligence and field validations. However, as demonstrated through the
presented case study, when used by experienced and suitably qualified
wildfire engineers within the Incident Management Team it has the potential
to assist determine the suitability of firefighting strategies at the rural urban
interface and reduce the potential for catastrophic injury and the loss of life
associated with burnover.
The results of the studies presented in this dissertation should not be
considered in isolation, but rather alongside each other. A recurring
conclusion of this research is that when attempting to suppress landscape
scale wildfire, it may be more appropriate for fire services to consider early
instigation of indirect attack or defensive strategies including safeguarding,
evacuations and clear communication to the community and other
stakeholders that conditions at the head fire are not defendable.

It is

suggested offensive strategies involving personnel and appliances should be
employed with caution after detailed analysis of fuel structure and continuity,
secondary to the increased use of aerial firefighting suppression.

Early

adoption of this approach will assist prevent crews being inappropriately
tasked to potential dangerous ‘dead man zones’ where they will not only be
at great risk, but will have little if any impact on the fire. Further, it will clearly
articulate the severity of the approaching head fire and will assist to prevent
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unrealistic community expectations of fire services intervention during
catastrophic wildfire events.
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